Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

BRITISH RAILWAYS BILL (By Order)

Read a Second time and committed.

COVENT GARDEN MARKET BILL (By Order)

FELIXSTOWE DOCK AND RAILWAY BILL
(By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next.

CHESHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL BILL (By Order)

GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL (By Order)

Read a Second time and committed.

Oral Answers to Questions — POST OFFICE

Control of Expenditure

Mr. Onslow: asked the Postmaster-General what steps he takes to prevent unnecessary or wasteful expenditure by his Department.

The Postmaster-General (Mr. Edward Short): Control of expenditure is the constant concern of all levels of management and is exercised through a comprehensive system of financial, budgetary and operational management employing modern standard techniques.

Mr. Onslow: How does the Postmaster-General square that Answer with the fact that £3,000 was recently wasted in the Guildford telephone area in sending

out this sort of ludicrous information about the new price of telephone directories?

Mr. Short: This is not wasted at all. It is money very well spent. At the moment directory inquiries on the telephone cost us almost I s. each. We are trying to persuade people to use the yellow pages of the classified directory, because we find that the greater part of these inquiries could be answered through the yellow pages.

Mr. Bryan: On the subject of waste, would the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Bristol Siddeley affair showed up a quite astonishing incompetence in buying methods in some Government Departments? Is he absolutely—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. We must deal with the Question on the Order Paper.

Mr. Bryan: Is he absolutely certain that the commercial skills of his own Department match up to its very difficut tasks?

Mr. Short: Yes. I think that this kind of case could not occur in the Post Office.

"I'm Backing Britain" Postmark

Mr. Onslow: asked the Postmaster-General what instructions he gave regarding the introduction of the " I'm Backing Britain "postmark.

Mr. Edward Short: My instructions were for an early introduction of the postmark campaign, at the largest possible number of offices.

Mr. Onslow: What on earth are these words supposed to mean in this context? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that they cannot refer to the sender or recipient of the letter, who has no say in what appears on the envelope? If the Post Office is backing Britain not only should it not need to be told this, but would it not be more effective to do something to improve the postal and telephone services instead?

Mr. Short: If the hon. Gentleman is opposed to the "I'm Backing Britain" campaign, let him say so.

Equipment

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Postmaster-General what estimate he has made of the number of new jobs, in industry supplying Post Office equipment, will be created in Scotland over the next 12 months.

Mr. Edward Short: I have made no estimate. It is impossible to equate jobs in the telecommunications industry in Scotland with extra Post Office business there, as the industry produces equipment for other customers at home, and for export, as well as for the Post Office. I expect Scotland to get its share of the increased Post Office business which is going to development areas.

Mr. Hamilton: My right hon. Friend will appreciate that we in development areas in Scotland very much welcome this development. Does he also recognise that there are complaints in the local areas concerned that most of the jobs are for women, when jobs for men would be infinitely preferable?

Mr. Short: I realise that there are a lot of jobs for women in this kind of business. Next year we are increasing our orders for telephone exchange equipment by almost 30 per cent. and the greater part of this will go to the development areas.

Returned Letter Branches (Destruction of Articles)

Mr. Lane: asked the Postmaster-General whether he has completed the review of the rules governing the destruction of articles in the returned letter branches; and if he will make a statement.

The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. Joseph Slater): The review will be completed in about two weeks' time.

Mr. Lane: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making this review and for the very full apology that he has sent to a constituent of mine who suffered loss of valuable documents. Is he aware that this seems a very long time to take to review what was a relatively simple matter? May we have an assurance that the review really will go far enough towards eliminating the risk of any repetition?

Mr. Slater: I hope that we shall be able to achieve that. The hon. Gentleman will agree that we were right to obtain the views of our staff, people working in the returned letter branches, responsible for looking after this traffic and with practical experience, before issuing revised instructions.

Supplies (Procurement)

Mr. Bryan: asked the Postmaster-General what alteration in methods for procuring supplies he will make in the light of the report of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: asked the Postmaster-General if he will make a statement on the renewal of the bulk supply agreement for telephone exchange equipment for the period after 31st March, 1968.

Mr. Edward Short: The future arrangements for the procurement of exchange equipment are still being discussed with the manufacturers, and I hope to make a statement shortly. The Telephone Apparatus Agreement is not being renewed and we shall be seeking competitive tenders later in the year.

Mr. Bryan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that almost everyone whom one meets in the industry seems to have had access to the report by the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation? Is he further aware that it is a subject of immense interest to this House? Could we not have the report published, for our consideration?

Mr. Short: I have looked at this, as has my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who has answered a Question in the House about it. Manufacturers gave information to the inquiry on the basis that it would remain confidential. For that reason we feel that we are bound by this pledge to the manufacturers, and we cannot publish the report.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman is doing the right thing with vigour. Is he not aware that in the installation of telephones per capita we are dragging behind many civilised countries such as the United States and Sweden and even Commonwealth countries like Australia and


New Zealand and that the decision to ask for a year's rent in advance is not the way to catch up?

Mr. Short: I agree that the penetration of the telephone in this country for many years has been behind that of many other countries. We are beginning to sell the telephone quite intensively in many parts of the country, as the hon. Gentleman will see if he goes to this year's Daily Mail Ideal Home Exhibition.

Mr. Ellis: On the question of new contracts for procuring supplies, would my right hon. Friend note that the Prices and Incomes Board's Report No. 55 points out that distributors' costs are traditionally borne as a percentage of costs but that in some cases there is no need to increase prices because those extra costs have not been increased due to devaluation?

Charges

Mr. Bryan: asked the Postmaster-General if he will give an undertaking that he will retain Post Office charges until the House has had an opportunity to debate the forthcoming report of the National Board for Prices and Incomes on the subject.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: asked the Postmaster-General which telephone charges he now intends to reduce.

Mr. Edward Short: I cannot anticipate the decisions which will be taken in the light of the impending report of the National Board for Prices and Incomes. I shall make a statement in due course.

Mr. Bryan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many industries with absolutely parallel reasons for raising their prices as the Post Office have had their requests turned down by the Prices and Incomes Board? I ask him quite seriously what he proposes to do if the Prices and Incomes Board turns down his request.

Mr. Short: The hon. Gentleman would not expect me to answer a hypothetical question like that. However, no other industry in Britain has to find the sort of money which we have to find for capital investment. For example, over the next five years we must find £2,000 million. From where would the hon. Gentleman get it?

Mr. Gilmour: Since the right hon. Gentleman has said that some telephone charges are too high, does it not follow that these should be lowered—or can this Government only put up charges?

Mr. Short: I have said that one of the objects of the present operation is to correct the imbalance in the present tariff structure. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that over the years the charges have been tinkered with so much, with bits put on here and bits put on there, that they are out of balance. I hope that we can get them right and that they will stay right for many years.

National Giro

Mr. Jopling: asked the Postmaster-General if he will make a statement on the progress of the Giro.

Mr. Edward Short: The arrangements for setting up the National Giro service continue to make satisfactory progress, and I expect the service to open towards the end of this year as planned.

Mr. Jopling: Would the right hon. Gentleman tell us how it is intended to invest the money which will accrue and how soon he hopes to get £150 million of investment so that the interest rates will cover costs and the break-even point will be reached?

Mr. Short: That is another matter. If the hon. Gentleman wants detailed replies to questions like that, he must put down a Question.

Mr. Bryan: Would the Postmaster-General say from the surveys which I know the Post Office has been making what sort of number of customers it expects to have for the Giro in the opening year?

Mr. Short: At the moment we are allocating large numbers of registration numbers to business firms. Later this year we hope to start doing this with private individuals as well. The response to date has been rather better than we expected.

Telecommunications Industry

Mr. Jopling: asked the Postmaster-General if he will publish a White Paper on the implications of his proposed Post Office reorganisation for the telecommunications industry.

Mr. Edward Short: No, Sir. The only such implication, if the hon. Gentleman is referring to the reorganisation now in progress, is that responsibility for relations with the telecommunications industry is being concentrated in a newly created Purchasing and Supply Department.

Mr. Jopling: In view of the magnitude of the telecommunications industry, is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that it would not be better to set it up as a separate public corporation rather than lump it together with the Post Office, as is envisaged?

Mr. Short: I am not sure what the hon. Gentleman means. If he means setting up the postal side of the Post Office as a separate business and the telecommunications side as another separate business, that is being done. Managerially the two businesses are quite separate from broad level right down to field level, including the regions. However, there will be one board at the top—one Post Office Corporation at the top of the two businesses.

Post Office Magazine, "Courier"

Mr. Blaker: asked the Postmaster-General what plans he has to reorganise the Post Office magazine Courier, having regard to the loss of £45,661 in the first 12 months of operation to September, 1967; and if he will state the average loss on each copy sold in that period.

Mr. Edward Short: The Post Office contribution to the cost of Courier will be reduced during 1968 by £8,500 to about £37,000. The average loss on each copy sold in the first 12 months of operation was 7d. In 1968 this will be reduced to 3·3 pence.
Many large industrial organisations bear the entire cost of their house magazines.

Mr. Blaker: Would the right hon. Gentleman agree, that it is very difficult to justify running a journal of this kind at a loss when the Postmaster-General is seeking to raise postal charges? Would he give an assurance that it is his objective that this enterprise should cover its costs entirely and that if it does not do so it will be discontinued?

Mr. Short: I will give no such undertaking. This is money extremely well spent. The Post Office employs 440,000 people, and one of the great problems in it is communications. I believe that this new Post Office newspaper makes a real contribution to improving communications in the Post Office. There are a number of hon. Members present who are associated with firms in which the house magazine costs a great deal more than this and the entire cost is borne by the firm. In the Post Office, the employees pay 3d. for the magazine.

Satellites (Ground Terminal Stations)

Mr. Marten: asked the Postmaster-General how many ground terminal stations, civil and military, for satellites will be in operation outside the Communist bloc of countries by the end of 1968; and how many of these will be British made.

Mr. Edward Short: About 20 civil earth stations for commercial use are expected to be operational by the end of 1968. Two of them are British made. Military terminals are a matter for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence.

Mr. Marten: Is not this a very disappointing share of the world market in this most important matter? Does not the Minister agree that unless Britain has a properly co-ordinated national space programme and is able to offer to customer countries launcher, satellite and ground station, we shall never properly break into this market?

Mr. Short: It is not so much a matter of Government policy. It is, again, a matter of British firms becoming more competitive. The hon. Member will be pleased to know that Cable and Wireless has recently given two orders for earth stations, one in Bahrain and the other in Hong Kong. However, unless the British firms which are interested in this trade make an effort to become competitive, they will be frozen out of the market. They really must make a bigger effort.

A.E.I. (Research Facilities and Factories)

Mr. Moyle: asked the Postmaster-General whether he will seek to acquire the land and buildings of the Associated


Electrical Industries Advanced Development Laboratories at Blackheath, London, S.E.3, which have been declared surplus to requirement by the General Electric Company, with a view to integrating both the laboratory and the highly skilled research teams into the Post Office's research programme.

Mr. Dickens: asked the Postmaster-General if he will seek to acquire the General Electric Company-Associated Electrical Industries factory at Sydenham, London, S.E.26, to enable the Post Office to manufacture telecommunications equipment.

Mr. Edward Short: After careful consideration I have reluctantly concluded that I cannot take over either A.E.I.'s factories or research establishments.
The telecommunications industry's plans for expansion in development areas should be sufficient soon to satisfy my needs for equipment. As regards research, I am already committed to plans to concentrate all of it at Martlesham to improve efficiency and as a dispersal measure.
I shall, however, be very glad to consider applications for employment in the Post Office from any suitably qualified staff whom we can fit into our organisation.

Mr. Moyle: Is my right hon. Friend aware that that is a very disappointing reply, because if this research laboratory closes some valuable research teams will be broken up, that the staff concerned are completely disillusioned with the General Electric Company and that, in any event, the work will be transferred to such notorious areas of underdevelopment as Wembley and Coventry?

Mr. Short: I think that most of the research workers will be absorbed into the G.E.C.'s own research work, and we ourselves will be willing to take some as well. I do not think, therefore, that there is any employment problem. As I have said, the Post Office will concentrate the whole of its research from Dollis Hill and three other places on a 100-acre site near Ipswich on which work has already started.

Mr. Dickens: Is my right hon. Friend aware that whilst the latter part of his reply is helpful, the general tenor of his reply is disappointing in view of the re

marks in his speech to a recent telecommunications dinner about the need for an extension of pubilc ownership in telecommunications to offset the failure of private enterprise to supply equipment? Will he not reconsider the need to take over the small purpose-built factory in Sydenham for this purpose?

Mr. Short: The purpose-built factory at Sydenham does not make telephone exchanges, which is our great bottleneck, and it is too small to make them. It makes private telephone equipment. If we took it over, we should have to retool the whole thing. That would be a very long job and there would be no work for the men there in the meantime. As I say, in view of its size, it is doubtful whether that factory would be an economic proposition. If the Post Office is to go into the manufacture of equipment, it will not take over old factories which somebody else has abandoned. It will take over new factories and build things under the best posstible conditions in the development areas.

Mr. Bryan: Does the Post Office at present have power to manufacture?

Mr. Short: Yes, Sir.

Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough

Mr. Dalyell: asked the Postmaster-General if he will give details of nonclassified research work being done for his Department by the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough.

Mr. Edward Short: The Royal Aircraft Establishment does not carry out non-classified work for the Post Office. There is however an exchange of information on scientific matters, for example, concerning radio and satellite communication systems, via the Committees of the Electronics Research Council and by other channels.

Mr. Dalyell: With Dollis Hill, and Ipswich in the future, is it not making it impossible to take advantage of the work done at Farnborough in particular and at other defence research establishments in general?

Mr. Short: There is a very close exchange of information between us, and the last major work was that which appeared in the Follett Report at the end of 1963.

Capital Investment

Mr. Ridsdale: asked the Postmaster-General how much capital to date has been invested in the Post Office in the last 10 years.

Mr. Edward Short: In the 10 years to 31st March, 1967, £1,479 million, of which £663 million has been invested in the three years 1964 to 1967. Expenditure in the current financial year is expected to be £319 million.

Mr. Ridsdale: How much of the £2,000 million which the right hon. Gentleman said would be invested in the next five years will be invested in such projects as communications satellites and how much will go into extravagant schemes like local radio stations?

Mr. Short: None at all will go in local radio stations. The £2,000 million was for the Post Office. Incidentally, I should not have called satellites "extravagant" schemes. They are replacing submarine cables now. Apparently the hon. Gentleman does not realise that.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how much of the £660 million invested in the last three years was planned and ready for installation when the present Government took over?

Mr. Short: I cannot break up the figure, but I will write to the hon. Gentleman and give him separate figures for the three years, although he can see the massive build-up over that time.

Mr. Ridsdale: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the right hon. Gentleman to say words which I did not use, to the effect that satellite investment was extravagant?

Mr. Speaker: Order. We must get on with the Questions.

Letter (Misdelivery)

Mr. A. Royle: asked the Postmaster-General if he will seek to make an ex-gratia payment to Mrs. C. J. Parker in compensation for the consequential loss of £114 suffered by the constituent of the hon. Member for Richmond, Surrey, due to devaluation and the misdelivery of a letter addressed to Mrs. Parker.

Mr. Joseph Slater: No, Sir. To do so would open the door to an unlimited compensation liability which we could not possibly take on.

Mr. Royle: Would the hon. Gentleman look at this again? Is he aware that my constituent has lost a large sum of money solely due to mismanagement of the economy by the Government, ending with devaluation, and the inefficiency of the Post Office in the misdelivery of a letter? Will he look at the matter again and provide an ex-gratia payment for my constituent?

Mr. Slater: I have gone into this matter, and I have looked at it again to see what could be done. I must point out, however, that we handle 35 million items every day and, although only a small percentage is mishandled, we could not pay compensation for every unregistered letter which was delayed.

Mr. Royle: In view of the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Overseas Parcels (Size)

Mr. David Watkins: asked the Postmaster-General if he will increase the maximum permitted size of overseas parcels containing goods for export.

Mr. Joseph Slater: My right hon. Friend is considering how far we might be able to meet any demand for such an increase, consistent with our international obligations.

Mr. Watkins: Is my hon. Friend aware that the present limit frequently makes multiple packing necessary, to the general detriment of the country's exports? Can he tell the House what are our international obligations?

Mr. Slater: The position is that we cannot accept larger or heavier parcels for dispatch to other countries than we are prepared to accept from those countries for delivery here, except with the consent of the other postal administrations concerned. My right hon. Friend is considering how far we might be able to meet the demand.

Mr. Bryan: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that seems to be an extremely good supplementary question? Can he tell us why we will not accept bigger parcels here?

Mr. Slater: There is so much that we have to take into consideration. We have been carrying out different forms of mechanisation within the Post Office to deal with the parcels service, and all these matters have to be taken into consideration before we can determine whether there shall be a change-over.

Pensioners (Payment)

Sir R. Russell: asked the Postmaster-General what success has resulted from his efforts to provide alternative arrangements for the payment of pensions to pensioner, who would otherwise have suffered inconvenience, following the closing down of the sub-post office in High Road, Wembley.

Mr. Joseph Slater: I am happy to say that, as a temporary arrangement, pensions are now paid on Fridays between 9.15 a.m. and 12.45 p.m. in the British Red Cross Society's premises which are at 563 High Road, Wembley and opposite the former sub-post office. We are continuing our efforts to open a new sub-office in the area.

Sir R. Russell: May I thank the Minister and his Department for their efforts on behalf of pensioners? Will he also try the side roads as well as the High Road to see if he can find premises for the post office?

Mr. Slater: I will take note of that.

Mr. Marks: asked the Postmaster-General whether, in view of the increasing number of retirement pensioners, he will consider an increase in the number of sub-post offices or alternative arrangements for the payment of retirement pensions.

Mr. Miscampbell: asked the Postmaster-General whether, in areas such as Blackpool with a high proportion of retirement pensioners, he will review the facilities available through the Post Office for payment of such pensions; and, if necessary, if he will consider alternative arrangements.

Mr. Joseph Slater: There are currently about 25,000 post offices. Pensions are

paid at all of them and hte needs of pensioners are taken into account in deciding where and when to open new offices.

Mr. Marks: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that reply and I am glad to note from his Answer to Question No. 29 that he is taking care of this problem. I hope it is realised that many pensioners in cities have to cross busy roads. I hope that he will discuss the matter with his right hon. Friend the Minister of Social Security.

Mr. Slater: I agree with everything that my hon. Friend has said about this, but every new Post Office that we open means an increase in our costs, without any corresponding increase in revenue. We therefore try to strike a balance between the reasonable needs of the public, and the costs of providing the service.

Postal Services (Torrington)

Mr. Peter Mills: asked the Postmaster-General if he will make a statement on the postal services to Torrington, in view of the closure of Bideford Bridge.

Mr. Joseph Slater: Early morning mails have been delayed by about 30 minutes; but we are putting this right and I will write to the hon. Member about the matter.

Mr. Mills: My information is that the delays are considerably longer than that. As this area has already suffered enough in various other ways, will the hon. Gentleman at least ensure that the mails can be delivered on time?

Mr. Slater: We do everything that we can to meet that position. We have had to consider various means of rerouting mails and taking care that no community suffers because of what happened, but I shall write to the hon. Gentleman about this.

Postcodes

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: asked the Postmaster-General what will be the cost of introducing the alpha-numeric form of address coding system.

Mr. Edward Short: About £1,660,000 to code 75 major towns by 1970. Introduction of postcodes is an essential preliminary to the use of automatic letter


sorting machinery which will produce substantial savings.

Mr. Lewis: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that receiving a letter is a personal thing, and that this change to using a code instead of an address is an exercise which is not really worth the expense involved, in view of the impersonal nature of the new form?

Mr. Short: We are not changing to anything. The code is to be added to the address. This is essential, because it is the code which makes the machinery work. By the end of our mechanisation programme we estimate that the return on this system will be about 20 per cent.

Pillar Boxes

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: asked the Postmaster-General what proposals he has for changing the type of General Post Office pillar boxes at present in use throughout the country.

Mr. Joseph Slater: Much will depend on experiments beginning shortly with 200 rectangular posting boxes which will be more easily cleared and maintained; we do not, of course, intend to replace all our existing boxes.

Mr. Lewis: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in changing from round pillar boxes to square ones his right hon. Friend is putting himself into the position where he is not "with it" at all? Is not this going to be a totally unnecessary expense? These pillar boxes do not wear out. Why should we have to change them?

Mr. Slater: I always thought that the hon. Gentleman was in favour of progress. We have to consider the conditions under which our postmen work. In some cases they have to get down to ground level to remove the letters. With these new boxes they will be able to remain standing to collect the mail.

Oral Answers to Questions — TELEPHONE SERVICE

Public Kiosks, Northolt

Mr. Molloy: asked the Postmaster-General what progress has been made in providing additional public telephone kiosks on the council estates in Northolt, Middlesex.

Mr. Joseph Slater: The additional kiosks will be provided later this month to serve the Yeading Green estates.

Mr. Molloy: I am very grateful for that encouraging reply. However, would my hon. Friend note that there are estates in need of kiosks other than those he has mentioned? Will my hon. Friend give Northolt the consideration which it deserves?

Mr. Slater: Every application made to the Department for the setting-up of kiosks in various areas is given serious consideration. I know the great interest of my hon. Friend in this matter since as far back as February, 1967. I am delighted that we have been able to meet his request.

Decimal Currency

Mr. Eadie: asked the Postmaster-General the estimated increase in manpower in his Department because of the altering of public automatic telephone mechanisms as a result of the introduction of decimal currency in 1971; and if he will list the areas involved in the change.

Mr. Joseph Slater: We hope to make the change without any specific increase in manpower. Coin boxes and telephone exchanges in all parts of the country will be involved.

Mr. Eadie: I note with interest what my hon. Friend says about no increase being expected in manpower. Can he say precisely what the specific modifications involve?

Mr. Slater: The modifications will be to about 75,000 public and 150,000 privately-rented coin boxes which will have to be adapted to take the new coins. Equipment in 6,000 automatic telephone exchanges will have to be altered.

Equipment Orders (Deliveries)

Mr. William Price: asked the Postmaster-General what percentage of orders for telephone equipment is running behind the delivery schedule.

Mr. Edward Short: About 80 per cent.

Mr. Price: Is not that a distressing Answer? Would not my right hon. Friend agree that hon. Members opposite


could serve a more useful purpose by directing their energies away from abusing the Post Office and towards private enterprise, which is letting the country down?

Mr. Short: This is the major cause of our trouble in providing telephones and of the congestion in the system. In the 1950s, the demand for telephones in the 1960s was under-estimated. However, the industry has in the last few years made very great efforts, especially in the development areas. The crisis now is not so much one of capacity. The capacity is coming up to the point where it is adequate. The problem now is one of control of production and stores and I think that the industry will shortly get this in balance. I certainly hope so.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Does that mean that the right hon. Gentleman is no longer continuing his threat to import equipment because of the supposed slowness of things being supplied at home?

Mr. Short: If the choice at the end of the line was between utter chaos and importing equipment, I would not hesitate to import it. I hope, however, that the industry will not drive me to do that.

Mr. Bryan: To what extent can foreign suppliers supply this type of equipment?

Mr. Short: We are now using a certain amount of cross-bar equipment and I think that there would be a possibility of foreign suppliers supplying it. I repeat, however, that this would be done only in the last resort and that I hope that we will never be driven to do it.

Telephones (Manufacture)

Mr. Urwin: asked the Postmaster-General how many telephones were manufactured in 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1967, respectively; and what will be the estimated number in 1968, 1969 and 1970; and what are the respective percentages for development areas, including specific figures for the Northern Region.

Mr. Joseph Slater: As the Answer is a table of figures, I am circulating it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Urwin: I trust that, when the figures are circulated, they will prove to be helpful to the Northern Region. May I ask my hon. Friend if he is fully

seized of the vital importance of concentrating as much of this work as possible within the development areas?

Mr. Slater: Yes, and I can assure my hon. Friend that the greater proportion of the manufacture of telephones takes place in the development areas. When he sees the figures in the OFFICIAL REPORT, I am sure that he will be pleased with them.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Can the hon. Gentleman say what effect the fire at the Plessey factory in Yorkshire, causing £3 million damage, has had on the production of telephones?

Mr. Slater: No.

Following is the information:



Percentage


Year
Quantity
In all DAs
In Northern Region


1964–65
1,775,000
19
12


1965–66
1,400,000
17
15


1966–67
1,825,000
49
16


1967–68
1,525,000
60
9


1968–69
1,250,000
82
21


A reliable estimate for 1969–70 is not yet available.

Waiting Lists

Mr. Ian Gilmour: asked the Postmaster-General what is the number of applications for the installation of telephone equipment at present on the waiting list; and how many of these have been placed for over six months.

Mr. Edward Short: 131,200 and 46,000, respectively, at 31st January.

Mr. Gilmour: Particularly in view of the requirement of a year's rent in advance, would not the Postmaster-General agree that the figure is still disconcertingly high, and can he hold out any hopes of reducing it?

Mr. Short: It has shown that the year's rental in advance has nothing to do with it. In fact, the figure has gone up, and not down. As soon as the equipment supplies for the exchanges from the manufacturers are up to scratch, we hope that the figure will drop dramatically.

Kiosks (Commercial Advertising)

Mr. Cordle: asked the Postmaster-General why he has decided to stop commercial advertising in telephone kiosks.

Mr. Edward Short: Because the contract is coming to an end and I am taking the opportunity to review the position and will write to the hon. Gentleman when I have done so.

Mr. Cordle: Will the right hon. Gentleman say how much revenue the G.P.O. is likely to lose from this venture? Does not he recognise the usefulness of the service provided by commercial advertising, and does he consider that a proportion would be advisable in the service?

Mr. Short: I have never said that we are ending advertising. The Press statement was put out by the firm whose contract is being ended. The figure is wrong. The revenue is £100,000 a year, and costs about £25,000. I am reviewing the position. We also run a business, and have to do advertising.

Telephone Lines (Capacity)

Sir R. Russell: asked the Postmaster-General to what extent telephone lines are not being used in daytime and in the evening to their full capacity, and in which areas of the country.

Mr. Joseph Slater: There is normally some spare capacity outside the busiest hour. The general pattern is a high morning peak, a lower afternoon peak and an evening peak, but because of a temporary shortage of plant there is at present little spare capacity during the working day on lines linking some telephone exchanges, particularly in the Home Counties, the Midlands and the North-East.

Sir R. Russell: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether anything is being done to try to spread the load in those areas where the peak is too high?

Mr. Slater: The whole aim is to provide enough lines between telephone exchanges to carry the traffic during the busiest hours of the day without perceptible congestion.

Oral Answers to Questions — WIRELESS AND TELEVISION

Local Sound Radio

Mr. Hugh D. Brown: asked the Postmaster-General if he will make a statement on the progress of the local sound radio experiment.

Mr. Ridsdale: asked the Postmaster-General what has been the total cost of establishig local radio stations.

Mr. Edward Short: Of the eight stations authorised, five—Brighton, Leicester, Merseyside, Nottingham and Sheffield—are now in operation. The sixth, at Stoke, is due to open on 14th March; and the remaining two, at Durham and Leeds, by the early summer. On the cost and financing of the stations, I have nothing to add to previous Answers. I intend to review the experiment when the stations have been operating for a year or so. The right thing now is surely to let the stations alone to get on with the experiment.—[Vol. 756, c. 458–9; Vol. 757, c. 556–8; Vol. 759, c. 1750.]

Mr. Brown: Looking ahead, and being confident of the success of this venture, would my hon. Friend assure the House that the B.B.C. will not be starved of revenue, however modest it might be, to encourage the creation of other local radio stations?

Mr. Short: We shall have to wait to see. This method of financing the stations is one of the objects of the experiment. It looks as though it is going extremely well in some areas, such as Merseyside and Cheshire, where all the local authorities, including the Cheshire County Council, are co-operating, and less well in other areas. We shall have to wait for a year or so to see how the experiment goes.

Mr. Ridsdale: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many of us on this side of the House think that this is extremely extravagent Government spending and that this matter would have been far better left to private enterprise?

Mr. Short: I wonder whether all hon. Members on both sides of the House really think that. One of the great needs today is to improve the quality of communal life. I should have thought that nothing would have improved it more than a communal, publicly-owned station. I know that that means nothing to the hon. Gentleman, but a communally-owned station, tailor-made for the locality, can make a significant contribution to the quality of communal life.

Mr. English: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these stations have been extremely well received by the public in the areas in which they are situated and that there is not necessarily a conflict between public service and private enterprise if this is permitted throughout the country?

Mr. Short: There is no conflict between public service and financing them commercially. That is the distinction which I would make.

Mr. Bryan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many highly qualified engineers believe that the daytime use of medium wavelengths for local radio is not only possible but would be a great help to them? Is he absolutely certain that his own advisers are right in saying that this is an impossibility and there is no wavelength available?

Mr. Short: I have taken the best technical advice I could get, and I am assured that this is not possible. In addition, there would be the difficulty that as soon as it got dark one would have to switch to a different wavelength. But, apart from that difficulty, I am assured that the use of medium wavelengths during the day is not "on".

Television Act (Section 3(2, d))

Mr. Roebuck: asked the Postmaster-General if he will take proceedings against the Independent Television Authority for breach of their statutory duty under Section 3(2,d) of the Television Act, by allowing Lord Thomson of Fleet to appear in the Frost Programme broadcast on 29th November last.

Mr. Edward Short: I am informed that the Independent Television Authority has drawn the attention of the programme contractor which produced the programme, and of Lord Thomson, to the fact that there was a contravention of the Act. The Authority is satisfied that the contravention was inadvertent. This will, I think, meet the purpose of my hon. Friend's Question.

Mr. Roebuck: In view of the widespread concern in the country about the domination of most channels of communication by a tiny group of tycoons, can my right hon. Friend assure the House that he will use all the powers given to

him by Parliament to prevent those tycoons dominating the television screen? Is my right hon. Friend aware that, in the incident in question, my noble Friend Lord Wigg was enticed on to the programme by false pretences and subjected to considerable discourtesy and has there been any expression of contrition?

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot have the whole programme in a supplementary question.

Mr. Short: In regard to the first point, the contravention of the Act was not that Lord Thomson appeared on television. It was something he said. All of us who know him would, I think, acquit him of any desire deliberately to contravene the Act. I think that it was an inadvertent contravention. However, I.T.A. has now drawn the attention of the contract company to this contravention.
I understand that Lord Wigg has received an apology from the chairman of I.T.A. I very much regret what happened. There were two aspects of it. One was the appearance of Lord Thomson and the other was the appearance of another gentleman with whom Lord Wigg was involved in a libel action. I could not imagine any greater discourtesy than that to Lord Wigg. I am glad that I.T.A. has apologised to him.

Dr. Winstanley: While accepting the Postmaster-General's answer, may I nevertheless ask whether he is aware that many hon. Members believe that the restrictions imposed by the Television Act are too strict rather than too lax and that we would, therefore, prefer to see them relaxed rather than tightened?

Mr. Short: I should not have thought that the hon. Member would advocate that the proprietor of one of the stations should be allowed to express himself on a controversial issue of the day. This provision was deliberately put in the Act by Parliament.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: Surely, the prohibition in question is footling and it is time that the whole question was looked into and restrictive provisions of this sort swept away.

Mr. Short: It is not footling at all. It is something basic and important. We do not want television to degenerate into


the state in which the British Press at present finds itself.

Mr. Shinwell: Was not the trouble on the occasion referred to in the Question caused by the appearance of the editor of the Spectator, for which the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central (Mr. Ian Gilmour) is completely responsible?

Mr. Gilmour: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is at least a year since I sold the Spectator, so that his right hon. Friend is totally inaccurate?

Broadcasts (Distribution by Cable)

Mr. Gwilym Roberts: asked the Postmaster-General in view of the spread of television aerials and the inadequacy of existing master-aerial services, if he will take steps to establish a Post Office master-aerial system and piped television to compete with the existing firms in this field.

Mr. Joseph Slater: A system for distributing television and sound broadcasts by cable is to be provided by the Post Office in Washington New Town. Further developments will be considered in the light of this trial.

Mr. Roberts: Is my hon. Friend aware that the extension of public activity into the sphere of master-aerials would be very welcome on this side of the House? Would he accept that it is only by Post Office intervention that we can break the near-monopoly of the existing private firms and bring them up to scratch?

Mr. Slater: We hope that the experiment now taking place in the Washington New Town will prove to be the success that we think.

Mr. Bryan: As the Post Office has such difficulty in raising capital, would it not be ridiculous to go into the relay system business, which is notorious for its hunger for capital?

Mr. Slater: This is a comprehensive cable which takes not only telephones but also radio, television and everything else with it.

Television Programmes, Wales (Co-ordination)

Mr. Hooson: asked the Postmaster-General if he will seek powers to direct the British Broadcasting Corporation and

the Independent Television Authority in Wales to co-ordinate their programmes linguistically, so that Welsh language programmes are not appearing on both channels simultaneously and likewise that English programmes do not generally appear simultaneously on both channels.

Mr. Edward Short: No, Sir. I understand that the timing of Welsh language programmes is already co-ordinated to avoid undesirable clashes as far as possible; but that it would not be practicable to avoid the simultaneous presentation of English language programmes.

Mr. Hooson: Will the Postmaster-General bear in mind that it is extremely annoying to non-Welsh-speaking families to have both channels showing Welsh programmes simultaneously, just as it is annoying to Welsh-speaking families if English programmes are shown simultaneously? I have already given him an example of a simultaneous showing in one language.

Mr. Short: I saw the example on 14th February. I cannot pronounce the names of the two programmes, but I know them. The two broadcasting authorities have assured me that they keep in close touch about this. I think that the problem on the occasion to which I have referred was one of congestion due to a party political broadcast and to the Winter Olympics.

Television Licence

Mr. Wingfield Digby: asked the Postmaster-General, if he will undertake that there will be no increase in the cost of a television licence to viewers in areas which do not receive the B.B.C. 2 programmes.

Mr. Edward Short: I cannot anticipate any decision about the level of licence fees.

Mr. Digby: When can the people of the South-West, and indeed other areas, hope to get value for money in this and many other Post Office matters?

Mr. Short: This is not a Post Office matter, but a broadcasting one. I have looked very carefully at the question of a differential for areas which cannot receive B.B.C. 2. I have also considered a geographical differential. If the hon. Gentleman considers this, he will realise


that the only way of working a differential for people who cannot get B.B.C. 2 is to base it on the set, and have a higher licence fee for a set which can receive programmes on 625 lines, but many people in areas such as the hon. Gentleman's have bought a set of this kind, so this would be unfair. I am, however, looking into the question of differentials.

Mr. Bryan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that everybody will be glad to hear that he is considering this? In that we have broken through the differential idea on colour television, I think that this should be given more consideration.

Mr. Short: It is true, as the hon. Gentleman said, that we have established a differential with regard to colour television, but there are at least three other possibilities. All I am saying is that they are extremely difficult, if not impossible, but I am considering the matter.

Oral Answers to Questions — COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING

Sir Knox Cunningham: asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of his conversations with the Prime Minister of Canada, he will now consult the other Commonwealth countries and issue an invitation for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference to be held in London early in the summer in order to discuss Commonwealth and world problems.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): I would refer the hon. and learned Member to the Answers I gave to a supplementary question by the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) on 13th February and to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) on 15th February.—[Vol. 758, c. 1149–50, Vol. 758. c. 412.]

Sir Knox Cunningham: Will the right hon. Gentleman try to get a conference called at a very early date, and will he put forward for discussion at that conference such matters as the troubles in Nigeria, a settlement in Rhodesia, and the public relations of the United Kingdom with India and Kenya?

The Prime Minister: As I said in answer to the previous Question which I quoted, what is on the agenda is a matter for collective agreement by the 25 or so Prime Ministers concerned. Consultations are going on at the moment about the timing of the conference, and other arrangements. I have no doubt that all relevant matters affecting the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth's attitude to world affairs will be discussed.

Mr. Henig: If such a conference takes place, will my right hon. Friend consider putting forward the proposal that Commonwealth countries should cease to supply arms to the parties involved in the Nigeria conflict?

The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend will be aware, I have been in touch with a number of Commonwealth Prime Ministers about this, and my right hon. Friend has had continuing contact with the Nigerian problem. I do not think that it would help at this stage to go further into what has been said and done in these consultations.

Mr. Heath: Can the Prime Minister say what discussions are going on now between the Government and Commonwealth Governments about the Commonwealth Immigrants Act? If there is not general agreement about a Commonwealth Conference, will he consider holding a meeting at a lower level than Prime Minister to examine afresh the whole concept of United Kingdom and colonial citizenship, and so on?

The Prime Minister: I think that that is an important suggestion. As the right hon. Gentleman will be aware, my right hon. Friend has been in close touch with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers most directly concerned, and, indeed, so have I. We will consider whether this is a matter for discussion at or in the surroundings of a Commonwealth Conference, or whether some other meeting ought to be held.

Oral Answers to Questions — DEVALUATION

Sir Knox Cunningham: asked the Prime Minister what steps he is taking to ensure the co-ordination between Ministers with responsibilities for ensuring the protection of the less well-off members of the community from the effects of devaluation.

The Prime Minister: No new steps are needed, Sir, because my right hon. Friends already work very closely together on these matters.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Can the right hon. Gentleman deny that there was a conflict between the two statements in his broadcast of 19th November, namely, that the pound in the pocket has not been devalued, and that some of our basic food prices would rise. Will he take this opportunity publicly to deny one or other of those statements?

The Prime Minister: I think that we have been over this a number of times in the House. The hon. Gentleman cannot have heard the answers that I gave on this question on Tuesday.

Sir Knox Cunningham: I was here, and I heard them.

The Prime Minister: I said clearly in that broadcast that prices would rise. I also said that safeguards were needed to prevent prices rising which were not due to devaluation. I said that action would have to be taken to help the less well-off sections of the community. I stand by those statements.

Mr. Maudling: But does the right hon. Gentleman recall that, in reply to my question on Tuesday, he tried to avoid the issue by quoting only one part of his self-contradictory broadcast? Since the Government now accept an estimate of a 7½ per cent. increase in prices this year, does he still regard this as consistent with talking about not devaluing the pound in our pockets?

The Prime Minister: No such figure has been accepted by the Government so far as prices are concerned. With regard to the earlier statement, my statement was true in the broadcast, that the action of that Saturday night had not devalued pounds in pockets, bank accounts or—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—it had not; it was perfectly clear, despite the legend which right hon. Gentlemen have tried to perpetuate. I said that prices would rise. I thought it right to say that, because it was a realistic assessment of the consequences of devaluation.

Mr. Barnett: If we are equating price increases with devaluation, would my right hon. Friend tell us how many times there was devaluation in the previous 13

years? If we are really to help those who are slightly above the supplementary benefit level, would he consider raising the starting point for rate rebates, thus helping people in that direction?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will know that, in the statement on 16th January, we announced not only a forthcoming increase in the supplementary benefit but an improvement in the starting point for rate rebates.

Mr. Heath: If the right hon. Gentleman were doing that telecast again, would he put the "pound in your pocket" sentence in?

The Prime Minister: As a matter of accuracy, yes, but recognising the truth of Kipling's quotation,
If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken
Twisted by knaves to make a trap for tools
perhaps not. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Sir Knox Cunningham: On a point of order. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I will raise the matter again.

Oral Answers to Questions — CONSUMER PROTECTION

Mrs. Joyce Butler: asked the Prime Minister what arrangements he is making to co-ordinate the consumer protection work of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Health, the Department of Education and Science and the Home Office.

The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friends work closely together on this as on other matters and no new arrangements are needed, Sir.

Mrs. Butler: Will my right hon. Friend accept that this arrangement is out of date today, when there are complex matters like labelling spread over three Ministries, with separate legislation, and that consumer protection is the Cinderella of all these Departments? Will he appoint a Minister of Consumer Welfare when he reorganises the Government?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will be aware of the great importance which we attach to consumer protection and the work which has been done and,


of course, the Bill which hon. Members will soon be able to debate in greater detail, but, of course, there is a difference in the labelling problems in respect of chemists' preparations, for example, with which the Ministry of Health is concerned, in respect of food and the quality of food, and on the question of misleading descriptions in the matter of textiles or household goods. It is right that the Departments responsible for these should be responsible for consumer protection, under the general guidance of the President of the Board of Trade, who is, of course, the Minister for consumer protection.

Oral Answers to Questions — WOMEN (ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BOARD)

Mrs. Joyce Butler: asked the Prime Minister if he will mark the 50th anniversary of women's franchise by taking steps to appoint an anti-discrimination board to which cases of discrimination against women can be referred.

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend's idea is an interesting one and if she would care to let me have detailed proposals I would be happy to have them examined.

Mrs. Butler: Is my right hon. Friend aware that women are fed up with being exploited as pretty birds when they are young and as "silly moos" when they get older as a substitute for equal human rights now, and that there is need for a board of this kind to which cases of sex discrimination can be referred if needed?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend must be responsible for the choice of the words which she uses and she will know that Mr. Alf Garnett is not a fully paid-up member of the Labour Party. On discrimination, what I think my hon. Friend is concerned about—as are my right hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench—is the question of discrimination in appointments and other matters, where there is still a long way to go. That is why I look forward with interest to receiving her detailed proposals.

Dame Irene Ward: I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman for not having heard very well what he was trying to mumble. Would he be kind enough to confirm that detailed proposals have

gone to him to end discrimination against women? Can he assure us that these will be carried out this year without further delay?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Lady courteously responded to my invitation to send me proposals, but since, for the greater part, they involve tax changes, she will probably think it right that they should go first to the Chancellor of the Exchequer—

Dame Irene Ward: They have.

The Prime Minister: —and, secondly, she will understand that I do not want to anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget Statement.

Mrs. Lena Jeger: Why does my right hon. Friend keep asking for letters from hon. Ladies? Will he accept my assurance that hon. Ladies would much more appreciate early action on the subject of equal pay rather than be put to the trouble of sending him any more useless letters?

The Prime Minister: I hope that the letter which I will get from my hon. Friend on this question will not be useless but productive and constructive. The answer to her first question is that I like getting letters from lady Members, but if she feels that these matters could be better discussed by personal interview, of course I would like that even more.

Mr. C. Pannell: On a point of order. With great respect, Mr. Speaker, does your selection entirely of ladies to ask supplementary questions on this Question indicate a degree of discrimination from the Chair?

Mr. Speaker: Yes, I am afraid it does.

Oral Answers to Questions — SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (SPEECH)

Mr. Lane: asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech by the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to the Cambridge University Democratic Labour Club on 9th February, on economic policy, represents Government policy.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Lane: As the Secretary of State spoke enthusiastically about increasing


Government intervention in industry, would the right hon. Gentleman not accept that industry is fearful of more intervention by this Government and that continuing talk of this kind by Ministers will only set back further the return of industrial confidence?

The Prime Minister: I remember exactly the same arguments being used, only at much greater length, in the debates on the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation Bill, but now even the hon. Gentlemen who used them will, I think, be extremely happy about the achievements of the I.R.C.

Mr. McNamara: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that the Report of the Wilson Committee into Bristol Siddeley indicates that we should perhaps have more Government intervention in industry?

The Prime Minister: That raises other issues, with which my right hon. Friend has dealt. That was, of course, the question of the degree of cost control operated by right hon. Gentlemen opposite in the matter of certain contracts, and, of course, the House by this time will have had time to study the Report on that stewardship.

Sir C. Osborne: The right hon. Gentleman just boasted about the work of the I.R.C. Is he proud that, as a result of that work, the Woolwich factory has been closed, to the great disappointment of his colleagues who want to see more employment created?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Member will know that that is one of the inevitable consequences of mergers designed to increase efficiency, but he will know also that his fellow trade unionists, since long before he joined the fold, have been pressing for much more consultation and much earlier notification when men's jobs are involved. As he heard me say the other day, I feel that there is a need for a code of conduct in these matters of mergers involving notification not only of the unions and the work-people immediately concerned but also of the Government Departments and the chairman of the regional economic planning council concerned.

Mr. Hannan: If my right hon. Friend is in any doubt about the value of Government intervention, will he visit

Fairfields and ask the 2,000 workers there whether their jobs are safe or not?

The Prime Minister: I am well aware, on this as on so many other questions in the industrial and economic fields, that, while there was a spate of questions and criticisms at the time, hon. Gentlemen opposite are now very slow to ask what is happening at Fairfields.

Mr. Peyton: To return to the speech to which the Question refers, would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that for his right hon. Friend to say that devaluation was a stick of dynamite which had been used to blow the prison gates open was going a bit far down the road of exaggeration and extravaganza which we expect from him?

The Prime Minister: Hon. and right hon. Members are, of course, in all cases, responsible for the metaphors and imagery they use. I should have thought that, in view of the opportunities, as well as the problems, which devaluation creates, that was not an inappropriate form of words to use.

Mr. Dickens: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his remarks today about the need for a code of conduct for the private sector will be warmly welcomed on this side of the House, particularly since that sector is getting £2 million a day of taxpayers' money in Government subsidies? When may we receive a Government statement about this code of conduct?

The Prime Minister: I am glad that my hon. Friend feels that my remarks are worthy of that somewhat belated welcome, remembering that I said it last week. We are, of course, entering into discussions with those concerned in industry to see what can be done to work out a viable code of conduct between industry and ourselves.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We must get on.

RHODESIA

Mr. Molloy: asked the Prime Minister if he will now make a further statement on Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister: With permission, Mr. Speaker, I would now like to answer Question No. 6.
As the House knows, my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary yesterday undertook that a further statement would be made about Rhodesia as soon as the Government had reviewed the situation arising from the events of the past few days. The House will wish to know that, in addition to the promised expression of the Government's view, which will be made available as soon as possible, discussions are taking place through the usual channels about the most appropriate arrangements to enable the House as a whole to express its opinion on these matters.

Mr. Molloy: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this whole matter is now a test for Britain, for the British Parliament and for the whole concept of the British Commonwealth, and that if some action is not taken we shall not merely be condoning murder, but legalising lynch law—of which, I hope, all hon. Gentlemen opposite disapprove? Will my right hon. Friend consider calling an emergency meeting of the Commonwealth to take some kind of action to bring down this régime, for unless this is done swiftly the blood that has been let loose this week might result in a blood bath which I warn my right hon. Friend could take place in Africa because of the vulgar actions of this illegal régime?

The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend said, this is a matter, first of all, for Parliament, and I would have thought that the reaction of all hon. Members in all parts of the House in the past three days has shown the sense of shock and horror which is felt in this House.
To answer my hon. Friend's question about the Commonwealth, my right hon. Friend and I are, of course, getting in touch with Commonwealth Prime Ministers because these are matters of deep concern to the whole Commonwealth, but I am far from convinced that, at this stage at any rate, an emergency meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers would be the right way to handle this matter. My hon. Friend will be aware that the matter has now been brought before the Security Council, so that it has become, as one must have expected, a matter for deep international concern.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Having been critical of the Commonwealth Office

from time to time, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he is aware that some, at least, of my hon. Friends very much welcome the tone of the statement issued by the Commonwealth Office and made public in the Press; on, for example, the front page of The Times this morning?

The Prime Minister: I would want to look again at that particular point because my right hon. Friend is, I understand, not quite sure to which statement the hon. Gentleman is referring. [Interruption.] This is no laughing matter, and I hope that even the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) would agree. Certainly my right hon. Friend and I very much appreciate what the hon. Gentleman has said about the Commonwealth Office, and I know that it has been the view in all parts of the House that, in this very difficult situation, my right hon. Friend has conducted himself not only with great firmness but also with dignity.

Mr. Gardner: In view of Press reports today of some most unfair comments at the United Nations on Her Majesty's Government, and while appreciating that my right hon. Friend faces this diplomatic difficulty in tackling this problem, would not my right hon. Friend think that an emergency meeting of Commonwealth heads might be worth while, if only to allay this sort of criticism?

The Prime Minister: I have made it clear that if this were thought by the Commonwealth to be the right way of dealing with the immediate problem, then it would naturally be something which we would want to consider. I am not yet convinced, however, that it would be the right answer. However, we will maintain the very closest contact with all our Commonwealth partners. I am, of couse, well aware, as is the House, of the deep feeling which exists in Commonwealth countries, particularly in African Commonwealth countries—but by no means exclusively them—and we will have to see what emerges from our consultations with them.

Sir C. Taylor: Did the right hon. Gentleman read the column in the Daily Mirror this morning, written by George Gale, which I believe considerably reflects the attitude of many people in this country?

The Prime Minister: I would be sorry to think that it expresses the attitude of many people, or of any hon. Member of this House.

Mr. Manuel: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the great anxiety that exists in many quarters in Britain, arising from the murder of the three Africans, because of the fact that more than 100 other Africans in Southern Rhodesia are presently in prison with the death sentence hanging over them? Is he aware that unless something tangible is done resulting from the action that has taken place, we may be placing the lives of these 100 Africans in jeopardy?

The Prime Minister: The question of the other 100 who lie under sentence of death, many of them having spent very long periods in the death cell, must, of course, be a matter of deep concern to all who have any responsibility in dealing with this question—by no means all of them for murder; many are under mandatory death sentences under the repressive legislation in Salisbury. It is precisely for that reason that I appealed yesterday for some restraint, whether in action or words. Despite the natural desire of my hon. Friends—indeed, of us all—to find some way immediately of hitting back, I do not recommend that we should seek to deal with this situation by gestures which, however self-satisfying, are ineffective and meaningless. We must look at the whole deep lesson of the last three years, which came to a head this week—to the fact that, so far as some of these people are concerned, what we have been dealing with, even negotiating with and fighting, is essentially evil, and the House must recognise that this is so.

Mr. Hirst: While welcoming the Prime Minister's assurance that before making a further statement he will look at the matter in the full concept of the total period of three years, will he include in that the grave burden of responsibility which rests on the Government by way of their gross mismanagement of this problem from beginning to end?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman is entitled to his views on these matters. We do not accept his strictures. Looking back, if there is one part of our record in this matter where I think that we took very great risks, it was to

offer to men of that character the right of independence and self-determination, without majority rule applying, and in circumstances where we would have had to trust their word as to the operation of the rule of law on an agreed constitution. What appalled us all—including, I hope, the hon. Gentleman—was the affidavit by Lardner Burke, which said that whatever the highest court of all, the Privy Council, decided, he would take no notice of it but would go ahead and hang them—a direct flouting of the rule of law, with which this House must he concerned.

Mr. C. Pannell: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind that the tragedy we have been witnessing is that quite humble people have been used by personally-minded men for ends which were base ones? When considering that, will he consider the position of the Governor, who has been in the forefront of this agitation, and consider whether it is not now time to remove him from the exposed position which he holds so that we can deal with this frontally between London and Rhodesia if need be?

The Prime Minister: I know that the whole House will want to pay tribute to the steadfastness of the Governor over these three years in a very lonely exposed position, for the wise advice he has been able to tender and the essential link he has provided, but it perhaps underrates the determination of the Governor to suggest that he would want such a suggestion to be made at this time. He is now in one sense more exposed and lonely than ever and he has the bitterness of realising how much he has been let down by those he trusted.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Following the question asked by the right hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell), can the Prime Minister say whether in fact on this occasion the Governor was informed of the decision as to what advice should be tendered and whether he was asked to communicate it to the de facto Government of Rhodesia? If, as I understand, we are to have a debate on this subject fairly soon, will the Prime Minister bear in mind that there will be a general desire that all the necessary factual information should be available? Will he give an assurance that it will be possible for hon. Members on either side of the House who


want information of a purely factual nature to get it from the responsible Minister in some way or another before the debate?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. We shall do our best to ensure that this information is available, and I think the hon. Member will be better served by getting it in that way and not from sources which some hon. Members have relied on in the past. So far as the Governor is concerned, my right hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary yesterday made clear what communications there had been with His Excellency before the advice was given last Saturday. As to the suggestion that we should have asked him to communicate with what the hon. Member calls "the de facto Government"—which is not a phrase we can accept because, of course, it is still subject to further judicial process and consideration—I do not think it would be right for us to suggest that the Governor could get in touch with Mr. Dupont.

Mr. Orme: Is my right hon. Friend aware that some of the British Press comment this morning, particularly George Gale's article in the Daily Mirror and the cartoon in the Daily Mail, is below the usual standard of the Press, and the inference that the policy of this Government is responsible for what has taken place is absolutely untrue, for the responsibility rests on those who deny the vote to the majority of people in Rhodesia?

The Prime Minister: Of course, what the Press says on these matters, as on all other matters, must be a matter for the British Press. The difference between our Press and the Press of Rhodesia is that our Press comes out every day with every column filled with print and there is no interference. There is not, as on Monday, a very large part of the Rhodesian Herald censored and the exclusion of any reference to the resignation and the words of Mr. Justice Fieldsend and Mr. Justice Denby-Young. So far as the British Press is concerned, it must be free to write what it wants to write, and it is.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: Will the Prime Minister say whether the factual information which he has promised before the debate will be issued in the form of a White Paper? Will it include the con

siderations which in this case led to the recommendation as to the Prerogative of Mercy being exercised by the Secretary of State instead of the ordinary established procedure of recommendation by the Governor?

The Prime Minister: I thought my right hon. Friend had given all the possible information he could to the House on this matter. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware that the situation facing my right hon. Friend on Friday evening was, first, a refusal of an appeal to the Privy Council, which is the highest court in these matters, a refusal based on an affidavit by Lardner Burke in which he said he would not be bound by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Furthermore, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware, there were strong rumours of preparations immediately to hang the men concerned before even an application could be made on Monday morning to the Privy Council. In those circumstances I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman would feel, as has been so clearly stated in all parts of the House, that my right hon. Friend's advice was right in the circumstances.

Mr. Hector Hughes: The Prime Minister has said, very properly, that this grave matter is being brought before the Security Council. Would he elaborate that a little with a view to indicating the urgency of the matter?

The Prime Minister: One cannot, of course, know exactly what the Security Council will do in these matters. In addition to the procedure of an individual country having to raise the matter with the Security Council, the Security Council has to decide whether it wants to hear a particular question or to raise a particular question. It would be premature at this stage, therefore, to forecast whether there will be a debate in the Security Council and what its outcome would be likely to be.

Mr. Hastings: May I ask whether the same high principles in regard to independence which the Prime Minister has enunciated were in his mind when he decided that we should leave Aden?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman and hon. Members have put that


question many times. We have a responsibility in the case of a country where uniquely since the history of South Africa—unique in all the decolonisation—independence has been proposed without adult manhood suffrage. We had a special responsibility to lay down the principles under which there would be guaranteed unimpeded progress to majority rule. Those principles were laid down by the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home), and he has stuck to them ever since including his recent visit there. I think we are right to stand by the principles agreed in this House. The situation in Aden, where there was no proposition of that kind, was entirely different.

DRILLING RIG "OCEAN PRINCE" (LOSS)

Mr. Lubbock: (by Private Notice)asked the Minister of Power if he will make a statement about the loss of the drilling rig "Ocean Prince" in the North Sea.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Power (Mr. Reginald Freeson): During the night of 5th–6th March, in a severe storm, the "Ocean Prince", which was standing on the seabed in 75 ft. of water, suffered damage and the derrick collapsed into the sea. All persons on board at the time were withdrawn to safety by helicopter. I am advised by the licensee that the stand-by vessel has been driven off by the continuing storm, but is expected back on station this afternoon. An aerial reconnaissance by the licensee confirms that the rig has now broken up, but I am awaiting further details from the licensee.

Mr. Lubbock: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that 45 lives were saved by the prompt and heroic action of a helicopter pilot? Is he satisfied that in case of any future disaster of this kind there will be helicopters available to take personnel off a rig? Will an inquiry be set up similar to that which examined the circumstances which resulted in the loss of the "Sea Gem"? Have the recommendations of that inquiry and other inquiries been implemented?

Mr. Freeson: I join with the hon. Member in paying tribute to all those,

and in particular to the helicopter pilot, who organised the safe deliverance of the men from the rig which was in difficulties. With regard to the general arrangements for safety, although legislation has not yet been introduced to implement the recommendations of the Report of the Inquiry on the "Sea Gem", the procedures which were recommended have been put into practice, and this includes regular servicing by helicopter. Legislation will be coming forward as soon as possible, but in the meantime we are in close contact by way of the Ministry's Inspectorate and safety practices are implemented.

Mr. McNamara: In view of the fact that this is the second serious disaster to a rig and there have been other problems affecting rigs breaking loose in the North Sea, is my hon. Friend satisfied with the position of these rigs at the moment and as to their general safety conditions? Will he undertake to see that they are particularly watched in the present bad weather?

Mr. Freeson: I can give the absolute assurance that there is close contact between licensees and the Ministry's Inspectorate in applying, by voluntary co-operation as at present, under our licensing procedure, safety regulations and procedures as recommended by the Report of the Inquiry. We cannot legislate or administer for acts of God. In so far as it is possible, we are maintaining safety practices.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Heath: May I ask the Leader of the House to state the business of the House for next week?

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Richard Crossman): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 11TH MARCH—Supply (14th Allotted Day):
A debate on naval policy on an Opposition Motion.
Thereafter, the rule will be suspended for two hours for discussion of Vote A of the Navy Estimates, 1968–69.
TUESDAY, 12TH MARCH—Supply (15th Allotted Day):
The following Service Votes have been selected for debate:
Navy Votes 1, 4, 5, 8 and 9.
Army Votes 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10.
Defence (Royal Ordnance Factories) Vote 1968–69.
Defence (Army) Purchasing (Repayment) Services Vote 1968–69.
Air Votes 2, 7 and 8.
I understand that it may be convenient to devote two hours to each of the three Services.
Afterwards, Motion on the Post Office.
WEDNESDAY, 13TH MARCH—Supply (16th Allotted Day):
Vote on Account of the Civil Estimates and Defence Central Estimates, 1968–69.
Debate on an Opposition Motion on the Government decision to lift the ban on imported beef.
Motions on the Calf Subsidies (United Kingdom) Scheme and the (Supervision and Enforcement) Order.
THURSDAY, 14TH MARCH—We shall ask the House to approve a Timetable Motion for the remaining stages of the Transport Bill. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame!"]
FRIDAY, 15TH MARCH—Private Members' Motions.
MONDAY, 18TH MARCH—Supply (17th Allotted Day):
A debate on a topic to be announced later.
The Question will be put from the Chair on all outstanding Votes.
Motions on the Income Tax Transitional Relief (Extension of Period) Orders.
Motion on the Police Pensions (Amendment) Regulations.
Prayer on the Thames Valley Police (Amalgamation) Order.
It may be convenient for me to remind the House that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will open his Budge: on Tuesday, 19th March.
The general debate on the Economic Situation and the Budget Resolutions will be continued on Wednesday and Thurs

day, 20th and 21st March, and brought to a conclusion on Monday, 25th March.
FRIDAY, 22ND MARCH—The business will be consideration of Private Members' Bills.

Mr. Heath: Is the Leader of the House aware that the Standing Committee which is considering the Transport Bill has now discussed over 450 Amendments and covered 35 Clauses and five Schedules in 19 sittings, that the average time of discussion on each Amendment has been only 15 minutes, that the Conservative Opposition have taken less than 50 per cent. of the time of the discussion, that the Opposition at the beginning volunteered to sit three days a week, and that they have on three occasions since then offered to sit longer but the offer has been refused by the Minister of Transport, who is in charge? Is the Leader of the House therefore aware that the only reason which he can possibly have for guillotining this huge, controversial—

Mr. Michael Foot: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. On many occasions you have reminded hon. Members that they should ask about time and not seek to advance arguments when they are called to ask supplementaries on the business statement. Since this matter is to be debated next week, will you not apply to the Leader of the Opposition the same rule that is applied to other hon. Members?

Mr. Speaker: I think that there is much in what the hon. Gentleman says. The Leader of the Opposition is, however, arguing as to why we should not take on Thursday the Motion which has been referred to.

Mr. Heath: Mr. Speaker, I am putting forward immensely powerful arguments as to why there should be very much more time than the Leader of the House is prepared to agree. I remind the Leader of the House that he is responsible for time in Committee just as much as he is responsible for time on the Floor of the House. Therefore, the only reason which he can put forward is that he has put ten—[HON. MEMBERS: "NO."]—Bills into one and—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The right hon. Gentleman is now getting into merits.

Mr. Heath: With great respect, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the Leader of the House what possible—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Noise from either side does not help at all. Mr. Heath.

Mr. Heath: I am asking the Leader of the House what possible—

Sir A. V. Harvey: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will recollect that two days ago you called Government back benchers to order on six different occasions. Today, because my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition is making points that they do not like, they are creating a disturbance every time.

Mr. Speaker: Order. It would be an over-simplification of what happens in the House if the hon. Gentleman were to suggest that noise comes from only one side.

Mr. Heath: I am asking the Leader of the House what possible justification he can have for taking time during this coming week to guillotine the Transport Bill, other than the fact that he has put ten Bills into one and, through his own incompetence, could not start the Committee stage until January. Is he aware that we regard this as absolutely unjustifiable?

Mr. Crossman: I would not say that I was wholly surprised by the reaction of the Leader of the Opposition. He has put forward what he regards as powerful arguments. I prefer to reserve mine for next Thursday afternoon.

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Ellis—Mr. Heath.

Mr. Heath: rose—

Mr. Ellis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press the point of order. I shall call him. Mr. Heath.

Mr. Heath: Can the Leader of the House, if he cannot find any justification for the guillotine, tell us when we shall have the debate on the Bristol Siddeley Report? It would be much better to have that than to have the debate on the guillotine Motion.

Mr. Crossman: I have been discussing with the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee the statement he has made

that he has decided to have a special investigation. He has assured me that it will not take long, and I am hoping that we can have our debate well before the Easter Recess. The Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee cannot give me an absolute assurance as to how long his Committee will take. I thought, in view of his Committee's decision to hold this investigation, that we should postpone our debate until the Committee has completed its investigation.

Mr. Ellis: Can my right hon. Friend give us some more guidance as to how long the special investigation of the Public Accounts Committee is likely to take, when we can expect to have a debate on the Floor of the House, and whether the witnesses are likely to be recalled by the Public Accounts Committee.

Mr. Crossman: It is not for me to discuss the proceedings of the Public Accounts Committee. I can only repeat to my hon. Friend that the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, although clearly he cannot commit his Committee, is hopeful of completing the investigations in time for us to have a full debate on the Floor of the House before the Easter Recess.

Mr. Turton: Why is not the Leader of the House using the procedure he himself devised in Standing Orders for timetabling Public Bills?

Mr. Crossman: If there is a strong demand from the Opposition, we shall be delighted to use a procedure which gives the House only two hours to debate the matter instead of what I propose.

Mr. Michael Foot: Will my right hon. Friend take into account that many of us in the House believe that it is extremely urgent that we should have a debate on Vietnam? Will he take into account that a few weeks ago more than 100 hon. Members on both sides of the House asked for an early day debate on this issue and, although the Opposition have retreated from this demand and have thereby devalued Early Day Motions, some of us were serious in tabling that Motion? Will my right hon. Friend give urgent consideration to having a general debate on Vietnam, when we can discuss what many of us regard as the most serious matter in the whole world at present?

Mr. Crossman: I gave some account of what business we shall be doing in the next fortnight. We have to deal with the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill, and that will take us into April. I am hopeful at that time that we shall find time for some of the urgent topics, including Bristol Siddeley and Vietnam, which the House should and must debate.

Mr. G. Campbell: Can the Leader of the House tell us what precedent there is for imposing a guillotine on a Bill on which so far there has been no need to move a single Closure Motion in Committee?

Mr. Crossman: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman should hold himself in patience until I introduce the Motion. [HON. MEMBERS: " Answer."] This is a business statement. I intend to explain the justification for the Timetable Motion when I move it on Thurday afternoon.

Mr. C. Pannell: Will the Leader of the House bear in mind that for at least the 19 years that I have been here all guillotine Motions follow a pattern of attack and defence in precisely the same sort of phrasing, whatever Government are in power, and we have now got to the point of tedious repetition? Will he, therefore, dispatch this in the shortest possible lime by a simple vote?

Mr. Crossman: No. I always reflect on suggestions about procedure which my right hon. Friend gives me. This is a guillotine Motion. There is certainly much to be argued, and I am greatly looking forward to the arguments when we start the debate next Thursday.

Mr. Thorpe: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that he is the Leader of the whole House on these occasions and, therefore, has an obligation to the House as a whole, not merely to one side? [Interruption.] Does he recollect that last week the House was asked to rush through a very important piece of legislation and there were complaints from all quarters of the House that there was inadequate time for debate? Do we take it that the chaos in that case has gone to the right hon. Gentleman's head? Since he is justifying this Measure, will he confirm that it is the longest and most intricate, except for the Finance Bills, to be introduced since the war, and that

the Standing Committee, without any closures, has made the best progress of any Standing Committee this century?

Mr. Crossman: We had better wait until Thursday before discussing the merits of the Timetable Motion. I would only reply that the case for a timetable is to ensure that the debate is better organised, not worse.

Mr. Alfred Morris: As the debate on the Bristol Siddeley affair will mainly be about the workings of private enterprise, am I to understand that the Leader of the Opposition will be offering time for this matter?

Mr. Crossman: No. I have decided, on the whole, that the Government should offer time. This is a matter of great public concern which the Government are anxious to have debated.

Mr. Webster: Is the Leader of the House aware that it is his duty to protect the House against a most ill-digested Measure introduced half-way through the Session? He has failed. Nevertheless, he has a residuary duty to protect the right of a Standing Committee to debate it properly. He has failed and should resign.

Mr. Speaker: Order. With respect, we shall be debating this on Thursday.

Mr. Milne: Arising from yesterday's statement by the Minister of Power on the pricing of North Sea gas, and bearing in mind the conflicting statements from the heads of the nationalised industries relating to power, can we expect an early debate on fuel policy?

Mr. Crossman: I do not see any prospect of a debate on fuel policy during the next fortnight. It will go into the list of priority debates which we must have at the beginning of April.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: Reverting to next Thursday's debate on the guillotine Motion, will the Leader of the House give an undertaking not to introduce a guillotine Motion later for Report stage so as to avoid the constitutional impropriety of an Act being put on the Statute Book with large parts of it not subject to any Parliamentary debate or consideration

Mr. Crossman: The right hon. and learned Gentleman must await the terms


of the Motion which I shall submit to the House next Thursday.

Mr. Swain: Does my right hon. Friend recall that, during the Committee stage of the Coal Industry Bill, the Minister of Power appealed to the House for the utmost speed in passing the Bill through all stages so that the benefits could be paid by Christmas? Will my right hon. Friend ask the Minister of Power to make an early start in presenting the Regulations to the House so that there is a possibility of the payments being made by next Christmas?

Mr. Crossman: I am not aware of any delay in the Regulations, but I think I should tell my hon. Friend that the necessary consultations with the unions are taking a little longer than expected.

Mr. John Hall: Would not the Leader of the House find it possible to meet the very important point put to him by his hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot), a point which is shared by many of his hon. Friends, that we should have a debate on Vietnam by having it next week in place of the timetable Motion?

Mr. Crossman: It is a matter which I would seriously consider before decisively rejecting it.

Mr. R. W. Brown: Has the attention of my right hon. Friend been drawn to the B.B.C. broadcast this morning concerning his timetable on the Transport Bill? Is he aware of the travesty of the facts contained in that broadcast and will he ask the Postmaster-General to do something about putting those facts right?

Mr. Crossman: Yes, I am aware of the terms of the broadcast. As always, we should not believe all we hear on the B.B.C. or read in the Press.

Mr. Heath: Following the Lord President's answer to the last question—

Mr. Crossman: On the contrary, one might wait to hear what the Lord President has to say about the business for next week and not try to anticipate it on the basis of unauthorised rumours from other parts of the House.

Mr. Heath: I was attempting to ask the Leader of the House about his reply to my hon. Friend concerning giving further consideration to the debate on Vietnam next Thursday. I understand that he does not want to give arguments for a guillotine, but can he tell us why it is necessary to have a guillotine next Thursday? Perhaps he will tell us when he will make a fresh business statement announcing that we shall have a debate on Vietnam instead?

Mr. Crossman: I think the right hon. Gentleman must have misheard me. I said that I would consider the matter before decisively rejecting it. I said that I would explain next Thursday why, in my view, we have to have a timetable introduced straight away.

Dame Irene Ward: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he could find time next week to debate the advisability of him relinquishing his position as Leader of the House and letting us have somebody who would really reflect the opinion of the Leader of the House.

Mr. Crossman: The hon. Lady has been here long enough to know that there are ways and means of putting that suggestion to the House in the correct form.

Mr. Moyle: Can my right hon. Friend say when we are likely to get the long awaited and long promised debate on industrial mergers and their consequences?

Mr. Crossman: I think I must explain again, that I have stated the business for the next fortnight, and that subject is one which we must look for not earlier than the beginning of April.

Sir D. Renton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that four Regulations have already been laid by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Scotland, respectively, following the Government's decisions about the future of Civil Defence, that two further Regulations will have to be laid by the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland, and that these six Regulations raise separate matters which should be debated separately? In arranging future business, will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the need for providing


sufficient time for them to be debated separately so that each is debated on its merits.

Mr. Crossman: I will give careful consideration to the idea that each should be debated separately. My own view was that the four on Civil Defence could be grouped together. Certainly they need adequate debate and I will give time for adequate debate.

Mr. Winnick: Can the Leader of the House tell us whether, in the next few weeks, we will be able to have the long awaited debate on Rhodesia, which is all the more important because of the crime committed yesterday?

Mr. Crossman: After the interchange following the Prime Minister's Answer to the Question, it seems clear that whether we debate Rhodesia will depend a good deal on events. Certainly if there is a case for debate the Government will not be reluctant to have one, but we must consider carefully whether it would be suitable.

Sir J. Eden: Is it not quite clear, since the right hon. Gentleman has failed to give a proper explanation of why he must hay e a guillotine Motion next week that whatever happened in Standing Committee the Minister of Transport would have forced this on him? In those circumstances, is he not guilty of complete betrayal of his position as Leader of the House?

Mr. Crossman: I gathered from hearing the B.B.C. this morning that the accusation was the other way round. However, neither is true. I have been watching the progress of the Committee very carefully, as it is my job, and I came to the conclusion that we should have a timetable now. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] That is what we shall discuss next Thursday. I am answering questions on business, and next Thursday we shall have six hours to discuss this. That seems to me to be time enough.

Mrs. Renée Short: Why not two hours?

Mr. Judd: With reference to my right hon. Friend's answer to my hon Friend the Member for Croydon, South (Mr. Winnick), would he not agree that as ultimate responsibility for everything that

happens in Salisbury lies in this House we must have a debate on Rhodesia, and the sooner the better?

Mr. Crossman: I think that it is very probable that we shall need a debate on Rhodesia fairly soon. But I am not prepared to say more than to ask the House to study the interchange which took place after the Answer of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister today. If that is looked at, people will realise why I am not prepared to commit myself precisely on a debate on Rhodesia now.

Mr. Hirst: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that, quite apart from the discourtesy involved, his attitude of refusing to recognise his responsibilities to the House as Leader of the House is inefficient in itself, and that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition is perfectly right to draw attention to the size of the massive Transport Bill, notwithstanding which one-third of it has been got through in 19 sittings, which shows a high efficiency?

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman can raise that point on Thursday in the debate.

Mr. Crossman: From my experience in the House, I think that discussions on timetables follow a fairly orthodox, routine course, whichever party is in power. Since the war, the Conservative Party has timetabled 15 Bills and the Labour Party 3.

Mr. Henig: Has my right hon. Friend seen Early Day Motion No. 187 on the Order Paper, in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Barnes) and other hon. Members? In view of the concern felt by many hon. Members that British arms are being used in the Nigerian conflict, and British interests are thereby making a profit from the continuation of this horrible war, will he find time very shortly for a debate on the Nigerian situation and the possibilities open for this country to hasten a peaceful settlement?
[That this House welcomes the support given by Her Majesty's Government to the peace initiatives taken by the Commonwealth Secretariat with a view to ending the Nigerian conflict, but urges that as a pre-condition Her Majesty's Government take all possible steps to prevent the supply of arms for use in the war in order to demonstrate genuine neutrality.]

Mr. Crossman: I can only tell my hon. Friend what I have said to other hon. Members, that I cannot hope to do it in Government time. If my hon. Friend can find opportunities of another kind, it is up to him to seek them.

Mr. Peyton: Is the Leader of the House aware that his last answer on the guillotine Motion, when he referred to the routine nature of the discussions, showed how superficial a study he had made of the problem? Is he aware that many of us think that it is a pity that he has not allowed his newly-emergent sense of shame about the Bill to lead him to withdraw it altogether rather than to seek to stifle discussion of it?

Mr. Crossman: I am aware that at Business time opportunities can be taken for putting over views which concern not only the timing of business, and the hon. Gentleman takes them. I prefer to retain my arguments for Thursday, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will have the courtesy to come and listen to the case I shall then make on the timetable.

Mr. Peyton: There is no case.

Sir T. Beamish: Can the Leader of the House think offhand of any year since 1265 when Government business has been in a greater muddle?

Mr. Crossman: I could think offhand of a number of years. When I measure our chances of getting through our business by the summer holidays I see no reason for the hon. and gallant Gentleman and his family to be dejected about their summer holidays at present.

Mr. Speaker: Order. We should keep Simon de Montfort out of it.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Does the Leader of the House appreciate that by introducing the guillotine on Thursday he could ensure that parts of a Bill which could cripple Scotland will not be properly discussed? Is it not a constitutional outrage to use a means designed to protect again filibustering to prevent proper discussion of a Bill involving £1,900 million of public money introduced within two weeks of devaluation?

Mr. Crossman: The hon. Gentleman should wait and see the terms of the timetable Motion, the object of which will be

to ensure that adequate discussion does take place.

Mr. Leslie Huckfield: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that those of us on Standing Committee F considering the Transport Bill are rather concerned about the way in which some hon. Gentlemen opposite have preferred to make use of the two all-night sittings we have so far had not to make progress—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are on business questions at the moment.

Mr. Dean: May I draw the attention of the Leader of the House to Early Day Motion No. 190, which points out the heavy damage which Government policy is inflicting on the economy of the South-West? Would that not be an excellent subject for debate next Thursday?
[That this House deplores the damage Her Majesty's Government has inflicted on the economy of the South-West by unemployment, the selective employment tax, discrimination against the tourist industry, defence cuts and transport legislation; further deplores the failure of Her Majesty's Government to implement any of the main recommendations of the Report of the South-West Economic Development Council which was published over seven months ago; and calls on Her Majesty's Government to take urgent action on these matters.]

Mr. Crossman: There is a long list of subjects which we should all like to debate on days we could choose, but I would not think that next Thursday would be the right day to debate that Early Day Motion. The signatories should study the terms of the Government's reply to the South-West Economic Development Council before suggesting that we have a debate.

Mr. Geoffrey Wilson: Is the Leader of the House aware that I was a member of Standing Committee E, which dealt with the Transport Act, 1962, and reached Clause 11 after 19 sittings? The Standing Committee on the present Transport Bill has reached Clause 38. In those circumstances, why is it necessary to have a debate next Thursday on the guillotine Motion when so many other urgent matters could come before the House?

Mr. Crossman: I hesitate to enter into the merits of the matter, but the two Bills are not pf precisely the same length. I suggest that we both reserve our discussion on this until next Thursday.

Mr. John Wells: As the finance available for the Agricultural Training Board runs out on 31st March, can the Leader of the House tell us when the Government intend to lay a new Order to enable that undesirable body to continue, so that we may pray against it?

Mr. Crossman: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman puts that question to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food or gives me notice of it. I could not answer it off the cuff.

Mr. Wells: I should be out of order if I put it to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food because it belongs to the Minister of Labour.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[13TH ALLOTTED DAY],—considered.

LONG-TERM AIRCRAFT PROGRAMME

Mr. Speaker: Order. Before we begin the business of Supply, may I announce that I have not selected the Amendment standing on the Order Paper in the name of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) to the Motion relating to military aircraft?
With regard to the Amendment to the Motion on Vote A, also in the name of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire, I cannot forecast whether the hon. Gentleman will be successful in catching the eye of the Chairman during the debate on Vote A, but if he is successful he will have an opportunity to move that Amendment.

4.19 p.m.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: I beg to move,
That this House regrets that Her Majesty's Government's precipitate actions and vacillating policies have jeopardised this country's long-term aircraft programme, both operationally and industrially, and made Great Britain deeply dependent on others for vital elements in our ability to defend ourselves and contribute to the defence of our allies.
The first part of the Motion hardly needs debating or arguing. It refers to "precipitate actions", and it is clear from the three days' debate we have already had on defence that action was taken first and the thinking will follow later. We are now saddled with an interim Defence White Paper which will lead to a full Defence White Paper in the summer.
The question of "vacillating policies" has also been well argued by the Secretary of State for Defence himself, who has explained that he wanted, I think on five occasions, to see a period of stability for the Services, and on each occasion a crisis swept him and the plans into the wastepaper basket. I shall deal with the operational repercussions and will leave my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) to


concentrate on the industrial repercussions. I also want to deal with repercussions on the balance of our forces and on our alliances.
The total defence budget this year is up by £66 million. The introductory paragraph—which, I believe, must always be written by Ministers, for it contains so much more politics than the rest of the White Paper put together—has a whole lot of excuses, presumably thought up for the Left wing. I am sorry not to see members of the Left wing here for it explains that this, that and the other were unforeseen, all of which has meant extra cost. This, of course, happens every year.
Of course, defence estimates often have to be adjusted because of unforeseen contingencies and I recall that, last year, there was a Supplementary Estimate of £43 million. But the same people are in the same jobs this year. They are a little more tired and will, therefore, probably make a few more mistakes and be more hurried in their preparations in view of the crisis, so that we can expect an even bigger Supplementary Estimate at the end of the year.
In addition, this defence budget does not allow in any way for the cancellation costs of the F111 or of the Buccaneer or of the Chinook. One hazards the guess that these together will add another £70 million, much of it in dollars, to the bill we are debating.
Much has happened since our debates last year. First, there was the crisis of the paper aircraft which the Defence Secretary thought up and in which he put so much faith—the Anglo-French V.G. Then there were the economic crisis of July and, as always happens under Labour, the defence votes took the brunt. Then we had the devaluation crisis and again defence cuts. In this instance, the air side of the Ministry of Defence took the brunt, and we had the cancellations of the Chinook and the Buccaneer. Then came the January economies and the cancellation of the F111.
The country and Parliament find it difficult to anticipate just what the Government are going to do. There is, however, one certainty. Whenever the Government get into an economic crisis and look for things to cut, the great majority of the cuts come in the defence programme. That is very popular with

the Left wing but had for the defence of the country and our commitments. Sometimes they say that sacred cows are to be slaughtered, but defence always bears the brunt. This is a typical reaction—a sort of Pavlovian dog reaction—of the Labour Party to an economic crisis.
On page 68 of the Grey Paper—in semimourning, as it should be—one sees the division of the responsibilities and of the vote as between the different Services. The Ministry of Defence (Central) has the biggest percentage increase—Parkinson's Law at work, presumably—with an increase of 14 per cent. the air expenditure shows the smallest increase and in real terms is a cut, for it is only 2 per cent. up. The Ministry of Technology shows a reduction of £17½ million. It is not clear why this should be so. I hope that it is not because the Government are eating the technical seed corn and cutting back the development of future advanced weapons and aircraft, because if that is so we shall feel the strain even more in the mid and late 1970s.
The biggest percentage increase of 12 per cent., is for the Ministry of Public Building and Works, providing an extra £21½million. I understand that this is largely for bricks and mortar, in most cases providing or re-providing in this country facilities which already exist overseas. It is worth remembering, too, that we were told on Tuesday that £30 million has already been spent on extra barracks and married quarters. This seems a strange way of spending money in order theoretically to save it.
We condemn the Government for the repercussions of these affairs on the present and future operational strength of the Royal Air Force. We remember the brave words of the Defence White Paper in February. 1966, which said that the Anglo-French V.G. was to be both operationally and industrially the core of our long-term aircraft programme. I feel rather sorry for the Under-Secretary of State for Defence who, I believe, is to follow me in this debate.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Merlyn Rees): No.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Last year, the hon. Gentleman went very far in his praise of the F111. He referred to his visit to


Texas—I do not think that his journey was really necessary—and highly praised the aircraft, saying how desperately essential it was and quoting the paragraph of the Defence White Paper, 1967, which said:
The key to the deterrent power of our armed forces is our ability to obtain early warning of an enemy's intentions through re-connaissance to strike at his offensive forces from a distance in case of need.
The hon. Gentleman then said:
Although we do not plan to indulge in major operations without the co-operation of allies, this does not absolve us from the responsibility of maintaining a balanced force capable of making a contribution which those allies would value.
…the principal rôles of the F111 aircraft will be tactical and particularly reconnaissance—(OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th March, 1967; Vol 743, c. 245 and 247.]
I think our first concern is how we are to replace the reconnaissance power which has gone. The Minister of Defence for Equipment said on 13th December that this responsibility would fall on France and the United States. Later, the Defence Secretary said that it would not fall on the French but on the United States. But can we be sure that the United States will always be able to provide these facilities for our troops wherever they may be engaged? Can we be sure that the Americans will not be involved in a serious conflict in the Pacific or other Harts of the world where their troops may be endangered, and that they will pass to us all the up-to-date and essential information on the distribution of potential enemy forces gained as a result of their reconnaissance? We cannot carry out such reconnaissance ourselves.
I imagine that we had a pre-eminent position in the development of reconnaissance equipment, particularly in the avionics for the TSR2 which we are now trying to sell, quite rightly, for the F111 reconnaissance version. I hope the firm is successful. I believe that we have adapted some of this equipment for the Phantom. What aircraft is to carry out the rôles which every Minister in the Department has said is absolutely vital for the success and safety of our troops?
On 4th March, the Minister of Defence for Equipment told us of the Warton studies, referring to the variable geometry aircraft which is likely to have an engine from the 13ristol-Siddeley division of Rolls Royce. He told us that it might go for

ward in the mid-1970s. One wonders whether this is a realistic approach because, if one examines the research and development list in the White Paper, this does not seem to be any more than a paper project. It is even put down as a project, followed by the words "a study". It is nothing more than a study at this stage. If it is really only a study, how are we to have hardware in the mid-1970s? Can we be told in firm terms what is being done to replace th reconnaissance abilities of which we have deprived ourselves?
Under Labour's constant barrage of cuts the capability and number of first-line aircraft in the Royal Air Force are beginning to go down. Too much money has been spent, and not enough has been done to develop or provide new aircraft. Money has been spent on cancellations. HANSARD of 28th July, 1967, contained an interesting list of all the cancellations that had taken place. It showed that the TSR2 cancellation had cost £195 million; the HS 681, £21 million; the P1154 £21 million; the Anglo-French variable geometry study—the paper aircraft—£21 million. That adds up to £240 million, and no aircraft to show for it.
I have added up all the figures for cancellations which we made when in office, and it will be found that these current costs, in two and half years, are already greater than all the costs which were listed, and of which so much was made in the 1964 and 1966 General Election campaigns. More money has been wasted in the last two and a half years than was wasted in the entire 13 years of our Government. This is not the end—I wish it were. Added to the—240 million we will see, presumably in this financial year—negotiations are going on now—the cost of cancelling the 50 F111s. I wish the Government well and hope that they will be very tough in their negotiations with the United States. They understand tough and realistic talk, but I doubt whether it will cost less than £50 million. The cancellation charges for ten Buccaneers and 15 Chinooks have also to be costed. In all another £70 million may be added to the £240 million, making £310 million in cancellation costs, and not one single aircraft to show for it. This makes the £30 million spent on peanuts in the last Labour Government look very small beer.
As time runs out and new aircraft are not developed, what is worrying is that the strength of the Air Force is running down. I take my information from the March edition of the Air League publication, "Air Pictorial".
It is stated there that by the early 1970s the following will be the modern aircraft in use by the Royal Air Force: 100 Royal Air Force Phantoms; 60 Harriers; 150 Jaguars; 50 surviving Vulcans; 100 Lightnings and possibly 80 Buccaneers, which will be transferred from the Royal Navy. There will be 460 R.A.F. teeth aircraft. We have heard it said that Britain cannot afford to have more. This is always the flabby excuse of Little Englanders. If we cannot afford it, how is it that other nations can? It is interesting to look at a list of those nations which have over 400 teeth aircraft.
Poland is the premier one among the Soviet satellites with 870. We are likely to have 460. There are over 400 possessed by France, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Turkey and even Sweden with a population of eight million, about the same as Greater London, is able to afford 400 combat aircraft, some of which are excellent Swedish aircraft and are nationally developed, not developed conjointly with others. It is not a question of cost but desire. Other nations can do it and we could if we wanted to.
Compared with the 460 which I have given, the shiny brochures which the Royal Air Force puts out tell a different story. Earlier this week a friend of mine telephoned the recruiting office at Kings-way and got most prompt service and excellent brochures. They are beautifully printed, very well prepared and in every respect admirable. The first page says:
The new aircraft coming into Royal Air Force service by 1970 will number over 1,000.
I hope that in reply the Minister who is responsible will tell us where these are coming from, because we know of no such figure. Over the page the first glossy picture, and how impressive it is, is said to be the first aircraft to which the Air Force can look forward. This is trying to get recruits for the Air Force, and the picture is of the swing-wing strike reconnaissance aircraft, the F111K.
There is a eulogy about how good it is and it is exactly the same in another

brochure. This aircraft was cancelled two months ago. Has the Minister not yet got round to telling his recruiting officers about it? Could he not have a printed slip put in? This is a manifesto, admirable and glossy, like the Labour Party manifestoes in 1964 and 1966, but it is totally and absolutely inaccurate and the sooner it is corrected the better.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: As a flabby Little Englander, and one who is not ashamed of it, may I ask the hon. Gentleman to make clear what he wants his aircraft for, because this is out of the context of what we are discussing?

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: I shall do so. The hon. Member calls himself a flabby Little Englander. I did not know that it was a current term, but he has described himself in that way. He is far from flabby on the Select Committee on which I sit with him. In some respects he is very robust.
I turn now to the maritime patrol. From time to time the Minister has spoken of the changing pattern of the Russian armed forces, the concentration which they are now making towards the maritime rôle, towards the use of large submarine forces which are often on patrol in all the oceans of the world. In these circumstances, have we really enough maritime aircraft? We should never forget what we nearly suffered in the way of starvation in World Wars 1 and 2. We must remember that 2,500,000 tons of raw materials come to this country every day. We are utterly dependent on the security of our shipping. Money spent on maritime aircraft is infinitely worthwhile. Are 38 Nimrods as successors to the Shackletons enough to do this job? Can we really watch our vital interests, and above all detect and help to detect submarines, with the total use of only 38 aircraft? All of these will not be operational, because some will be training and some will be in Operational Training Units. That is a small and unecomonic buy and perhaps the Government will consider whether we ought not to have a follow on order in the future.
I want to look at the other part of the Motion, which talks about the part that we are able to play with our Allies, and the way that we are likely to let them down. In a way the game is given away


by the phraseology of the White Paper. It says on page 5, paragraph 17:
We intend to reach a new understanding with the Government of Malaysia about the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement after 1971".
What has happened is that we are withdrawing from Malaysia. We have said that we are not to have a capability to carry out any defence agreement there. We are unilaterally abrogating a solemn treaty to the Malaysians and to Singapore. How can we say that we are to stand by our alliances? This is entirely wishful thinking and it certainly cannot fool our enemies or our friends. It is presumably put in to give some comfort to those who do not probe very deeply. There is another remark, later in this same paragraph:
We shall, however, maintain our interest in the stability of the Middle East and the Far East".
Of course we will, we have vast investments and interests in that part of the world, not least our raw materials. Over half of our oil supplies come from the Middle East, and from Arab countries. Of course we will retain interest but where is our capability? The Secretary of State has temporarily fallen asleep. [Interruption.] If he has not perhaps he will tell us now where is the capability to carry out these commitments?
We come reluctantly to the conclusion that we cannot carry out commitments, either in the Middle East or the Far East. The right hon. Gentleman was fond of saying, when he came back from Australia how essential it was that we should play a part in Australia. He was singing the praises of the F111, and said that this was the one weapon which had the capability to help the Australians if they needed help. Now that has gone how are we to help Australia and New Zealand? How are we going to help our S.E.A.T.O. allies? Are we ratting on every one of these commitments as we are ratting in Aden and the Persian Gulf?

Mr. Eric Lubbock: The hon. Gentleman has made a serious charge—that we are ratting on agreements we made with the Malaysians, for example. I am not aware that the agreement has ever been published, but he obviously has some inside knowledge of it. Are there revision clauses in that

treaty, or are we committed to remaining in the Far East indefinitely?

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: I looked at the Treaty clauses very carefully. In the case of Aden they clearly said that the treaty could not be unilaterally abrogated by one side. It can only be done by mutual consent of both sides. This is the normal wording for such agreements. I have not got it with me. I know the Secretary of State for Defence did not know about it when he made the announcement about pulling out of Aden.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Denis Healey): The hon. Gentleman made a serious charge. We never had a treaty with Aden. There was a great argument between the two sides of the House about whether a private undertaking given by the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) was binding on the present Government, but that was an undertaking to make a defence agreement and to keep a base in Aden. No such agreement was ever made, and that is why the party opposite criticised us.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: It was said that we would make a new defence agreement after independence, and the Minister wriggled on that. Prior to that there was an agreement between this country and Aden.

Mr. Healey: On a point of order. The hon. Member has now confessed that the words he used were totally wrong; surely he should withdraw them.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): That is not a point of order.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: I understand why the Minister is sensitive on this, because treaties have been broken, and I hope he will stand by the Malaysian Treaty. I see the right hon. Gentleman dissenting. Is there no defence agreement with Malaysia? The Minister does not answer. He knows perfectly well there is an Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.

Mr. Healey: If the hon. Gentleman wants me to answer there is the Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement, which is binding so far as relations between Britain and Malaysia is concerned. His right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) gave his view of our commitments under


that treaty and the S.E.A.T.O. treaty as meaning everything or nothing according to the view one takes. Those are not my views, those are the views of his right hon. Friend.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: He does admit there is an Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. I am interested to hear it. I am sorry he did not take the opportunity of telling us how we were going to carry it out. There is no capability to honour that agreement. It is going to be renegotiated. It says so in the White Paper.
I come to our N.A.T.O. obligations. We are told that with the air forces assigned to N.A.T.O. the balance will be altered so that there will be fewer nuclear and more conventional forces in the strike rôle. This is fully understood, and there is a statement here which deals with the new N.A.T.O. agreement. Most of us have read Mr. McNamara's statement to Congress, which sets out the philosophy in regard to N.A.T.O., which means strengthening our conventional forces this year. The Minister has endorsed this, and the Under-Secretary nods. Page 4 reads:
It is also agreed that, within the total resources available to N.A.T.O., adjustment should be made, particularly in the air forces, with the object of extending the conventional phase of hostilities should war break out.
Are we going to have sufficient aircraft to do that? As I understand it, Phantoms will provide local air superiority and give protection to the Harriers. But we have only 60 Harriers. This is a good aircraft, but is 60 enough to make a viable force and give tactical support to our Army in West Germany? I have some doubt about this. The Harrier is an improved aircraft. It started as the Kestrel with a small 9,000 lb. thrust engine, went up to 14,000 lb. thrust and is going up to 21,000 lb. This gives it more lift and greater flexibility with its weapons system. I wonder whether the Minister is right in sticking to 60. It is too small a number and cannot allow for the reserves to be built up.
The Minister for Defence for Administration, when he was winding up last night, said that these statements about strengthening N.A.T.O.'s reserves were based on the assumption that a conventional war would last three, four or

five days. He said last night that this idea of strengthening the mobilisation reserves in N.A.T.O. amounted only to a conventional war which might not last a week or more but would be stretched from two or three days to three, four or five days. The Minister nods. That is not the wording which Mr. McNamara used in his address, and this was put before N.A.T.O. and approved by N.A.T.O.

Mr. Healey: The hon. Member was in the House on Monday when I explained this. There are certain conventional types of conflict in Europe for which N.A.T.O. agrees at last we should retain a capability to deal with purely conventionally. A large-scale conflict in Europe N.A.T.O. has always believed and still believes is bound to lead to the use of nuclear weapons, and if it continues to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. When we are talking about prolonging that type of conflict, we are thinking of extending it from the two or three days, which the Commander-in-Chief of Northern Army Group said in a recent television interview he could fight, to four or five days prolongation which could make the difference between the survival of humanity and its destruction.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: If it was from two to three to four or five days, I hardly think it is necessary to have a N.A.T.O. reappraisal. The phraseology, which is entirely new, seems to overstate the case. The Minister recognises and we understand that he wants more reserves. Ought he not to order more Harriers? Is 60 enough to provide sufficient reserve? In the old days one used to be able to build an aircraft relatively quickly. They were relatively simple. Now they are very complicated weapons systems indeed, and should the need arise an aircraft cannot be built in less than 18 months even if it is proven and in production, if it is jigged and tooled. In fact, it is much more likely to be 24 months allowing for the avionics and other sophisticated equipment. Would it not be wise to have a follow-on order and to let Hawker Siddeley have the go ahead on the long-term delivery materials and on some of the components which take a long time to produce? I cannot believe 60 is a viable or economic force.
Everyone recognises that the smaller the number the more expensive the unit. If we want real numbers to get the export potential out of this aircaft, then it would be worth while going ahead with a worth-while number if the Government agrees this is a good and useful tactical aircraft to support our troops in Germany.
To summarise, by mismanagement of our economy, we have had successive crises. In each crisis, it is defence which has had to bear the brunt of the cuts. Of the three Services the Air Force has taken the biggest cut. The operational strength of our aircraft and the weapons we are now using was developed over the 13 years of Conservative rule. First this Government cut the replacements—the T1154, the HS681, the TSR2—and substituted other aircraft to do the job. Now these aircraft too have had to be cancelled. Money has been spent in bricks and mortar—£30 million extra last year, £20 million extra this year. Money has been spent on cancellation charges—£310 million—without a single aircraft to show. We have had the philosophy about bringing the troops back to this country. Then when they get back, we learn that their numbers are to be cut. Deprived of numbers and aircraft, we have to go back on our treaties and understandings. This is what has happened over the last two and a half years.
Now the Secretary of State for Defence is concerned to work out the full implications of the cuts, which he knows and acknowledges will be agonising, to honour the announcements made in January. We understand that we shall have a White Paper in June. I ask him whether he will try to avoid being too intellectually arrogant in this matter. Can he remember that we are making plans for the defence of our country and commitments in the mid-1970s and late 1970s? The one thing which we cannot possibly foresee is the state of the world at that time. Would it not be wise to leave options open? There will be a different Government and a different set of circumstances. Where there is a choice, surely it would be sensible to leave the option open.
The classic case of the option not being left open occurred when the jigs and tools of the TSR2 were destroyed just

before the 1966 General Election. I cannot understand that. One would have thought that perhaps the next Government, if there had been a change of Government, might need this as a bargaining counter with our American suppliers. I hope that this mistake will not be made again and that next time a sensible option will be left open so that if the state of the world changes, if there is a settlement in Vietnam, if there is a spread of Communism and our friends appeal to us for help, we have the means of honouring our agreements and answering their cries for assistance.
We see broken treaties and cancelled contracts all around us. We see revised and re-revised plans; they must litter the Ministry of Defence. I feel sorry for the Service planners, who must be beside themselves. No plan has been brought to fruition before the next plan has to supersede it. The Secretary of State for Defence and his two senior colleagues must have had a very difficult time. They must have searched their souls as to whether they should go on living among the ruins of their own defence plans or resign. I hope that they know where their duty lies.

4.53 p.m.

The Minister of Defence for Equipment (Mr. Roy Mason): We have listened to a most surprising speech by the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr-Ewing) calling for more aircraft for every conceivable rôle, in spite of our plans gradually to withdraw from the Far East and Middle East, we are lessening our international commitments, and yet, irrespective of cost, he demands more sophisticated aircraft for every rôle which he can conceive for the Royal Air Force. My intention is to deal with the industrial aspects of the Motion and to explain the reasons for our decisions. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force, if he is fortunate enough to catch your eye during the latter part of the debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, will deal with the operational side of the Motion.
First, let us see just how much truth there is in all the suggestions that the present Government programme represents a grievous blow to the health of the British aircraft industry and that there has been an irrational and indefensible


refusal to continue with sensible and cost-effective projects. To help our survey, it is necessary to delve a little into history.
After the First World War, it was the R.A.F. which pioneered the development of air services. More important, it was the R.A.F. which in the years leading up to the Second World War was responsible for pioneering and giving the industry the means to develop all the most important improvements in aircraft performance. It was the Air Ministry which in 1925 instituted a research programme into high speed flying, and thereafter the R.A.F. teams won the Schneider Trophy contests, developing the speed of racing seaplanes to over 400 m.p.h. A similar effort was devoted to long-distance and high-level flying, and it is worth remembering that distance records of over 5,000 miles were established as early as 1933 and of over 7,000 miles in 1938, and height records of over 50,000 feet were set in 1937.
This is not irrelevant to the Motion. All these figures are relevant to a comparison of performance—cost increases which I shortly propose to make.
In the 20 years which passed between the World Wars, it was the R.A.F. aircraft programme which led the way in industrial development and in improvements in aircraft performance. Yet at the end of that process, plus the industry's contribution—good industrial organisation and production methods—the unit production cost of each aircraft had not appreciably increased. A fighter aircraft at the start of World War I, built like a Rolls-Royce—[Interruption.] We built them. I am praising the British industry for its performance. But the research programme by the Ministry was giving the industry the chance to prove it. This was happening particularly between the two world wars.
A fighter aircraft at the start of world war one, built like a Rolls-Royce cost several thousand £s—indeed, it cost £4,000. At the start of the Second World War, Spitfires and Hurricanes cost £5,000. What, by comparison, has happened since the end of World War II?
First, as one would expect and hope, the R.A.F. has continued to lead the way in performance improvements, and has stimulated the British aircraft industry

accordingly. But what about costs? Let us take as a fair standard the case of a very successful modern non-British aircraft, the Phantom, an aircraft which has won many world records. In terms of performance this aircraft represents a remarkable improvement over the Spitfire, as the Spitfire did over the 1914 aircraft. But the Spitfire cost almost the same as the 1914 aircraft to produce. Each Phantom, on the other hand, is several hundred times more expensive than the Spitfire. The line of the graph relating performance to unit cost was more or less horizontal during the thirties. But during the fifties and sixties it has become more or less vertical, the type of vertical take-off we can well do without. Then, big increases in performance were achieved without increasing very much the unit production cost. Today, every increase in performance brings a huge increase in production cost—and the increases in research and development costs are, of course, even more marked.
This is the essential background to our debate today. This, if we must talk about history, is what history tells us about the most essential industrial aspect of the aircraft programme—that is, the relation of improvements in performance to increases in cost and the difficult decision of when to stop paying much more money to get a little more performance.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: We do not disagree with that argument. But does not exactly the same apply to Sweden and all the other countries which I quoted which have modern aircraft in even bigger numbers than we have?

Mr. Mason: The hon. Gentleman must not try to mislead the House or myself. He must not try to compare the size and sophistication of Sweden's aircraft with the research and development costs of a highly complex machine like the TSR2, Phantom or F111. There is no comparison, and it is wrong of the hon. Gentleman to try to mislead hon. Members who may not take such a close interest in these matters.
Let us relate this essential background to more recent times. Let us see what changes in the aircraft programme it has made necessary, not only in the last three years, but in the last seventeen—ever since the Korean War started off new


equipment programmes which have continued from successor to successor to this day.
In this context, it is worth examining the Conservative record. On 28th July last year, my right hon. Friend the Minister of Technology published an interesting list of the aerospace projects cancelled since 1951 and the money spent in each case. The Motion relates to the effect on the aircraft industry of cancellations, and, therefore, if it is true, it is worth while looking at the list of cancellations and how many there were when the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends were in Government; because it makes a fairly long list even in the small print of the OFFICIAL REPORT.
I will not weary the House by going through it all, but it is worthwhile to choose just some of the aircraft which have been cancelled. There was the Swift and its variations, the de Havilland fighter aircraft, the developed Hawker Hunter, the thin wing Javelin fighter, the Fairey supersonic fighter, the supersonic bomber, a naval interceptor, the Vickers military transport—all aircraft cancelled during the term of the hon. Gentleman's Government.
Missile projects were cancelled, and this, too, affects the aircraft industry just as much, because engines, aeroplanes and missiles are part of the aircraft industry. They cancelled a guided bomb with television eye, the Vickers flying bomb, an air-to-ship guided bomb, an air-to-air missile, a long-range surface-to-air guided weapon and Blue Streak, worth £84 million, which was completely lost.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Would the hon. Gentleman admit that £70 million of that has gone into E.L.D.O.? I am sure the hon. Gentleman will want to be fair and would not want to make capital to which he is not entitled.

Mr. Mason: The hon. Gentleman should not make suggestions like that. Some £84 million had been spent on the development of Blue Streak as a military project and what remains is a launcher, part of the equipment, in a civil application form: and it has not been worth all that to the European Launcher Development Organisation.
Apart from Blue Streak, there was a medium-range surface-to-surface missile

in August, 1962, Blue Water, which no doubt the hon. Gentleman will remember, on which £32 million had been spent; and then the Prime Minister of the day cancelled Skybolt at £27 million. And it is not only aircraft and missiles. The same can be said of aero engines; cancellation after cancellation, £200 million lost, and I do not exaggerate as the hon. Gentleman did in the course of his speech. Here was a series of cancellations, repercussion after repercussion hitting the aircraft industry all the time that Government were in office.

Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: The right hon. Gentleman is getting carried away with the situation. He has quoted types of aircraft to suit his convenience; but the Swift fighter was ordered by the Attlee Government and was cancelled not for financial reasons but for technical reasons. It was not up to the job. The specification was wrong. The cost to the taxpayer was some £35 million.

Mr. Mason: I do not have to argue with the hon. Gentleman about the reason for which a project was cancelled. The terms of the Motion relate to the effects of cancellations on the industry, and it does not come well from the mouth of the hon. Gentleman to put down a Motion of this kind and to seek to chastise this Government when they have been more guilty than we ever were.
What about the most startling event in the calendar of hon. Gentlemen opposite when in Government, the 1957 White Paper introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys)? I do not blame him, for it was the then Government's responsibility, but they cannot escape what effect this had on the industry and on the Royal Air Force, too; because here was the then Government's missile mythology "We are to have missiles for attack and missiles for defence. The days of manned aircraft are numbered. They are to go." That Government never fully realised how much they frightened the British aircraft industry and upset the R.A.F. Never in recent history has one White Paper had such serious, frightening and undermining results, particularly in the aircraft industry. Parliament, too, was seriously disturbed and, as we all know, the White


Paper was quickly buried. But the irresponsibility of that Paper and its effect upon the industry, on the R.A.F. and on the House can never be forgotten.

Mr. Julian Ridsdale: The right hon. Gentleman has spoken about Conservative Government cancellations, but one thing he has not said is that the Conservative Government never cancelled a successor to the Canberra, which is absolutely vital for the R.A.F. if it is to fulfil its functions in N.A.T.O.

Mr. Mason: The hon. Gentleman does not take much notice of the Questions an Answers about such things that have recently taken place. All that has been fully debated. I will deal with it later, as, no doubt, will my hon. Friend.
As far as the record of the present Government is concerned, the decisions taken during the last three years, unwelcome as some of them undoubtedly are to the R.A.F. and to the aircraft industry, have reflected three consistent main lines of thought, all aimed at greater effectiveness and greater cost effectiveness. The hon. Gentleman and the Government of that time can take a little credit, and I want to give credit where it is due. The first example of this new line of consistent thinking, of placing the needs of the Services first, was set not by my right hon. Friend but by the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, his predecessor.
There was the decision taken early in 1964, during the last months of the Conservative Administration, which I applaud, to order the Phantom for the Royal Navy. It was a very good decision, and that is why we confirmed it; and it is only charitable now to remember that in those days, at least, the Tories did not always allow themselves to be distracted by Jingoistic talk of "becoming deeply dependent on others" to the detriment of the Services' re-equipment programme.
Let us recall the situation at the time of the then Government's decision early in 1964. It had been hoped to develop the P1154 into a common aircraft suitable for both the R.A.F. and the R.N., but this turned out not to be possible, and to develop a naval variant of the P1154 would have cost more than the relatively small number needed by the

Navy would have warranted. In any case, the naval variant would have arrived late. Therefore, it was decided that it would be better to buy a version of the American Phantom aircraft.
I believe that the noble Lord, the then Minister of Defence, although he has much else to answer for, is to be congratulated on that decision at least, because it was arrived at in accordance with just the same correct principles as we have tried to follow ever since he set us that example. As he recognised, while any reasonable person would wish to help the British aircraft industry to the greatest possible extent, cases might arise in which the industry was not able to produce what the Services wanted at the time when they wanted it; and when that happened we must in the last resort put the Services' needs first. That is what he did, and rightly. But how does his decision—and those on Skybolt, Polaris and Martel—square with the Opposition's Motion today? Completely contradictory. What about "jeopardising the long-term aircraft programme"? I have mentioned projects on which the Conservatives, when in office, went elsewhere to get equipment at a better price, on time, for the Services. We have tried to follow that excellent example set by the noble Lord.

Mr. Lubbock: In speaking about the Phantom, should not the right hon. Gentleman remind the House that the United Kingdom content of its manufacture is getting on for 50 per cent., and does not he think that because of the superior performance of the British version over the American version there are prospects for selling it to other countries?

Mr. Mason: I must congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his detailed knowledge of the topic. There is at least 40 per cent. British content in the Phantom, with the new Spey engine power unit, a bypass engine with reheat, which may prove very superior indeed. I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for mentioning it.
I said that since 1964 the major developments in the Royal Air Force aircraft programme have reflected three main, consistent lines of thought. These are, first, reaffirmation of the validity of the philosophy of the Royal Air Force about the essential place of tactical strike/ reconnaissance in the overall defence concept, about the flexibility afforded to


the Forces by means of air transport, and about the greater economy of land-based as opposed to carrier-based aircraft. Second, we have recognised the need to accelerate the programme for the replacement of obsolescent R.A.F. aircraft, such as the Canberra, Hunter, Beverley and Hastings. Here let me say that although our plans have not all worked out as we would have wished, the Royal Air Force is at the beginning of a re-equipment programme which will provide it with aircraft greatly superior in performance to those they replace.
It is silly to make comparisons of the kind made by the hon. Member for Hendon, North and others about Sweden when we are to have aircraft which, in some instances, no other country has and which will be in advance of those of every other nation or air force.

Mr. Victor Goodhew: rose—

Mr. Mason: I am sorry, I must get on. I am taking a long time. Thirdly, we have recognised the need for a change—a need based on the cost considerations which I have mentioned. They have been spelt out many times by detailed inquiries, especially the Plowden Report. There has been a change from a purely national production programme to an interim programme based on a combination of United States procurement and national production and a long-term pattern of joint development and production combined with either foreign procurement or national production where appropriate. [Interruption.] Of course it is not the intention of the present Government to ignore completely the interests of the British aircraft industry.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Does that mean that we might have a national aircraft development, primarily developed in this country, for our own military purposes and to serve overseas?

Mr. Mason: I cannot at this stage prejudge the studies which are taking place at Warton, but I warn the hon. Member that the sort of aircraft which might be required might prove to be very expensive and, therefore, collaboration may be the answer if it is to be fully de-developed. [An HON. MEMBER: "Absolutely wrong."] Hon Members opposite

say that that is wrong, but those who have listened through the debates of the past two days will remember that in winding up the debate for the Opposition on Tuesday, the right hon. Member for Mitcham (Mr. R. Can) said:
Britain can no longer make for herself the whole range of vastly complicated technological equipment required by modern defence forces. We must buy some from other countries, including the United States. We must make as much as possible on a joint venture basis, particularly with our allies in Europe."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1968; Vol. 760, c. 347.]
It appears that hon. Members on the back benches opposite disagree with what their right hon. Friend said from the Front Bench.
Throughout this time we have reviewed not only the cost and timescale of the production programme of individual aircraft, but also basic defence philosophy, which is interrelated continuously with the selection of the individual aircraft types. A more logical and coherent picture of the review can be given chronologically rather than tracing each aircraft in turn. If the House will bear with me for a few minutes, I would like to do that.
The first stage was our successful attempt to cut back the escalating costs of the aircraft programme and to improve on the dates by which the Royal Air Force would be equipped with the more modern aircraft it needed. During this period, it was decided to cancel the TSR2. This aircraft, as all hon. Members know and most are honest enough to admit, was escalating in cost far beyond the capacity either of the defence Votes to pay for its research, development and production, or of the Royal Air Force to maintain it throughout its operational life.
We also cancelled the P1154 because it was going to be too expensive and too late, and we decided to go for a combination of the Phantom and the P1127. We decided to replace the HS681, on grounds of both timescale and cost, by the United States Hercules, and we selected a version of the Comet to replace the Shackletons. These were all logical steps. The Hercules came into service in 1967 and the Phantoms, the Harriers and the Nimrods are on order for the Air Force and are coming into service next year. That was sense; it was logical and it has worked.
Next we were involved in negotiations with the United States authorities over the three United States aircraft, including the F111, in which we were interested, making arrangements about cost, delivery and British components. These negotiations resulted in extremely favourable financial terms, including credit terms, which we were able to extend to the Phantoms for the Royal Navy ordered by the previous Administration. It was also agreed that British items, amounting to about 40 per cent. of the total cost of the Royal Air Force Phantoms, would be incorporated in those aircraft. All that is to the great benefit of the aerospace industry.
During the time which followed, the defence review of capability and commitments resulted in the conclusions that we needed a land-based strike reconnaissance capability, that greater emphasis was in future to be placed on the tasks of the Royal Air Force in the conventional rôle and that in view of changes in capabilities the R.A.F. should take over from the carriers the maritime tasks in the later 1970s.
In parallel with the defence review, there was a good deal of fundamental rethinking about the size and rôle of the British aircraft industry—[Interruption.]—in which the report of the Plowden Committee in December, 1965, is the obvious landmark. It is all very well for the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) to keep smirking from the back benches. The Plowden Report has had a great impact on the minds of most hon. Members who take a serious interest in these affairs.
The general outcome of the review was to confirm the correctness of a reduction in national effort and a change in emphasis towards joint development and production and, in particular, co-operation with France. We signed a memorandum of collaboration with the French in 1965. We then signed the first procurement order for the F 111 and linked it with procurement of United Kingdom equipment under the offset arrangement. We also settled the final buy of the Hercules, fixed a price for the Nimrods, decided on the first order for Harriers, and made progress with the Anglo/French projects, including the Jaguar and the Anglo/ French helicopters. Then we established

the optimum specification of the A.F.V.G. All this was towards the end of 1966, although it became increasingly clear to us that the French Government were having difficulties about financing the A.F.V.G. and, as we all know, it was cancelled a short time after that.
If I may come right up to date, I remind hon. Members who were not here on Monday of what my right hon. Friend said about the continuing need to place as much emphasis as possible on European collaboration in the research, development, production and procurement of defence equipment, and this is particularly of aircraft.
I have made this chronological review because it can be clearly shown that the same consistent lines of thought run through what, to some people, may otherwise seem a bewildering pattern. The first principle now, as when we began, is that once the needs of the Royal Air Force have been established, the various means of meeting the needs have to be considered without any other consideration in view than that we must have aircraft with the right performance delivered at the right time and at the right price.
The previous Administration had planned a tactical strike/reconnaissance aircraft which could not have come into service until three years after its target in-service date, and at almost incredible cost. They planned to introduce the P1154 in about 1970–71 at the earliest, whereas in our programme the Royal Air Force will get its first Phantoms this year and its first Harriers next year. They planned transport aircraft to replace the ancient Beverleys and Hastings which were unlikely to have been in service even by 1971, whereas under our programme there are Hercules aircraft already in operation and the whole of the Hercules force should have been delivered by the end of the summer.
In fact, as my right hon. Friend said when he opened the defence debate on Monday, the Royal Air Force will be receiving more than 400 modern combat jets over the coming years as good as if not better than any in Europe. [Interruption.] There will be 1,000 aircraft in the hands of the Royal Air Force but more than 400 modern combat jets. These are what will be in the hands of the Air Force in a few years' time.

Mr. F. V. Corfield: In regard to the costs of the TSR2, can the hon. Gentleman say why it was al the fault of the previous Administration when expensive modifications were ordered by the Royal Air Force up to within a fortnight of cancellation? In view of his emphasis on land-based aircraft, can the Minister tell us what aircraft are to be used in support of seaborne exercises in the future?

Mr. Mason: I do not want to go into all the details, but, as far as the TSR2 is concerned, three air frames were being built, and some of the research which went into the aircraft has since been used. Indeed, the hon. Member for Hendon, North said so, and his knowledge of the industry is such that I would not attempt to mislead him. He knows that some of the research is now being embodied in other modern aircraft. The electronics especially are being developed, which will be very useful in sales overseas.
The Royal Air Force will have a highly sophisticated force of more than 400 modern combat jets in the next two or three years. Its Phantoms will be the most advanced aircraft of their time for another decade. For several years, the Harriers will be the only fixed-wing operation 11 aircraft in the world with a vertical take-off and landing capacity. The Nimrods will be the most advanced maritime aircraft in the world, too. I make no apology for repeating those facts, which I know that hon. Gentlemen opposite would like to wish away but cannot. We are talking about first-rate equipment for a first-rate Air Force, and none of their cries and none of these Motions will alter it.
So much for the present state of the Royal Air Force, but what of the state of the British aircraft industry? I repeat that, wherever British industry can meet the needs of the R.A.F., it will get the orders. The industry is working now on a military aircraft programme worth over £100 million in 1968–69 in research and development alone. The bulk of it relates to the United Kingdom Phantom, the Nimrod and the Harrier, for which very valuable production orders will follow the R. & D. stage, just as they will for the Jaguar and the other new aircraft coming along. There is the Bucaneer improvement programme in

train as well, and we are saying little about the very large guided missile programmes, though they are just as important to the aerospace industry.
It is not for me to speak about Government assistance to the industry generally, but, as the Opposition Motion is drawn in pretty wide terms, let me quote one or two significant figures. Comparing 1963 with the present day, employment in the industry is almost the same, with 264,000 in December, 1967, compared to 268,000 in December, 1963. But output is up by £133 million at current prices. Exports are up by £90 million at current prices. Government assistance for civil transport aircraft has nearly quadrupled. The Government expenditure in the industry has gone up by £20 million to £350 million, which is equivalent to about 60 per cent. of the industry's output. If this is a case of an industry ruined by Government action, I can think of plenty of other industries which would gladly be ruined in the same way.
Nor is that the end of the story, because the offset agreements with the United States, which I am confident will not now be altered so as to affect existing contracts placed under them, have enabled our aircraft and aero engine industries to make sales worth scores of millions of pounds in markets which would otherwise have remained closed to them.
The trouble is that the Opposition Motion is not even like the curate's egg. It is not even good in parts, because it is a bad egg all the way through. It talks of "precipitate action", though they complain incessantly that we are taking a long time to make up our minds. It talks about "vacillating policies", when we have operated consistent ones and, moreover, some which were begun by a Tory Minister of Defence. It talks of our becoming "deeply dependent on others", when every rational study of the British aircraft industry in recent years has shown that international collaboration, especially European collaboration, is the proper pattern to follow. It is a muddled Motion and an irrational one. I am glad to ask my hon. Friends to reject it.

5.24 p.m.

Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: We know the right hon. Gentleman to be a most energetic Minister, but today


he has had his own reheat system in operation. He went through his brief at supersonic speed.
I have become more and more depressed recently about the outlook for the Royal Air Force, and I am in no way reassured by listening to his speech. I criticise even his historic record of costs because, when he talks about a Spitfire costing £5,000, there must have been many organisations which gave Spitfires when we asked for £10,000 for one who felt that they had been held on a string. Putting a Rolls-Royce engine into an airframe and then adding the necessary armament would have cost a good deal more than £5,000, so the right hon. Gentleman appears to have been wrongly briefed on that.
In the course of his speech, he referred to cancellations. He really must do his homework. The fact is that it is good to have cancellations. Even in the days of a Conservative Government, my argument was always that we did not cancel often enough. The moment that a specification appears to be going wrong, is over-weight, or does not measure up to what it should do, it is right to cancel quickly. If the right hon. Gentleman looks at the situation in America, the percentage of cancellations there is considerably higher proportionately than our own.

Mr. Russell Kerr: Would the hon. Gentleman apply that line of thought to the Skybolt cancellation, which cost the nation nearly £300 million?

Sir A. V. Harvey: I do not know what the hon. Gentleman was doing at the time of Skybolt, but I went to Los Angeles to see it. Britain did not cancel it. It was cancelled by the United States Government. We were led up the garden path by the Americans. It so happened that I signed a Motion bearing a hundred signatures which was sent to Mr. Macmillan when he was in Nassau, and I went to see him there. A week after, I went to Los Angeles. The weapon flew 1,700 miles. There was nothing wrong with Skybolt. The Americans cancelled it because it suited them. In doing so, they let us down. That is why I do not like being dependent on America or any other foreign Power to that extent.
The right hon. Gentleman talked about employment in the industry. Three years ago, I understood that we were to get the surplus capacity out of this industry and into others. He now boasts that it is employing just as many people.

Mr. Mason: I gave specific figures to the effect that there are 4,000 fewer people employed in the industry. It is not much less in 8 years, but there are 4,000 less. Nevertheless, the aircraft industry has stepped up output considerably, increased exports, and has had a fine record over the past few years.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I was involved in the industry for a number of years and, from personal experience, I know that there are always too many people employed in it. There is always a lot of "fat" and no firm likes to let its workers go in case it gets a contract and cannot recruit workers. We want to get the surplus people out of some sections of the industry and into other export industries.
What the right hon. Gentleman did not say is what is happening to the research units, because they comprise the most important aspect of the situation. Scientific workers will not stay in an industry unless they have something exciting to aim at and something which is as good as any other country has. We have lost the cream of our research workers to North America and elsewhere. Very few of them will come back, because they are involved on the West Coast in exciting projects in supersonic flight, and so on.
I have always attached the greatest importance to research in this industry as giving an unknown figure of fall-out to the engineering business as a whole in such subjects as metallurgy, electronics and hydraulics. An example of this is, the hydraulic pit prop, which was developed from one of Dowty's undercarriages. This is where we shall fail in years to come unless we have a viable aircraft industry with efficient research teams behind it.
The right hon. Gentleman then talked about land-based aircraft being substituted for the carrier aircraft. I am sure that the House would like to know what aircraft these are, because I do not know them. Perhaps we can be told by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for


the Royal Air Force when he winds up the debate what is taking the place of the carrier aircraft.
I have listened to many of these Air Estimates debates over 23 years, together with the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). We have had many battles, usually from a different standpoint. To me, however, this is by far the saddest occasion on which I have taken part in such a debate. It is not the amount of money that is being spent; it is the way in which the Government have mutilated the Royal Air Force and the research programme of the aircraft industry.
I am sorry that the Secretary of State for Defence has left the Chamber. I have known him for many years. He is highly intellectual, but highly arrogant. He speaks to us in this House as though he were a don, which he was at one time. Nobody knows anything except him. He is the thickest skinned politician that I have ever come across. He misquotes what hon. Members say, and does so with a broad grin on his face. He does not even take the matter seriously. I suggest that the Government would have been well advised to have made a clean sweep and got rid of the right hon. Gentleman after the mess they made of our defence affairs. Put him out to grass for a year or two. It will do him a lot of good. We have to live with him, but I hope that he will be reminded of his record every week during the life of this Parliament.
The Defence Review of 1966 made the most of the decision to order the F111A from the United States and to produce the Anglo-French geometry aircraft. Both these aircraft have now been scrapped, and there is no replacement for them. The right hon. Gentleman said that he was rather proud. He called me a flabby little Englander. I take a different view about my country. Many people in Britain expect to us to ensure that we have a front line Air Force which is comparable to that of other Powers of our size and means.
The key to the deterrent power of our Armed Forces lies in the ability to obtain early warninig of an enemy's intentions—we do this by reconnaissance—and to strike at his offensive forces from a distance. Britain will no longer be capable of doing that when the V-bombers, which are ageing, have gone. The Government

have taken a clear decision which means that Britain no longer holds the key to the deterrent power of our Armed Forces. Thus the Royal Air Force will lack a critical part of its capability.
I expect the Government to break their election promise about improving our economy, and so on, but when it comes to the defence of the country, I think that it is unforgivable to go back on a promise which was made less than two years ago. In their 1966 election manifesto they claimed that the Defence Review,
Has made certain that our forces will be able to carry out these tasks, without overstrain, with the full range of weapons needed for the job.
The F111A capability will to some extent be provided by the V-bombers until about 1975, but many of these V-bombers must be getting tired, and I shall be surprised to see them last for so long. A few may, but when will the last Canberra be flying? Some are now 20 years old. Over the years the Government have boasted that they, not us, would give the Royal Air Force the best equipment with which to operate and defend our country, but in future the whole burden, in Europe and elsewhere, will be carried by the United States Air Force if it is willing and free to do the job.
On 1st March the Secretary of State for Defence said:
…we shall need a replacement for the Canberras, the tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft, whether we are east of Suez or not. This aircraft Fill K replaces the cancelled TSR2 designed by the previous Government primarily as an aircraft for use in the European theatre."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st March, 1967; Vol. 742, c. 476.]
On 13th December last the Minister of Defence for Equipment said:
It"—
that is the F111K—
is required as much in Europe as elsewhere for this type of operation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th December, 1967; Vol. 756, c. 399.]
What has changed the situation in the meantime? The Minister said that it was required in Europe.

Mr. Lubbock: It was not really.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I am talking about what the Government said. The hon. Gentleman was not elected to the Government. The Labour Party was, and it took on this responsibility to the electorate.
What do our friends and allies think about us? Today I had lunch with an American—obviously I cannot name him—who has a great affection for this country. Politically he is unbiassed, but he is depressed about the way in which we are tackling these affairs. He remarked on the remarkably fine speech, in depth and breadth, which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made during the defence debate. It certainly was a fine speech. It was well thought out, and I am certain that he wrote it himself. What must our friends and allies think of us? In my travels abroad I find it—[interruption.] If the hon. Member for Feltham (Mr. Russell Kerr) wishes to intervene, he should stand up, and I will give way, otherwise he should hold his peace.

Mr. Russell Kerr: I was merely saying that an equally relevant question is what do we think of them, particularly in regard to the Vietnam situation?

Sir A. V. Harvey: I shall not get involved in that emotional subject, because I shall probably be ruled out of order if I do. I have a high regard for the Australians and New Zealanders who are playing their part out there, whatever other views there may be on this subject.
Speaking about the Harrier, the Secretary of State said on 27th February, 1967:
We hope shortly to conclude a fixed-price contract for an initial order of the P1127…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February, 1967; Vol. 742, c. 98.]
I imagine that the Government issued an instruction for the firm to get on with it, but that was a year ago. When is the contract to be signed? I am as much concerned as anyone about unduly large profits being made on contracts, but, if someone has an instruction to proceed, and a year later there is still no contract, it is quite likely that we shall have another nonsense. I would like to see the matter settled with a firm contract.
We are told that 170 Phantoms have been ordered, but, as the carriers are to be scrapped by 1971, what is the position now? Are any of these aircraft to be cancelled? I put this question to the Minister the other day when he was speaking. What will happen to the aircraft when the carriers are phased out of service? Will they be cancelled, or will

the Royal Air Force take them? Will they have to be modified if the Royal Air Force takes them over? The cost of these Phantoms over 10 years, including spares and running costs, is about £755 million. I estimate that 46 per cent. of the aircraft has a sterling content, but the extent of the sterling content has put up the overall cost of the aircraft.

Mr. Lubbock: And the performance.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I understand that the hon. Gentleman will make his own speech. I hope that he will stop interrupting me. I shall make my speech as I want to make it.
I propose, now, to say a few words about the TSR2. My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr-Ewing) referred to the question of jigs and tools. I remember going with a deputation to see the present Chancellor of the Exchequer when he was Minister of Aviation. The TSR2 had been cancelled. We implored him not to dismantle the jigs and tools for this aircraft in case they were required in the next two, three, or four years. We said that while the jigs and tools were in existence we would have some hold over the Americans if they started doing another Skybolt on us, yet in a matter of months the Government ran a steamroller over the jigs and tools and destroyed them. The only reason that I can think of for them doing that was that if the Conservatives had won the 1966 election we might have proved how wrong they were. Why was it done? There were empty hangars all over the country in which these jigs and tools could have been stored without any charge. All that we have today is a set of drawings.
It may have been an expensive aircraft, but the fact was that anything we spent on it would have been in sterling. We would have been using our own skills and research. Our own men would have been building the aircraft. It is not comparing like with like to say that the cost of the F111A was this, and that of the TSR2 was that, because in the latter case we would have been using home materials, and getting the "know-how" and fallout. It would have been a cheap proposition. I remember the chief test pilot, Mr. Beamont, after having flown about 50 or 60 hours, saying that he


would have had less trouble with this aircraft than with the Canberra at the same stage of development. Getting rid of it was a great mistake.
The right hon. Gentleman boasted about the transport aircraft, but it is about 16 years old, although still quite useful. A total of 66 were provided at just under £1 million each before the Government changed their policy in the Far East. How are they to be employed in three or four years? What will we get for our money? What will happen to the number of VC 10s on order for Transport Command? They are very expensive, but could be very useful to one of the airlines if not required by Transport Command.
My hon. Friend spoke about the combat strength of the R.A.F. It was pointed out by Air Commodore Donaldson in the Daily Mail that we have a combat strength of 460. lower than at any time since the 1939–45 war. It is one-fifth the size of the Communist Chinese Air Force. I know something about the Chinese Air Force, since I helped to form it and teach them to fly in the early 1930s in Southern China.
Our Air Force includes 144 obsolete Canberras which are not a suitable weapon today, 96 V-bombers which are nearing the end of their useful life, 204 Lightnings, and 50 marine piston-engined Shackletons. The Government said that they would give the R.A.F. the best equipment, and I know that the right hon. Gentleman said what we shall get in the 1970s—but that is their reply to everything. If I want a new hospital in Macclesfield, I am told to wait until the 1970s.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: To take the hon. Member's point about a replacement for the Shackleton, would he not concede that it was only when the Labour Government came in that an order was placed for the Nimrods, which go into operation very soon? He complains about this Government but his own Government did not put in an order for a replacement.

Sir A. V. Harvey: By the hon. Gentleman's own admission, his Government have not put in an order for the Harrier but have given an instruction to proceed. The Conservative Government did much to prepare the specification for the Nimrod. That is almost three years'

work by a Conservative Government: the hon. Gentleman must get his facts right—

Mr. Merlyn Rees: The important thing for my responsibility is to see that an aeroplane is in service. The hon. Gentleman complains about the Government not doing something. The order was placed as soon as the Labour Government came to power and it was impossible to have a new aeroplane for Coastal Command because the Tory Government had not placed an order. The process takes three years.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I am prepared to give the hon. Gentleman the point, but some of the work was done by the Conservative Government, and there are not enough on order.
The Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, in Alexandria, and Algiers, and the problems of the west coast of Africa, means that we shall need a large Coastal Command to police the area. This may be our biggest problem, to control that Atlantic coastline effectively. All that the Government have done over the Simonstown base is to antagonise the South Africans. This Government never seem to learn from experience. This happened also with the previous Labour Government, although the Attlee Administration were an efficient team compared with this lot.
The cost of the Canberra replacement—of the TSR2, on which about £178 million has been spent, the A.F.V.G., which cost £2·5 million, and the F111K, which cost £56 million and could cost £70–£80 million—will be at least £236 million, and we have nothing to show for it. This is incredible. Then we have the other cancellation charges, all resulting in very little.
My experience leads me to believe that this Government do not understand defence, with one or two exceptions. I am sorry for the Under-Secretary, who is well liked in the R.A.F. and does what he can, but living under the present Secretary of State and trying to put his policy into practice is quite something to take on. What disturbs me is that the Left-wing of the Labour Party will want more cuts. They said so last week. They will not be satisfied with what has been done already—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: indicated assent.—

Sir A. V. Harvey: I am glad to see the hon. Member supports my contention—

Mr. Russell Kerr: Would the hon. Gentleman not agree that our attitude, which he has accurately described, will continue so long as we spend roughly 75 per cent. of our aircraft manufacturing capacity on the military instead of the civil side?

Sir A. V. Harvey: The hon. Gentleman is confused about the figures. We must relate this to a proportion of the gross national product, since we can spend only what we can earn. Our present percentage is not far out, and Britain can afford an efficient front line Air Force with British-made aircraft, which it has not got today.
What will happen in the Persian Gulf after British withdrawal? We have heard about the possibility of rulers buying some aircraft and getting an air force together, but we do not know for sure. Twenty-six British advisers were sent out of Aden at a few hours' notice a few days ago. The Soviet Union will probably send officials and technicians to replace them. There is a frightening situation in the Middle East, through which runs our blood line to Australia and the Far East.
Even more important, I was bold enough last year to say that I thought morale in the R.A.F. was not too bad, but I cannot say that today. It is bad. The hon. Member must know it and recruiting figures show it, and it will get worse. What young man in his senses will opt to enter any of the Services? I do not say this to put anyone off, since my own children are involved, but they cannot see a career. They see men in their thirties being axed in the same way as happened in the 1920s and early thirties. These young men want a good career, and the Government keep saying that they will guarantee it, but this is a false prospectus. The R.A.F. prospectus about Fl I Is and numbers of aircraft is "not on".
The Chief of Air Staff, with his usual great loyalty to the Government, has faced a personal crisis in recent months. I am sure that his colleagues will do their best, but I cannot see how any Government can continue as they are, with this

most necessary fighting Service. I have been involved with the Air Force, either flying as a regular, a reservist or an auxiliary, or making aeroplanes for about 40 years—all my working life—and this is the worst moment that I have known when I see what is happening to the R.A.F. The hon. Gentleman boasted of what they are doing instead of admitting that they are under pressure from the Left-wing to make these alterations.

5.49 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I have followed the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) many times over the last 20 years, and, although we have differed fundamentally, I believe that we understand each other's point of view. He regards me as a spokesman of the Left wing of the Labour Party and I regard him as a typical Conservative Member who is greatly interested in developing the aircraft industry and who has frequently acted in a dual capacity, as a director of one of the big aircraft companies and as an M.P.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I have not been connected with the aircraft industry for 12 years.

Mr. Hughes: That is news to me. I do not follow the ramifications of the Stock Exchange as closely as I should. For many years the hon. Gentleman was a director of Handley Page, but if he is no longer connected with that company, that is a loss for Handley Page and a gain for Parliament. I am likely to misunderstand people, but certainly there is evidence to show that the hon. Gentleman is often regarded as a sort of respectable, pushful, enterprising, political commercial traveller for the aircraft industry.

Sir A. V. Harvey: But not a fellow-traveller.

Mr. Hughes: I am a fellow-traveller. I travel with all sorts of people along the road which leads to the abolition of the whole military aircraft industry, for I realise that it is out of date.
I have a good memory. I recall a famous speech in which the hon. Member for Macclesfield was despairing about the future of the aircraft industry. That was 12 or 15 years ago, when he said that the industry, under the then Tory Government, was in such a bad state that he would not encourage his son to join


the R.A.F. I believe that he was right and I congratulate his son for going into something more productive. I appreciate, however, that if all the nation's sons had thought the same way, we would never have had an R.A.F.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I must put this right. My eldest son, who is now 25, was not, owing to inefficient eyes, eligible to join the R.A.F. My youngest son considered the Army, but decided against it. The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong and he must be fair.

Mr. Hughes: Whatever the position, I recall the hon. Gentleman being despondent about the future of the R.A.F. and I clearly remember him saying that he would not encourage his son to join it. In any event, I hope that his son is prospering in another career.
Over the years the hon. Gentleman has gone from despondency to elation about the R.A.F. and the future of the military aircraft industry. Today he is in a state of despondency because he thinks that the Labour Government have ruined the industry and that there is not much future far it. My view is entirely the opposite. I have criticised this vast expenditure and I am here today to continue that criticism. We are being asked to vote £557 million, which is £30 million more than last year. We are supposed to be in a financial crisis. We are worried about the state of the £. All these financial considerations seem to vanish through the door when we discuss the Votes for the Services.
As in the past, I am here as the unofficial representative of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I want to know what we are getting for this money. I also have a constituency interest to declare. At last I am able to say that we in South Ayrshire have got something for this expenditure of £557 million. In the recent storms in South Ayrshire an R.A.F. helicopter fed sheep on the hillside with turnips from the air. It was the first real contribution that I have been able to acknowledge for my constituents in the last 20 years from the Services. The only value we have got for our money over the years is this action by the R.A.F., which sent out a helicopter to save 600 sheep from starvation in the snow.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: My hon. Friend probably knows that along the shores of

this country every year the R.A.F. saves many civilian lives. Perhaps some of those people come from Ayrshire. Perhaps in 1940 his constituents were grateful to the R.A.F.

Mr. Hughes: I do not want to go back 25 years. I want to know what we are getting for our money now. I cannot understand why, when I express my gratitude to the Minister and say, "Thank you very much for saving the sheep of South Ayrshire", he rebukes me. I am not often in a mood of thankfulness.
The farmers of my constituency want to know how to get in touch with the R.A.F. when they need assistance. They also want to know why some farmers got turnips while others did not. Is there any class distinction here? Are the big farmers and landlords who have a certain amount of social influence provided with turnips from the sky while the small farmers are not? And how do farmers generally apply for this assistance? Do they send in application forms or merely seek help verbally if their sheep are isolated and need to be fed by helicopters?
I acknowledge the philanthropic attitude of the R.A.F. However, it is not a philanthropic institution. It is supposed to be capable of fighting a modern war. While its subsidiary activities are important, do they justify our spending £557 million on them? Even if the Minister adds up the cost of all the helicopters for feeding sheep, saving lives and so on—including the Aberfan disaster; I am not sure whether he has taken the storm in Scotland into account—I am sure that it would not work out at £557 million. Whatever the cost of these subsidiary activities, I would be glad to meet it out of public funds, but that does not include vast sums being spent on American aircraft when I do not know the purpose of the R.A.F. or what part it could play in a modern war.
The country is supposed to be in a bad financial state. The £ is in difficulties and I cannot understand how expenditure of this magnitude can help us in this crisis. As I study the financial Press, it seems that the greater the military expenditure, the weaker becomes the position of the £. If it is not helping the economic position of the country, we are entitled to criticise and to oppose this expenditure.
What do the latest figures of expenditure mean to the average household? The latest figures I have been able to get from the Ministry of Defence show that the defence bill is costing 16s. per head per week for every individual in the country. A man and wife are paying 32s. a week and a family of five pay £5 a week for the various defence forces. I do not know how this can be justified. All the philanthropic facilities, all the dropping of turnips in storms and the various things done by the R.A.F. would not amount to £10 million.
So far as I can reason this out, it is done for the purpose of preparing for a war against the Soviet Union. During the years when we have had arguments about this there have been enormous developments which make the R.A.F. almost obsolete for a modern war. The hon. Member for Macclesfield will remember that I asked a question which had never been asked in this House before. It was almost sacrilege to ask it in an Air Force debate. We were talking about fighters and I asked a very simple question, how can a fighter aircraft, costing a lot of money, defend us from a bomb coming from a rocket? I do not know and the hon. Member cannot tell us.
Since we have had these arguments there has been tremendous development in the technological armament of the Soviet Union. I think the Soviet Union has larger helicopters than we have. I am not an authority on this, but I understand that in Paris recently Russian helicopters were on sale.
The whole character of modern warfare has changed. If we got into a nuclear war the possibility would be that the bombs would not descend on us from bombing aircraft but from rockets. Someone in a distant part of the Soviet Union would press a button and three or four megaton bombs would knock this country to smithereens. Apparently we would have the satisfaction of knowing that someone in the United States had pressed a button and that the Russians were destroyed. The hon. Member cannot contradict this. Instead of coming from modern fast-flying aircraft, the bombs are more likely to come from rockets. If so, we are not entitled to spend this large sum of money without further inquiry.
Science has completely changed war. Hon. Members opposite, and on the Government Front Bench, are thinking in terms of a war 20 years ago, but they are talking about aeroplanes for the 'seventies. What will happen in the 'seventies I do not know, but I have heard an interesting argument put forward with great passion by the Under-Secretary. He passionately denounced the wickedness and futility of what the Conservative Government did in office. In turn the pots on the other side will call the kettles black. On the last occasion when the Labour Party was in Opposition we moved a Motion of censure on the Conservative Government. We were asked to censure the Tory Government because in 13 years they had spent £20,000 million of the country's money without having anything to show for it.
That was the argument of George Wigg. It was the argument put by our Front Bench. We trooped into the Division Lobby to denounce the Conservative Government because they had spent all that money on Blue Streak, Skybolt, and all the other paraphernalia and had nothing to show for it. Now the hon. Member for Macclesfield makes the same accusation against our Government. Our Government produces the same excuses and talks in the same way. If this Government lasts for another decade or so and piles up the same expenditure, all that the Tory Government in another 10 years or so will have to do is to move a Motion in the same terms as we moved against the Conservative Government for having wasted £20,000 million of the taxpayers' money and having nothing to show for it. So I object.
The one occasion on which I think the hon. Member for Macclesfield and I were in agreement was when he appreciated my argument that, instead of spending these vast sums on military aircraft, we should spend them on the development of civil aircraft. For about two minutes we agreed. I lost him after about the third minute. I put the proposition seriously to the Government today that this £500 million would be better spent in developing civilian aircraft.
I am interested in civilian aircraft because I have a near-constituency interest. In Prestwick there is a large aerodrome and a comparatively small aircraft industry. I am not against the aircraft


industry. I am not against its research or organisation. I want to see this organisation, money and resources put into civilian aircraft. We should do that on a large scale and forget about expenditure on bombers.
We should realise that in many underdeveloped countries comparatively small aircraft are needed for transport and freight purposes. There is a huge market awaiting us, but at the moment we are spending our money on obsolete military aircraft. We are doing almost the same as the Conservative Government did. We are in a competitive age. Our competitors in countries such as Japan are not wasting their money in this way. They would think it ridiculous. I was in Japan last August. I found that they are spending only 1 per cent. of their national income on any kind of defence. The Japanese Diet, especially the Socialist members of the Diet, would immediately table a vote of censure if a defence Minister there came forward with a bill of this kind.
Every intelligent Japanese businessman puts his resources into modern industry. It is because we are not doing that; because we are going on in this blundering, old, Conservative way that the Japanese are beating us in the competitive markets of the world. One proof is this: in Hong Kong, until recently, the Japanese yen was stronger than the British pound and that is because the Japanese are living in a modern age and they have done away with the paraphernalia of so-called "defence".
In voting this money to the Government in these Air Estimates we are not thinking of the economic welfare of the country. We are wasting our men, our resources and the brains of the younger generation in going on in this way and imagining that this in any way defends Britain.
Ours is an over-crowded island. If there is an atomic war it will not be a question of whether our aeroplanes are a second slower than those of the so-called enemy. It will be a question of rockets and ballistic missiles being used by one power or another. We are spending our money wastefully on obsolete weapons which do not lead to our defence. I speak as one who is interested in seeing this country solvent. I regard this as a waste of money and I am opposed to it.

6.12 p.m.

Mr. Hector Monro: I cannot say it is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) in this debate, but I can say his views make me all the more passionate that the Royal Air Force should be the finest Service in this country.
He dwelt for some time on the humanitarian efforts of the Royal Air Force to help farmers in times of difficulty. I am glad he paid tribute to the help given recently in South Ayrshire. It is not only humanity that brings the Royal Air Force to help in this way. It is an important part of Service training for pilots. The fact that there were pilots of helicopters helping in Scotland recently bears very fully on the remarks made this afternoon by the Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) about the magnificent demonstration of airmanship of the helicopter pilot in the North Sea yesterday. That pilot was an ex-Royal Navy helicopter pilot and it is likely he gained great experience and skill in doing this work in Lossiemouth, in the North of Scotland.
The only point on which I agreed with the hon. Member for South Ayrshire were his remarks about light aircraft. It is true that there is a great market and potential for them. I shall come to this a little later in my speech. I do not expect the hon. Gentleman has forgotten the great work done by the Prestwick Pioneers in the Royal Air in Malaysia. These were built not very far from his own constituency.
This Motion deals with the long-term. I do not think one can deal with aircraft in isolation as far as the long-term is concerned; one has also to look at the short-term and the expected life of the aircraft themselves. Basically, the debate is about the Royal Air Force.
I was glad that in the opening remarks of the Minister of Defence for Equipment tribute was paid to the great service of the Royal Air Force. This year it celebrates its 50th year of active service. It was interesting to hear the comments he made on some of the highlights of the Royal Air Force, particularly before the war, of flights of endurance to South Africa and India, at great altitudes, and high speed, because these are the types of operation that the pilots of the Royal Air Force enjoy. They like to be able


to take initiative, and the sense of achievement in completing a flight of this sort is something which has to be felt. The Royal Air Force should, whenever possible these days, give its operational pilots the chance of making the unusual types of flights and operations because there is a wealth of experience and achievement to be gained from them.
We in the House tend to look at aircraft procurement entirely in relation to defence, particularly in commitments overseas and their operational rôle. I do not think it is coupled sufficiently with the Service that flies and operates them. I accept what the hon. Member for South Ayrshire has been arguing: we must keep a careful eye on the financial considerations. We must also consider the Royal Air Force far more than we do. The Royal Air Force itself must sit in silence and think very strange things about what we politicians have done for it over the years.
We have to view our purchase of aircraft with regard not only to our operational rôle but also to the aircrew and ground staff who will fly and service these aircraft. This, in turn, has a very significant effect on recruitment. This may well be more self-evident in the future.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr-Ewing) has shown that there is very excellent recruiting material provided by the Royal Air Force, but it is disappointing that the latest edition has suddenly become out of date.
Let us look at the point of view of the aircrew. Why does one join the Royal Air Force? Surely, it is because one wants to fly. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), I was also in the Royal Air Force and later in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. The reason that one joins the Air Force beyond the desire we all have to serve our country, is simply to fly.
I am disappointed that so few of the senior Royal Air Force officers—wingcommanders, group captains and air officers—are not able to be in constant flying practice and, far less, be up to date with instrument rating conditions.

Sir A. V. Harvey: In fairness to the Chief of Air Staff, Sir John Grandy is in constant flying practice as senior officer.

Mr. Monro: This is, of course, so. I include Air Marshal Sir Augustus Walker who does it all with one arm. But the point I am arguing is that a large number of senior Air Force officers have very few opportunities to fly.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: When I first took up this appointment—and I am sure the hon. Member for Harwich (Mr. Ridsdale) will bear me out in this—I found that about 10 years ago the decision was made that aircrew generally would not have to fly while doing desk jobs. The reason is that to put a man in a modern aeroplane, when not in constant flying practice, is, these days, extremely dangerous. When I inquired why this was no longer done, I found that the American Air Force also carries out exactly the same policy. It is not for want of trying on their part; it is that they are not allowed to do so in many cases.

Mr. Monro: I appreciate the Under-Secretary's view. He is trying to make my speech for me. I know that what he says is true, but I was going to argue that there should be a slight change in emphasis of policy. The policy which the Under-Secretary has pointed out is either that of the Ministry of Defence or is brought about because suitable aircraft are not available. In the last days of the Auxiliary Air Force, when we were flying Spitfires or Vampires once a month, it became slightly illogical. I shall come later to the question of the provision of suitable aircraft.
The strength of the Royal Air Force has been discussed. On Monday the Secretary of State said that there would be 1,000 aircraft in the R.A.F. in the early 1970s. That figure must include every possible aircraft—not only jets, piston-engined and training aircraft, but no doubt those in museums also. I want to look at this question in a little more detail. Hon. Members have quoted the Press and the very excellent publication Air Pictorial for details of aircraft presently available.
In round figures there are about 85 squadrons. To realise how the Air


Force has changed, that figure should be compared with the figure of 487 squadrons in service in 1945. Of these 85 squadrons, 45 are jet and combat squadrons and eight are maritime squadrons. Therefore, the first-line defence is fewer than 500 fighting aircraft—the V-bombers, Canberras, Lightnings, Javelins, Hunters, and the 50 Shackletons. If we phase out, as we must, the Canberras, Victors and Javelins, we shall be down to about 350, plus the Buccaneers, if they are transferred to the R.A.F.
We have listened with interest to details of the aircraft which will be brought into the Royal Air Force in the near future—the Phantoms, Harriers, Jaguars and Nimrods. I appreciate that a proportion of the new aircraft will have to be diverted to training. Then there are 200 transport aircraft—Hercules, VC10s, Belfasts and Andovers. Presumably, the Argosies will be phased out in the not too distant future, because the type originally flew in 1959 and these aircraft will be getting rather elderly in the early 1970s. I expect that, in designing the Nimrod, the Government have allowed for the fact that they could be converted to transport aircraft at relatively short notice in an emergency.
The Shackleton has had a long and good career in the Royal Air Force, bearing in mind that the prototype flew in 1949. It is now getting old. The Mark III, which was a very big improvement, came into service much later. I am glad to know that these aircraft are not to be retained for much longer. I hope that the Under-Secretary can assure us that by 1970 certainly they will all be retired from service. There are relatively few of them in each operational squadron and they fly about 200 hours a month, which imposes a big strain on servicing. The R.A.F. ground crews are to be congratulated on the way in which they have maintained these aircraft, particularly for flying in difficult weather conditions in the far north of Scotland. We have all been very sad at the crashes which have occurred in the last year, all of which occurred. for a particular reason and which certainly were not due to age or to faulty servicing.
These aircraft will be replaced by the Nimrod. Although I accept that there is no alternative to the Nimrod, I wonder

whether it is the best choice for maritime reconnaissance work. I know that it can get out into the far Atlantic or the very far North very quickly indeed, but I do not think that flying what can be termed a stiff aircraft like the Nimrod—as opposed to the Shackleton, which is flexible, for its wings go up and down in the air currents—at low level for long periods in bumpy conditions will be an experience that aircrew will enjoy. I doubt whether the highly complicated radar equipment will enjoy the experience either.
The other aircraft which I am glad to know will soon be phased out is the Canberra. This aircraft is 20 years old. I agree that many of the Canberras now flying are much younger than that. In my experience—I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield will agree—older aircraft, however many new engines they have had, never fly quite as well as new ones. When they reach the age of about 15, it is high time that they departed for the scrap heap. One of the first aircraft I flew on operations was an old Catalina from a lake in India. It had flown 2,500 hours, which was a high number of hours for an operational aircraft during the war. It took about three and a half minutes to get off in a flat calm, whereas a new Catalina would probably get off in two and a quarter minutes. The age of the air frame made a tremendous difference.
We have aircraft now for operational squadrons and for transport squadrons. I want to ask the Under-Secretary a little more about what is in view for training units and what aircraft can be provided for the host of pilots who have joined the R.A.F. but who have little or no opportunity to fly. Most pilots who are keen on flying would think that only 20 hours a month flying was a pretty miserable ration. We should make a real effort to provide some type of light aeroplane which pilots such as these could fly on the average R.A.F. station.
I will not go to extremes. Naturally, I do not expect R.A.F. officers who are out of flying practice to fly jets, V-bombers, Lightnings, or even helicopters or Shackletons. However, I believe that it is the duty of the Ministry of Defence to make every effort to maintain the enthusiasm to fly and to provide an aircraft for this classification of R.A.F. officer


to use. I should have thought that out of this huge amount of money a few hundred thousand pounds or £1 million could be found for this purpose. A few more Beague 206s would be the thing. I am sure that those who have seen the Beagle Pup will recommend it highly as just the type of thing to keep officers in touch with the air, with radio procedures, and perhaps with simple transport duties. The Jet Provosts and the Gnats are too advanced for this type of use. I hope that the Under-Secretary will consider this suggestion with as much seriousness as I advance it.
Whilst talking of the Gnats, I am sure that the whole House will want to congratulate the R.A.F. and its aerobatic team on the tremendous demonstrations they have given throughout Europe in recent years, which do so much to enhance the morale of the Service.
My suggestion about flying in the Royal Air Force in less rigorous conditions might do something towards retaining younger pilots in the Service, rather than letting them go to the civil airlines.
I do not want to talk about the Reserves, and I should not do so on the Motion, but in passing I should like to mention that I wish we had the much closer link between the Service and civilian life provided by the Auxiliary Air Force and the R.A.F.V.R.
This week my hon. Friends have shown in the House why Britain needs air power and the best aircraft. I have tried to show that we should balance our requirements in an effort to raise the morale of the Royal Air Force. We must never let it run down and I am sure that the House will always be prepared to provide the money if the Government's recommendations are sound and sensible. Certainly, where the Royal Air Force is concerned the Government can count on my support.

6.31 p.m.

Mr. James Johnson: It is not my habit to intervene in defence debates. As an amateur, I usually sit and listen to my betters in these matters, but occasionally I walk in and hear cryptic comments by Ministers and by hon. Members opposite about

what will happen to a particular plane. That plane is the Buccaneer.
Many people, particularly in the South of England, who should know better—but perhaps they are a little ignorant about geography—seem to think that Hull is mainly a fishing port. Some even seem to think of it as a fishing village. But if they came to Humberside they would know that we have many thousands of engineers, and that Hawker Siddeley makes at Brough a very fine plane called the Buccaneer.
The Motion has to do with cancellation of contracts. We have suffered from cancellation of the Buccaneer. In the first week of January it was announced by Hawker Siddeley that about 1,000 workers were to be made redundant, with 400 starting straightaway. There was a bit of scaremongering on the part of an hon. Member, if not some hon. Members, opposite in Yorkshire. But at present just a little over 400 are likely to be unemployed, of whom quite a number are women in the offices. We hope that that other fine new plane, the Harrier, will give us work, although it may unfortunately mean that Portsmouth will lose some. But that is one of those things that happen in the aircraft industry. I had the pleasure of seeing the Harrier in action a short while ago with some of my colleagues on the Aviation Committee.
Hawker Siddeley has done very well with Buccaneer contracts in the past, including the arms deal with South Africa which we cut back after coming to office. The 1967 Report of the Public Accounts Committee, which is the financial watchdog of the House, indicated that excessive profits were made on those contracts. The Times said:
It now looks as though the sum involved in the Government's over-estimating of costs on the Buccaneer aircraft contracts awarded to Hawker Siddeley is at least £12,500,000.
We make fine planes at the Hawker Siddeley plant—the old Blackburn works—and much money has been made in the past. While we hope that we shall make more Buccaneers in the future, that will be done, perhaps, with not quite the 17½ per cent. or more profit that there has been formerly.
On the question of Buccaneers for South Africa, let there be no doubt that South Africa would have used them not


only for the usual purposes of defence but also—and I say this quite clearly—in case of any internal disaffection. I know that South Africa has many Harvards which I am told it could and would use, as our Government used them in Kenya 10 or more years ago in the Mau Mau emergency. Perhaps South Africa as 600 for this purpose.
Although my colleagues and I are against selling Buccaneers to South Africa, I hope that in the light of comments in the debate on Monday and today we may see the Mark 2 made in larger numbers. As the Minister said, it would be of distinct value to our defence in the future. On Monday, my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Equipment said:
As for our existing aircraft, I think that it is worth mentioning that we are planning how to improve the Buccaneer 2s which the Royal Air Force will inherit from the Navy so that it has a useful naval-attack and reconnaissance capability for use against land targets. We also hope to place an order shortly for the improved basic trainer, the Jet Provost 5.
When he follows an important statement about the Buccaneer by saying
We also hope to place an order shortly
I assume that perhaps in the sentence before he was thinking of placing a first order. We shall see. Later he said:
I know there is concern about the F111 cancellation but we shall have to await the outcome of the present Warton studies."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1968; Vol. 760, c. 167.]
I do not know what these Warton studies will be, but I hope that they will come down in favour of what I believe to be a magnificent plane, the Buccaneer 2. I had the good fortune to go with my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he was Minister of Aviation, to the plant where the Buccaneer is made, and I have been over it since then more than once. I have talked to shop stewards who are my constituents and to the design team. When I speak to shop stewards in the A.E.U. who belong to Hull, competent and highly-skilled workmen, I am left in no doubt that it is a fine plane. There is an excellent management under Captain Duncan Lewin, and first-class workmen are engaged on production. They are hard-headed and competent constituents of mine—they are bound to be

hard-headed and competent if they are my constituents.
They asked "Why should we worry unduly about cancellation of the F111?" Speaking as a layman, I can only give the gist of what I am told. I understand that the F111 concept originated in the requirement for a TFX—tactical fighter X. I am told that that is the justification for its variable sweepback; it was required to do long patrols for which endurance was vital. For that purpose the swing wing spreads to its maximum span. It is brought back to a "paper dart" shape when there is a need for full speed in interception. I understand that the swing wing seems fully justified for that type of operation. But it also offers other things.
The fully-spread wing offers the advantage of development of high lift for take-off. This must have been one of the attractive features of the plane when comparing it with other aircraft. On the face of it, the fully-spread wing enables a heavy load of fuel and bombs to be taken off, after which the wing swings back.
But I also understand that the performance of the F111 is somewhat disappointing. This may be because the F111 was designed and built in something of a hurry. It may be that the extra weight and bulk of the swing wing outweigh the aerodynamic advantages. Without too much detail, I have here some figures about the F111. It weighs 80,000 lb. and has to go up to 100,000 lb. for long-range missions. As a result, I am told, the promised gain in the plane's performance has been eaten away and it is now virtually no more than a big aircraft of conventional efficiency with two by-pass engines of identical design to that of the Spey.
I heard my right hon. Friend say today that there would be a further development of the Buccaneer, and I hope so. I understand that it is a similar aircraft to the F111, with similar overall efficiency. It does not carry the same penalties in volume and bulk of the swing wing. There is almost the same performance as the F111 offers on long-range trials.
We have been told the performance of the F111—dimensions, fuel capacity, etc.—but it is important at this stage to


distinguish between the limited fuel load which could be lifted from an aircraft carrier and the potential fuel load which simple development could provide. I hope that my right hon. Friend will tell me what are these simple developments which possibly the Government have in mind to make the Buccaneer a better plane which will live up to these statements on its behalf. We believe that it is such a plane.
The F111 has a strike radius with a 2,000 1b. load of about 1,550 nautical miles. The Buccaneer, developed, as we hope, as the Mark II, has a range of 1,450 nautical miles with a 2,000 lb. load. The F111 carries a 20,000 lb. full bomb load for 500 nautical miles and I understand that the Buccaneer can carry 16,000 lbs. for 400 nautical miles.
Where the Buccaneer comes out better is in what is termed the low-level dash of about 100 nautical miles or more. The supersonic nature of the F 111 makes it almost useless for this because it burns up so much fuel on a low-level dash. Indeed, I am told that its internal fuel load of 32,000 lbs. could be used up in a little over 200 miles of top speed at low level. So we claim that the Buccaneer is certainly superior in this respect.
The two Front Benches disputed earlier about the sophisticated equipment which would have been built up in the TSR2 and which hon. Members opposite claim has been wasted. I understand that this is not so. This equipment can be and is being used in our later aircraft and that it is being and will be carried in this advanced type of the Buccaneer, which can carry all the known equipment we have so far and whose large weapon bay is an obvious advantage.
The Buccaneer would be invaluable in any use made of it in the European theatre, whoever may be the potential opponent. I submit that this plane has an excellent case, both technical and military, as well as on other grounds, for development. But I also speak unashamedly from a constituency point of view. On Humberside we have a claim because of rising unemployment; and on behalf of the men who make the Buccaneer, and who could make its development, I make an open plea that we should continue to make this aircraft in larger

numbers at the old Blackburn works, west of Hull.
It is important on the Humber to maintain employment for skilled and qualified men engineers. We are generally an area of low-paid workers. By and large, we have unskilled workers on low wages and with a comparatively low standard of living. It is important not only to keep industries of this nature, therefore, but to expand them for the good of Hull and of Humberside as a whole.

Mr. Corfield: The hon. Gentleman is worried about employment prospects in his constituency. Why, therefore, did he vote against the possibility of selling more Buccaneers to South Africa?

Mr. Johnson: Because I happen to possess some moral qualities which have been consistent and constant throughout my political life, and I will not vote to sell any kind of aircraft, whether made on the Humber, the Mersey or any other estuary, by any firm anywhere, which would be used in any possible conflict with coloured peoples in the Commonwealth or elsewhere. That is why I voted as I did.
Of course, I am here to fight to get jobs and employment for my people, and I say again that we have fine engineers on Humberside and can make a fine plane. The Buccaneer is a good plane and I think that my right hon. Friend may share that view. If it can be built in larger numbers and can be shown to be of value to the defence of my country, that is the case I make.

6.48 p.m.

Mr. Eric Lubbock: I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) for a reason which will emerge, as he probably realises. But first I would say what a very good case he put on behalf of his constituency for a developed version of the Buccaneer and how interested I was in his comparison of its performance with that of the F111.
This matter was the subject of a little discussion between the hon. Gentleman and myself two years ago, during the Kingston upon Hull, North by-election, when I warned the people of Hull that it was not likely that the Government would order the Buccaneer as a replacement for the Canberra. I was followed


that same day by the present Home Secretary, who held up a copy of the Hull Daily Mail which had a story headed, "Royal Air Force unlikely to get the Buccaneer". He poured scorn on my speech, which was there reported, and said that there would be work ahead for at least four years at Brough, taking the works up to 1970.
I rather think that the hon. Gentleman also made some remarks about my speech during that by-election, although I have not got the cutting to hand. The hon. Gentleman has had to plead in the House, two years later, for work for his constituents. Two years ago, responsible Ministers, including the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, made the same speech for electoral reasons in Hull saying that there was four years' work for the people at Brough. Now they are unmasked, and although the hon. Gentleman has put up an extremely good case on behalf of his constituents, I must blame him partly for what has happened, because of the unjustified faith which he placed in the promises of Ministers. There was never a chance that the Buccaneer would be ordered as a replacement for the Canberra.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that someone in Hull said, at that time, that the Buccaneer was to be ordered as a Canberra replacement?

Mr. Lubbock: The proposition had been advanced in some quarters. There were three alternatives—I do not say that they were all taken seriously—the F111, the developed version of the Mirage and the Buccaneer. All that I said when I went to the Hull by-election was that it was highly unlikely, to put it at its most modest, that the R.A.F. would get a developed version of the Buccaneer, and therefore it was time for the Government to make contingency plans and decide what alternative work would be made available to the workers in Brough when employment ran down on the Buccaneer.
This was the speech for which the present Home Secretary criticised me so violently, accusing me of making election capital out of this Buccaneer programme. All I was trying to do was to persuade the Government to adopt some sensible plan for creating employment for the hon. Gentleman's constituents. Now he pleads

in the House two years later. Why did he not join with me on that occasion in pleading with the Government to make some long-term contingency plans—when it might have done some good—to anticipate the difficulties, so that these workers would not be dismissed, as they will be during the coming year?

Mr. James Johnson: You have made a point which is not correct.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. The hon. Gentleman must use the traditional form of address.

Mr. Johnson: The hon. Member for Orpington would perhaps allow me to say that he is not correct in saying that any of us, including the Home Secretary and myself, said that this was the replacement for the Canberra. This is not a factual statement. I will accept what the hon. Gentleman said earlier about the cancellation. We on this side maintain that the employment of these people is an internal matter for Hawker Siddeley, whether or not a plane is made at a particular time. It is up to the internal resources of the firm to plan work for these 417 people, and I am glad to say that it is doing this.

Mr. Lubbock: What the right hon. Gentleman said, leaving aside the question of how one was to use the version of the Buccaneer, was that there was four years' work at Brough, taking us up to 1970. I quite rightly pointed out to the people of Hull at that time that there was nothing like four years' work available on the Buccaneer programme, unless it was to be sold to South Africa, and I absolutely agree with everything that the hon. Gentleman has said on this score.
Unless he was envisaging an order from South Africa, where was the work to come from during these four years? I do not want to go into this at any great length. It was only because I happened to follow the hon. Gentleman and remembered this controversy so vividly that I raised it. It came to my memory recently when I saw this threat of redundancy in the hon. Gentleman's constituency.
I ought now to turn my attention to the Motion on the Order Paper. I am very pleased that at last we know what the Tory defence policy is—at least I hope we do. At last we have this version,


and we are not to have the policy of the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) which has sometimes been put forward from the Opposition Front Bench. It is very confusing, when they keep altering their policy every five minutes. I would much sooner that they stuck to this one, as it is a distinct and clearly recognisable Tory policy. For that reason I violently disagree with it, because it will be colossally expensive, and I hope that this will be clearly explained to the electorate.
I can assure hon. Gentlemen that I will make sure that my constituents know of the bill that they will have to foot if the Tory Party ever get into office again. What have they said? The hon. Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr Ewing) said that the F111 cancellation was harmful because we had no early warning reconnaissance capability. Does that mean that if and when the Tories are ever returned to office they will reinstate the order for the F111 at a cost of £450 million, plus whatever escalation in price will have taken place between now and then? They would not negotiate this contract at the favourable rate of fixed prices which the present Government obtained as part of the offset agreement. They would be paying something like £700 million to £750 million for the F111.
I have always been violently opposed to the order, ever since it was first mooted. I do not often quote myself but I wish to do so now, from my speech of 13th April, 1965, during the debate on the cancellation of the TSR2. I said:
…the decision to cancel the TSR2 was acceptable only on the assumption that we would not replace it by an American aircraft. We shall certainly resist any proposal to do so."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th April, 1965; Vol. 710, c. 1253.]
I was speaking officially on behalf of the Liberal Party on that occasion. I reiterated our opposition to the F111 on 13th December, 1965; 1st February 1966; 21st November, 1966; 14th March, 1967; 1st May, 1967; 7th November, 1967.
All along we have been warning the Government that this aircraft was a highly undesirable addition to the capability of the Royal Air Force. We were never convinced that it was essential to defence requirements in Europe. I was always certain that the reason why hon.
Gentlemen opposite were insisting on buying the F 111 was because of their misguided and foolish policy east of Suez. If we had been confined, as we suggested, to a purely European rôle and we reaffirmed our policy on this during the course of the defence debates, no question would have arisen in the first place of ordering the F111.
It was not until we got around to looking at our strategic and political posture in the world and came to the conclusion that we could no longer play this world military policeman rôle and withdrew from the Far and Middle East that we decided that the F111 could be cancelled. What has been the consequence of delay in arriving at this decision? The Government, and through them, the British taxpayer, will be faced with a very large bill, estimated at £70 million.
We want to know from the Minister who winds up—I do not know whether we shall, because the Government are chary about giving figures of this nature—what has been the cost to the British taxpayer of the Government's foolish policy in pursuing the F111 order until the very last moment, thus being faced with these enormous cancellation charges. We would like to know from the Opposition whether it is true, as I inferred from their opening speech, that if they were returned they would reinstate the the order, at a vastly greater cost.

Mr. Ridsdale: Can the hon. Gentleman say what his party's replacement for the Canberra would be?

Mr. Lubbock.: Certainly. This has been dealt with in the defence debate, when we said that, as far as we could see, in a European rôle the Phantom aircraft was perfectly capable of carrying out the tactical strike and reconnaissance rôles allocated to the F111. One of the Defence Ministers in a previous debate poured ridicule on me when I suggested that many of the reconnaissance functions of manned aircraft had now been taken over by satellites.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: I constantly listen to advice from professionals, and so on, about this and I remember the hon. Gentleman saying this. Is he seriously saying that a tactical reconnaissance rôle, bearing in mind that it often has to be


performed when cloud is about, can be performed by satellites?

Mr. Lubbock: I said many reconnaissance functions. I did not itemise them. If the hon. Gentleman reads the American scientific magazines—one never gets this information in British journals or from hon. Gentlemen in the House; defence information is practically impossible to get—he will see that the resolution of photographs taken from satellites is constantly being improved, and the use of infra-red photography is enabling the detection of military equipment to be made from satellites in very poor weather conditions. The hon. Gentleman has tried to distort what I said. I do not say that every reconnaissance function could be discharged by means of a satellite but the technological capability of satellites in reconnaissance is being constantly improved.
I wish hon. Gentleman sitting on the Government Front Bench would not misquote me all the time. The hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence for Administration yesterday, in his winding up speech, without giving me any warning at all, referred to something I was alleged to have said in 1965 which I never said at all—something about the Territorial Army. The hon. Gentleman, before he makes these allegations in the Chamber, should have the courtesy to inform hon. Members that he is going to do it and, secondly, he should look up the reference to avoid making these mistakes.

The Minister of Defence for Administration (Mr. G. W. Reynolds): I have just cleared with Mr. Speaker a statement I was going to make at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning. Since I have been attacked on the point, might I say that I did, in fact, allege that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) made a certain statement in the House, and I realised later that the statement was made by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson). It was a slip of the tongue and I apologise to 'the hon. Member for Orpington for any embarrassment he may have suffered as a result of my mistake.

Mr. James Davidson: This interruption was made during a speech I was making last night,

when the hon. Gentleman referred to this alleged remark by my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock). This he says now was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) in December, 1965. We looked carefully through all the indexes of HANSARD for December, 1965 and no such remark was made. I would like the precise reference.

Mr. Lubbock: I am grateful to the Minister for what he has said. The remark he was referring to, made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson), was on the occasion of the preliminary statement in July, 1965, when my hon. and learned Friend said that we welcomed the reorganisation of the Territorial Reserve forces, but he never said anything about their abolition. It was wrong for the hon. Gentleman to give that impression last night, but I shall be out of order if I pursue this topic any further.
I want to come back to the Tory Motion and the speech made by the hon. Member for Hendon, North. I have already mentioned the expense that would be laid on the British taxpayer if his policies regarding the Fill were pursued, if we reinstated the order which is now being cancelled, or if any future Government decided to develop separately for the Royal Air Force alone, without entering into co-operative arrangements with some foreign Governments, an aircraft for this purpose. The Government were right in going to the French Government to see whether we could get some co-operative agreement to develop the AFVG, but because of the French Government's financial difficulties we were not able to pursue this. I still hope it will be possible to come to some agreement with perhaps the Germans and other European nations to go ahead with variable geometry aircraft. I would like to know what is happening to the contract at Warton.
When I put a question to one of the Defence Ministers some months ago he said the study was coming to an end and we had not come to any agreement with our allies but in the meantime a holding contract would be awarded. We want to know the position of the design team and whether they are to be kept in existence pending some agreement with


the Germans or other potential collaborators and how we are getting on with negotiations.
The hon. Member for Hendon, North also spoke about maritime reconnaissance. As a maritime nation we want to make sure that this job is done properly. He asked whether 38 Nimrods would be enough to carry out all the functions we have in mind. If we are withdrawing from the Far East and the Middle East this will be entirely a home defence function and we will be having Nimrods based in the United Kingdom, or not further away than the Mediterranean theatre. Therefore, I would have thought that 38 was quite a reasonable number and would be fully capable of discharging the task we are intending to lay on it.
The hon. Gentleman said further that 60 Harriers was too small a force, but all the time he is adding to the bill. In the end we are going to be faced not with a £2,000 million defence estimate but with something like £3,000 million. I understand at the same time that it is the policy of the Conservative Opposition to reduce taxation. I would like them at some time—probably this is not the occasion, but it ought to be done so that the country can see where they stand—to try to reconcile the two demands they constantly make. On the one hand, they speak of reductions in taxation—an admirable sentiment of which I entirely approve although I cannot see that happening this year. I think this should be a long-term aim. In my opinion taxtion in this country is too high, but I do not see how it can be reduced if at the same time one demands more of everything and a very sophisticated aircraft such as the F111 or an equivalent for tactical striking reconnaissance. The Conservative opposition want more maritime reconnaissance aircraft and more vertical take-off and landing aircraft, such as Harriers, they want to retain aircraft carriers almost indefinitely, and in addition have a large number of aircraft such as Phantoms based on them. I want to know whether they have made any effort to tot up the bill to find out the total, and whether they would care to express it in terms of the standard rate of Income Tax so that everyone could know what the Tories want.
They know this Motion criticises the Government for the fact that it has made Great Britain deeply dependent on others. I would remind the Tories that it was their Government who originally ordered the Skybolt, that fiasco which has been mentioned already. In regard to the Polaris submarines we are heavily dependent on the United States. As I understand it, the Americans are going to phase out the Polaris missiles and replace them with a more sophisticated version. We therefore have to consider how we can keep our Polaris force in operation if we are not able to get spare parts and servicing equipment from the United States.
As already mentioned in the debate, it was the Conservative Government who placed the order for the naval version of the Phantom. They were quite right to do this, and it is surely inconsistent now to say we should not get tied up with the untrustworthy foreigners who might withdraw. That is the impression given by the Motion in speaking about the nation becoming deeply dependent on others. This is part of the dependence on others. We have bought these versions of the Phantom and the naval version which in my opinion will be a very good plane. I am pleased to say that it is coming on very well, although I know that the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) does not agree with me. I have learned from the experts with whom I have discussed the matter that the Speyengined Phantom will be an absolutely first-class aircraft with a much better performance than the American-engined version. As I said in an intervention in the speech of the Minister of Defence for Equipment, there are very good prospects for selling this aircraft overseas when the time comes.
I know that there has been a short delay in introducing the Phantom into service and that it has cost us rather more money than we had hoped in fitting the Spey engine, but there is always some escalation of costs. I do not know any military programme in the last 20 years in which there has not been an escalation in costs.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: In the United States?

Mr. Lubbock: In the United States as well. One has only to consider the experience with the FB111 to realise that the introduction into service of the Phantom has been relatively smooth and it will be only about three months late.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: The hon. Gentleman says airily that there are always escalations in costs. But the escalation here is of the order of 70 per cent., and 70 per cent. is quite some escalation in cost. The unit cost has risen from £1½ million to £2½ million, basically because of research and development involved in the adaptation of a British engine to an American airframe. Would the hon. Gentleman deny that?

Mr. Lubbock: The Minister will be capable of dealing with that later. If we com pare the cost effectiveness of the Spey-engined Phantom with that of the American-engined equivalent, we find that we have made a very good buy.
I was talking about our being deeply dependent on others. I agree with the right hon. Member for Mitcham (Mr. R. Carr) who said, although not in this debate, that it was desirable to co-operate with our European allies on sophisticated projects. Therefore, I entirely approve the Jaguar, the Anglo-French helicopter programme and the Phantom. This is how we must proceed in the next few years. It is impossible for Great Britain to undertake all missions without taking account of the needs of foreign air forces and the numbers we might require in our Services.
It is not fair to point to Sweden and say that because that country has more front-line military aircraft than we have we should do everything on our own. The Swedish aircraft programme is far more limited. Sweden does not have any maritime reconnaissance aircraft. It does not believe it necessary to have v.t.o.l. or s.t.o.l. aircraft such as those we have coming into service. As far as I can see, the Swedish Air Force is confined to an interceptor capability and, because it is able to order quite a large number of a single type of aircraft, it makes it look as though Sweden has done well. But if it had the same defence rôles as Great Britain it would have to depend to some extent on co-operation with others.
I do not think that even the Conservatives genuinely think that it was worth

tabling the Motion. Judging by the number of them who have been in the Chamber in the last couple of hours, they do not seem to have much enthusiasm for it. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense."] The hon. Gentleman says "Nonsense", but if he wants chapter and verse I can give it to him. At 5.10 there were six Members present, apart from those on the Front Bench. At 5.25, there were six Members present—

Mr. Cranky Onslow: That was because at that time the House was listening to a speech by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) which we have heard three times before in these defence debates.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: I should point out that my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) was reporting to our party on his recent visit to South Africa and Rhodesia. Therefore, the Liberal Party will understand why many people wanted to attend that meeting and hear his report, in view of recent events in that part of the world.

Mr. Lubbock: It must have been a very fascinating meeting. Unless the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire is still speaking—and I gather that he is not—

Mr. Onslow: The hon. Gentleman is speaking now.

Mr. Lubbock: —there are four Tory Members in the House at the moment. The end of the speech by the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire elsewhere has not caused a flood of Tories to appear in the Chamber. I do not wish to make a lot of this, but one might have expected that if the Tory Party felt so strongly about the Motion, as the hon. Member for Hendon, North might have led one to think, one would imagine that a few more of them would have turned up for the debate, not only to listen to him, but later in the afternoon to participate in the debate. I excuse hon. Members from attending the speech of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). The fact that it has been so difficult for the Conservatives to keep this debate going, as has been evident to me, indicates that the Motion is just a charade.

7.16 p.m.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: Perhaps I had better point out that at 5.30 on Thursdays there is the regular weekly meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party. These, too, are fascinating occasions. Therefore, any accusation that the Labour benches are unduly empty is perhaps misplaced.
I realise what a gulf separates me from hon. Members opposite—not only from the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), but from the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) when he talks about a Mediterranean commitment. Very kindly, the hon. Member for Macclesfield, who made an important speech, offered to stay. I said that he should do no such thing, because it is an imposition for an hon. Member to have to stay for a speech, when a Member may or may not catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. However, I warned him that I would take him up on some of his basic assumptions.
The hon. Member for Macclesfield argued that by removing British power, and particularly air power, from Aden, we invite the Soviets to walk in. If we assume that the Soviets will walk in in our absence it may be legitimate to argue that we would need a great deal of air power there. But who thinks that the Soviets would have any easier time in Aden than we have had? Surely it is certain that if there were to be a Soviet occupation of Southern Arabia, they would meet the same sort of unpleasant and formidable resistance as we have met. I should have thought that that was the guarantee against the argument of the hon. Member for Macclesfield of a Soviet take-over.
The hon. Gentleman went on to talk about what we should do in the face of the Chinese threat in the Far East. Yes, I am a Little Englander, or Little Briton. I believe that we have no business to meddle in the Far East and that our presence there at this time is counterproductive. The same goes for West Africa. In the long term, although not perhaps in the short term, the same resources would be much better devoted to helping the Cocoa Marketing Board to get a proper price for its product than embarking on some fruitless and counterproductive military adventure.
That is not to say that people like me who are Little Britons are sneering in any way at our history. It is possible to argue that Britain's history is extremely honourable in many ways. But people like me adopt a very simple attitude on which our philosophy is based. Either our country is a great imperial power holding sway in India, Pakistan, Burma, Singapore, Hong Kong and throughout the vast part of Africa and we do empire properly, or we do nothing at all. In our present kind of situation, we get the worst of all possible worlds.
I would wish that we put the 19th century behind us as part of history. It is not a subject which we want to debate today. But there are many people in this country, particularly among the younger generation, who say, "We are really Little Britons". I should like to see us overcome a degree of self-importance which we do not have, because it is this idea of self-importance that has led us into so many ludicrous commitments.
For example, there was a discussion between the Front Benches on the AngloMalay treaty. The actual details of the commitment are not important in this debate, but what I believe is important is the reason why the Malays are angry with us—which is not because we have withdrawn troops from Malaysia. I do not know what Sir Norman Walker has told the Government, but my Malay friends say that the reason they are angry is that if the undertakings had not been given they themselves would not have entered into commitments such as those they made to Eastern Malaysia. Therefore, I believe that not only are these commitments that we make costly, difficult and counter-productive; they are positively dangerous to our allies in that inevitably they lead those allies into false positions.
If one thinks all this, and more, it alters drastically one's attitude to the question: what kind of planes should we have in this country? There is one vital point I wish to make. I am not for opting out of the common financial burden of the West. I am not one of those who believe that America should pay for Britain's defence and that Britain should do nothing in return. We should bear a part of the common burden of


the West, particularly in relation to developing countries; and if the British defence budget is cut in the style I would wish to see, the corollary is that we could spend a great deal more money in helping the developing countries. So it is not just a question of sheltering under some kind of American umbrella.
I would say one thing to the hon. Member for Macclesfield, who made a plea for a hospital in Macclesfield. I have no doubt that my hon. Friend on the Front Bench wants new schemes, hospitals and training colleges in Bishop Auckland. I know I want them in West Lothian, and I have no doubt they are needed in Orpington and elsewhere. But we cannot do both, though it is silly to believe that overnight we can wave a magic wand and beat swords into ploughshares. Nevertheless, there is a central economic issue. As long as we go on with the kind of demands made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr-Ewing) we will not be able to do the kind of things, at home and abroad, that many of us are agreed should be done as a matter of urgency. We really do have to come to a long-term choice.
The hon. Member for Macclesfield made a serious point when he spoke about research and how exciting jobs were being provided. But has not research also changed?—because one of the most interesting developments is the part that Britain has played in the development of the C5A, the world's largest transport. As the hon. Member for Orpington knows, many of the designs for that were made in London and transmitted day by day, early in the morning to the Lockheed computer at Marietta, Georgia; so the hon. Gentleman should not assume that simply because research is highly expensive, therefore, it necessarily goes to the United States of America.
I believe there is scope for using British skill not only in competition with the U.S.A. but in conjunction with it. That is the kind of thing we ought to develop. like everybody else in this debate, I am concerned about the B.A.C. design team at Warton. The question I ask is whether simply in order to keep a highly competent group at B.A.C. we should embark on all kinds of expenditure on which we otherwise would not embark. This is a matter of value judgment. As many Members here will know, demands for

other kinds of research are such that there is really a central issue: whether one should devote quite so much to design teams, however distinguished in the aircraft industry, in relation to other research which might be done.
I would like to follow the hon. Member for Orpington, because I am not a pacifist. I believe there have to be forces in this country. I am a "fortress Britain" man, and a "fortress Britain" man has to be clear how he is going to arm the R.A.F. I believe there are various ways of doing this in the form of either buying a small number of aircraft from the United States of America—because only a token force is wanted—or, impious thought, making some agreement with the French to buy the Mirage, the interceptor aircraft, or to buy a Swedish plane. There are such things as package deals, and if we go a step further than Concorde or develop some other project we can gain on the swings what we have lost on the roundabouts. But the idea that this country should settle down with the Germans and other European Powers to build a swing-wing aircraft, after all our experience of the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft seems highly doubtful.
I am also doubtful as to the extent to which, in such a complex operation, one can go ahead with more than three or four partners involved; and if we do not have more than three or four we create tremendous market problems. If it is decided to accept this philosophy and we are all to go ahead with this type of operation we should be clearer about markets at an early stage. Let us get the markets right before we embark on any kind of commitment; because unless the market is right we shall run into the kind of financial trouble with which we are all too familiar.
Turning now to the words used in the Motion—
precipitate actions and vacillating policies
I do not blame the Ministers on this kind of issue. Nor can I bring myself to scorn the Opposition. Frankly, the exchanges which took place between the Front Benches did Parliament no good in the eyes of serious people, and technically they were a little naïve on both sides. Perhaps these things should be discussed more objectively; but while in many ways I have sympathy with the Government on this, I must say in public that


I now regret many of the speeches I myself made, very eloquently, about Thunderbird, Seaslug, Skybolt, Firestreak, Bluestreak, and the rest, because I believe one learns that these problems are extremely complex, and not easy.
That should be said. But after the cross-talk between the Front Benches there is another question which hon. Gentlemen are entitled to ask themselves: how good is the advice that successive Defences Ministries have had from their official advisers? I am not one to get up in the House of Commons and attack civil servants either by name or particular Ministries, but as Select Committees go into these matters perhaps one gets more and more concerned at the advice processes by which successive governments have landed themselves in a series of cancellations.
Another truth may come home. Can a country of our size such as ours afford mistakes of this kind? It may be said that such mistakes are almost inevitable in view of the rate of technological advance and innovation in almost every country, but that reinforces my argument, that such weapons are not to be made by economies such as ours.

Mr. James Ramsden: I have great sympathy with what the hon. Member says, and I agree with it to a great extent. Does he agree that the fact with which we have to contend is that true advice about technical problems leading to advanced projects is difficult to obtain without the commercial yardstick which, by definition, is denied to one in this sort of subject? The problem is that the truth is difficult to obtain.

Mr. Dalyell: I am impressed by arguments for commercial discipline in these matters, but in great sectors of life that is impossible and the Government have to do their best. I would not care to dispute the point, which is becoming more self-evident, and if one talks to the Russians about this, they, too, have considerable costing problems, which they would not have admitted five years ago. Yes, advanced projects are very difficult.
Part of this issue is the question of research costs. I do not want to develop in too much detail the argument put forward by the hon. Member for Orpington. It is, however, striking that when, at

Farnborough—this has been published and, therefore, I may say it—we asked the Director why, after the cancellation of the P1154, the HS681 and the TSR2, there was no pro rata cut in research, a long explanation was given. It is incredible that even though one cuts back, rightly or wrongly, on major projects, one is told that basically the research costs continue at the same level for another five years or more. Therefore, there has to be the closest scrutiny of this kind of issue.
That is why I welcome the Government's initiative in setting up a Select Committee—and how often in defence debates we have asked for this—to probe the details of how the mechanism works. When our results are published, it will be up to the House of Commons to see that at least an explanation is given, if not considerable action taken, radically to change the mechanism whereby these things operate.
I would like to refer to the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft. My right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary knows that I argued about this at great length in February, March and April last year. Surely, the lesson to be learnt is that before one enters any kind of cooperative system with another European Power, or any other Power, one informs oneself about the market possibilities. It was clear from the middle of February, 1967, that when Marcel Dassault was going ahead with his Mirage 3G, it was extremely unlikely that the French aircraft industry would be prepared to cooperate. I am glad that the project was brought to an end in time without going to a great deal more money.
I accept in general the point made by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Equipment that we must get the right aircraft, with the right performance, at the right price and at the right time. That is very difficult to do. That is why I go back to the sort of proposition, of which I am in favour, of tailoring our aircraft commitments to our strategic needs; and in my view, since our strategic needs are very modest indeed, we should buy off the shelf.
One then disposes, on the basis of the assumptions which I have outlined, of the need for a long-term military aircraft programme. However, people like myself


are in difficulty because we want Concorde. The issue is whether we can go ahead with Concorde and, at the same time, have virtually no indigenous military programme.
That brings us to one of the major problems which any Government must face at the present time: how to give the same urgency to civil research as has been given to military research sponsored by the Government. I would like to hear from one of the Defence Ministers in the not-too-distant future what is the Government's overall strategy for providing a way in which we can get the proper rate of technological innovation without resorting to large-scale military expenditure. This is one of the central problems of any modern Government in a technical society.
I hope that some senior Government Ministers will devote themselves to this difficult problem and explain their overall strategy. I happen to think that the Government—at least, individual members of it—have given a good deal of thought to this. I praise my right hon. Friend the Minister of Technology. I am sure that he is conscious of it. Next time that an opportunity presents itself in the House, I hope that either he or the Secretary of State for Defence will give attention to this problem. In a sense, it is also the problem of my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson).
Urgent also is the question of the F104 replacement. I do not think that any aircraft can have the right automatically to reincarnation. When I am asked about the F104 replacement, is it not a legitimate reply, before any deterrent aspects are considered, to say that we have Polaris in the rôle of the V Bombers? I am one who has defended Polaris—I know that my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) takes a different view—in Tribune, now that we have got it. If we keep Polaris, what is the point of embarking on an aircraft programme other than a short-range interceptor programme or buying interceptors? That is a fair point.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is my hon. Friend aware that when the Polaris programme was introduced, we were told and we thought that expenditure on the Air Force would fall because we had Polaris?

Now, we have expenditure on both systems.

Mr. Dalyell: I have sympathy with my hon. Friend. I have always understood that Polaris was the successor to the V-bomber.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: But we have got both.

Mr. Dalyell: I do not see why one has to add another requirement on top of the successor to the V-bomber.
I should like to raise the question, of which I have given notice to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, of the Phantom. It is quite true, as my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Equipment said, that the Phantom is many hundreds of times more expensive than the Spitfire. My right hon. Friend spoke in terms of a vertical rise in cost.

Mr. Cranley Onslow: May I point out one small thing to the hon. Member? In these recent debates he has been fortunate enough to address the House for nearly two hours all told, and many other hon. Members have not been as fortunate. In the light of these circumstances, perhaps the hon. Member would consider addressing a letter to his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who is not present, on a point which is of interest to the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member between them.

Mr. Dalyell: I have more to say, but that is a fair point. If there are hon. Members who have sat throughout the evening, the hon. Member was quite right to make it. I shall stop dead, therefore, though on previous occasions I was keeping no Member out. To squeeze the point, therefore, I am a bit concerned about the whole problem of the re-adaptation of engines. I gave my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary notice that I would raise with him the specific question of the costs of adapting the Rolls-Royce Spey engine to the Phantom. The general problem which arises is whether, even to save dollars across the exchanges, it is worth while going through all the research and development to fit engines into American aircraft for which they were never intended.
Having put that question, I take the point made by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) and, as other hon.


Members are waiting to speak, I will sit down.

7.40 p.m.

Mr. Cranley Onslow: I am most grateful to the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) for so kindly accepting the point which I put to him. He will have done much to restore the confidence of the House in the way in which we conduct our proceedings by so readily acceding to it. Not all of his hon. Friends would have done so.
Perhaps this has not been the best attended of debates, and we have heard good reasons why it has not been, since we understand that important matters are being debated elsewhere. It is unfortunate that this should be so, although it was rather ungallant of the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock), having persuaded one or two of his hon. Friends to stay and listen to him, to complain that other hon. Members were not similarly inclined to stay.

Mr. Lubbock: rose—

Mr. Onslow: No, I will not give way.

Mr. Lubbock: The hon. Gentleman has referred to me.

Mr. Onslow: I do not consider it necessary to give way to an hon. Member every time I refer to him.
One of the other reasons why this debate has been less than satisfactory is that the facts of the Motion scarcely need debating. I do not see the Minister of Defence for Equipment in the Chamber now, but, when he opened the debate on behalf of the Government, he suffered from a singular misfortune in that he appeared to have brought with him the wrong set of notes. Instead of a set intended for a serious debate in the House where hon. Members who know something about the subject could be expected to attend and question him, he appeared to have a set intended for a by-election meeting in the South Kensington constituency, where he might have had two or three supporters at most, none of whom would have understood what he was saying. That got us off to a bad start.
Since then, matters have improved a little. I am certain that the House is interested in the Motion and that there are still important matters to be said

about it, particularly on its two main aspects, which are the future of the Royal Air Force and its present condition, and the present condition and future of the industry.
I was fortunate enough to speak briefly in last year's debate on this subject. I ended by saying to the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force:
However proud the Under-Secretary may be of the new Air Force he claims to be building he must understand that the R.A.F. will serve the nation best only when it knows what it is expected to do. That, so far, it does not know, and nor does the House of Cornmons."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th March, 1967; Vol. 743, c. 393.]
Since then, that comment on the situation has not been invalidated. There have been changes. The F111 has gone. The AFVG has gone. The hon. Member for West Lothian would no doubt claim credit, justifiably, for the fact that Aldabra has gone. All those matters figured largely in that debate.
It is ironical to reflect that we now have a situation where the Government say that the morale and state of the R.A.F. are better than ever, when one of the main pieces of equipment that it was to have has been snatched away from it. For the value of this equipment to the R.A.F., I can quote no better testimony than the Minister's own words. Speaking about the F111, he said:
It will form a vital element in our strike/reconnaisance force and can go wherever it is needed from its base in the United Kingdom … The reconnaissance rôle is vital if it is thought politically that an outbreak of war—not necessarily global, but possibly limited—is imminent."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th March, 1967; Vol. 743, c. 246.]
Today, we have a situation where, in the European sector, we have a need for the capability which the F111 was intended to meet even in conditions not necessarily of global but of limited war. The R.A.F. has been deprived of that capability.
One is bound to ask oneself why the R.A.F. ever wanted it. The Secretary of State for Defence was pretty firm about wanting it, saying that he would cancel TSR2 but that it must be replaced. He told us a number of matters about it which have a strange ring today, perhaps all the more so in the light of his remarks at the end of the debate on 5th March of this year, when he told us about


the capacity which existed for low-flying aircraft to penetrate hostile radar screens, a capacity which the TSR2 and the Fill would both have been able to meet, the TSR2 probably better, and which he appeared to cast into the discard pile as being something for which we never needed the Fill. He said:
It was never our intention to develop the F111 in this particular rôle."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1968; Vol. 760, c. 356.]
It is remarkable to have contemplated having a most advanced aircraft with no intention of using it for a task for which it would have been most suitable.
All that we are left with to block the gap is the statement on page 32 of this year's Defence White Paper which says:
The effect of this decision on the future equipment of the Royal Air Force is now being studied.
I should think so. It calls in question the whole purpose of having a Royal Air Force at all. I suppose that we should be grateful that the Government are sensible enough to see at least they have a problem which deserves some study.
Taking another point from the Defence White Paper, we are told in the preamble on page 2:
The order for 50 F111 aircraft has been cancelled and the Royal Air Force transport force will be cut.
I find the second part of that statement rather puzzling, and I have not been able to find much elucidation of it in the remainder of the White Paper. Indeed, I have fold contradictions of it. In paragraph 5 on page 10, we find the words:
The strategic and tactical transport aircraft of Air Support Command will retain, with an increased capacity, their ability to maintain and reinforce units overseas.
On page 51, we are told something which I am very glad to see:
More stores, particularly high-cost items will be moved by air where it is possible to meet urgent requirements overseas rapidly and economically.
Obviously, that is sensible. But what does the preamble mean in this context when it says:
… the Royal Air Force transport force will be cut"?
Are there cuts to come which have not yet been revealed to the House? If the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army would be good enough to take note of this point, perhaps it will be possible for the hon. Gentleman who is to

reply and who is more experienced in these matters to deal with it.
One other point which I find puzzling in the Defence White Paper concerns tanker aircraft. In paragraph 47 on page 33, we are told:
The equipment of the tanker force with the three-point Victor tanker has been completed.
I think that that was so last year, and I wondered if the words which now appear do not conceal a somewhat dangerous situation. We have had a fairly major reappraisal of the functions of the R.A.F., and it seems possible that this will have involved a requirement for additional tanker capacity, but there does not seem to be any indication that this has been re-examined and, for instance, referred to D.O.A.E. so that they can do a run-through of it to see how the Government's calculations stand out. I am afraid that there is a hidden deficiency here which would be felt by the Air Force if ever it had to undertake the task which we are told that this nation will retain of having a general capability rôe outside Europe. I should like to be assured that the Government believe that the tanker capacity is adequate and that its existing state is one which has been reviewed in light of the latest defence re-review.
Perhaps I might move now to the second part of the Motion, which concerns the industry. This is a point where the transition is easy enough, because the aircraft industry exists to make and sell aeroplanes. Unless it serves that purpose, we might as well stop thinking about having one at all.
In this context, for historical reasons, although not precisely according to the history that the Minister read to us, the defences of this country have fulfilled a rôle in stimulating development and often, I believe, of stultifying it. These are important subjects which need to be studied with some care.
There are areas in which the defence services could provide valuable stimulus to our industry at this moment in respect of existing aircraft, for instance, the Islander, or the Jetstream, or the Beagle Pup, all of which exist and are flying, but none of which, so far as I know, has been ordered by the Royal Air Force. At least one of these has been considered and turned down for R.A.F. needs, and


international customer confidence is certainly not going to be increased by the fact that our defence Services do not appear to want to buy any of them.
Last year I made the point about the Chipmunk replacement. The Minister indicated that there were plenty of Chipmunks in crates on a number of airfields, and they could be taken out of their mothballs and used. If the Beagle Pup is a good aircraft, which it is claimed to be, it is one which might be brought into service with the Royal Air Force. There may be people who would be prepared to buy the superannuated Chipmunks and use them. There may be others who would be prepared to buy other aircraft which we would not need in Air Support Command if the Islanders were introduced. And if the deal was done properly, the Royal Air Force might show a profit.
There are at present 19 different types of aircraft operational with Air Support Command, and by 1971, at the lightning pace of modern rationalisation, this figure will have been reduced to 18. This is causing the most enormous additional on-costs to the Service, because it means that it is necessary to maintain a large variety of stores, to train men in a large variety of different types, and to run a whole series of different operations. If the number of aircraft could be rationalised and reduced, and the number of types not only reduced but made to consist of more modern types, this would be a sensible long-term programme, even though it might entail some small additional immediate cost. In the end, however, it could lead to a real economy.
I propose, now, to discuss cancellations. Some time before the 1964 election the Prime Minister wrote a book with a highly satirical title, "The Relevance of British Socialism", which he has since then done his best to forget, and which none of his colleagues can ever have read, although they will find it contains an interesting indication of how we can expect to see the Prime Minister manage our affairs in the period up to the next General Election. I am sorry that I have not a copy of the book from which to quote, but one point he makes is that cancellations are frequently necessary. I think that it is extremely juvenile as a method of argument to

say "Sucks to you, you cancelled so many", and think that that disposes of the matter.
It is the nature and timing of the cancellations that are significant, and it is often equally significant that aircraft are brought to the point of flight—two or three competitive types of the same kind—and then, of the three, two are cancelled, because this represents an overall gain, an overall increase in skill, and certainly a wider range of choice. I think that this is something which we should now consider, because there is a growing need to reduce the period which it takes to construct a new aircraft, to get it from the first design on the back of Sir George's envelope all the way into squadron service. We are accustomed to thinking of this as a seven-year period. We ought to be considering how we can reduce it to three or four years. The Minister of State at the Ministry of Technology frowns. I am not surprised, because I do not believe that if his Ministry were faced with a problem of this kind it would have any concept of how to solve it. This is not a problem which should be left to his Ministry to solve. I believe that the right answer to problems of this kind is to let the makers set the pace and to give them a wider discretion and influence in—

The Minister of State, Ministry of Technology (Mr. John Stonehouse): If the hon. Gentleman is pursuing that argument, will he also address himself to the question of who will finance the construction? Is he arguing that the constructor should put up the major part of the finance?

Mr. Onslow: I am prepared to argue that, provided the constructor is assured of an overall climate of operation in which he can make profits, and which will make this risky venture worth while. This situation does not exist at the moment, but it should be made to exist.
I think that the most dangerous statement in the Defence White Paper in the context of the long-term technological future of this country is on page 37, where it says:
Studies of a new combat aircraft will continue as a basis for a possible collaborative project.
That is a shorthand way of saying that nothing is going to happen. The right


hon. Gentleman frowns again. The parameters of indecision have been drawn, and all the makings of cancellation are there. Studies will continue while time passes and others take decisions. The Minister knows how difficult he is finding it to get anyone to make up his mind about the airbus. In the context of this country's military hardware, does he expect collaborative decisions to be taken more quickly? Does he expect national air forces to make up their minds more quickly than national airlines do? It is an interesting thought which I leave the right hon. Gentleman.
This idea that we can proceed only at a sort of three-legged pace is a tremendous handicap on our ability to progress, because if we choose the right projects, and go it alone, and do not dissipate our efforts over the whole field, we have a much greater chance of beating the industrial problems which face us. At the moment we have an industry whose core, to use an unpleasant word, or a word which may be unpleasant to the Secretary of State for Defence, is Concorde, with work on the Trident, the Harrier, the BAC111 and some military work coming in with the Jaguar in prospect.
The Jaguar is certainly an interesting venture, and I believe that it has considerable prospects, but this is not where the story should end. It is time now to consider what is likely to come next. It is time that we had an answer to the sort of report which has appeared in today's Evening Standard that the Germans plan to build a super fighter. They are going for a replacement for the F104. and they are prepared, if necessary, to go it alone. They are prepared to move. They may in the end have to cancel, but they may get the market. Once people in Europe start looking for a replacement for the F104, they will see that the Germans have something flying. It will mean nothing if we go along with designs and brochures and bland assurances from the Minister of Technology, "If you only give me a declaration of intent I will go to the Italians, to the French, to the Germans, and in five years' time we may reach an agreement to manufacture something".
All that also presupposes that nothing happens on the other side of the Atlantic. This is an area in which we have to

move, in which we have to stop being afraid of making mistakes. We have to recognise the kind of mistakes that we are likely to make, and to guard against allowing ourselves to make mistakes, the price of which we do not always recognise. If we are not prepared to take risks of the right kind, and on the right information, it is time that we stopped thinking about having an aircraft industry at all.
We must guard against one final danger, that of over specification. This is what killed the AFVG, the attempt to build into one aeroplane two basically contradictory requirements. It would have been much better if our Air Force had agreed that a match was impossible. Anyone who wants to look at the history of specification in this country, and the ghastly consequences that it can bring, can do no better than look at the history of British tank design during the Second World War, which was very costly and for many years remarkably ineffective, simply because of over-specification.
I am glad to see that the Minister of Defence for Equipment is now back with us, and I hope that he has dined well. He said something surprising earlier—that all the Government's plans have not worked out as they wished. I was amazed. I do not know what he is talking about. It has always been my impression and that of the public that this Government's plans have worked out precisely as they wished. Anyone in my constituency will testify that they cannot imagine that the Government could be so foolish as to have launched by accident upon plans which have had these consequences. Most of my constituents imagine that the Government intended what has happened.
One told me, shortly after that well-known phrase-coiner the Secretary of State had been talking about "superannuated Hitler Youth", that the conduct of the nation's defences at the topmost level seemed to have fallen into the hands of superannuated Young Communists, and he was not at all sure that the accuracy of this description was improved by the words "superannuated" or "Young".
I believe that the Government intended the logical consequences of their actions. They have brought the R.A.F. to a new low in morale and to a point at which it does not know what its rôle is meant


to be, and they have brought the aircraft industry to a point at which, although it may have orders—all of which date back to ventures launched before this Government came to power—and work in hand, and although its overall employment is likely to increase over the 1964 figure—there is redeployment for you and there is Plowden, that load of old rubbish—the future of the industry is in grave doubt, because we are in danger of being forced out of the technological race by indecision and wrong decisions. Only one right decision remains, and that is for the Secretary of State and this Government to get out.

8.2 p.m.

Mr. John Rankin: We are committing ourselves tonight to an expenditure of £557,320,000, an increase over last year of £13,567,000, and it is worth while noting that, of that vast sum, £52 million will go in wages and salaries to civilians and £270 million to building new aircraft. Thus, over £320 million of this Vote is for work, salaries and wages. That should be remembered in all the criticisms which have been made.
That prompts us to look ahead. Many hon. Members have spoken about the need to look forward in the aircraft industry. A total of 3,500 fighters and 2,200 fighter-bombers will be required by Europe from 1970 onwards. This is a market in which Britain must share, but it is essential that we do not lack the determination to gain as large a share as possible. Over the past few years, despite what hon. Members opposite have said, we have shown that we can sell airframes, engines and sophisticated equipment which earns follow-on orders from satisfied customers.
Our total exports since the war—this proves what I am saying—total £2,000 million, with an all-time record last year of £217 million, or £50 million more than our previous best. Our current order book is substantial and includes over £1,000 million worth of civil aircraft orders. When we take into account Concorde and the airbus, this total could be over £3,000 million. In addition there are the engines, the missiles, the equipment and the electronic sectors, for all of which there are large orders.
Our military potential is also substantial and could well total over £1,000 million. This is exemplified by new aircraft like the Jaguar and the Nimrod, which are now under development, and Britain's indisputable world lead with the Harrier, which I had the good fortune to see in operation only last week, is acknowledged by all connected with the industry.
Also, the equipment industry is maintaining its place and progress in the development of the sophisticated new aids which must keep pace with the design of larger and faster aircraft—for example, automation in flight control and advanced standards of air safety. Last year the industry provided no less than £50 million of our £217 million of total aerospace orders. We have been a world leader in the advance of international communications and there is no reason why that dominant position should not be recovered in the space age through the development of communications satellites. We must continue in this field if our technological leadership is to be maintained.
Spin-off from the aerospace industry gives the lead for many other industries to expand their technological capability. Micro-electronics, which are employed in the new range of miniaturised computers, is one example. They not only contribute to our export drive but are now being applied to industry generally to speed up and streamline new techniques and processes.
The aircraft industry, which contributes so largely to our defence and industrial needs, could also help to solve our balance of payments difficulties. For example, from 1960 to 1966, the dollar earnings of the British aircraft industry completely outweighed the burden of our dollar imports. In 1965, our airframe and engine exports to the United States were nearly two and a half times the level of imports from the States. In 1966 they were more than five times.
Then the situation changed dramatically. Between January and October, 1966, Britain imported £42,445,000 worth of American aircraft against exports to the United States of £20,252,000—imports in that year being more than twice those of exports, a disastrous story and for this the aircraft industry has absolutely no blame. My right hon. Friends


will not deny that this was purely and simply a Government responsibility. The exports of the industry this year are the second best in its history.
Much has been made recently of the allegation of excess profits, and since an inquiry is under way it would be out of place for me to comment on that. In fairness, however, it should be pointed out—and if I am wrong I am sure that I will soon be corrected—that responsibility for the costing of Government contracts rests equally between Whitehall and the industry. Again, therefore, if any misdemeanour in quoting prices and so on has occurred, and if what are called excess profits have been earned or can be shown to have been earned, Whitehall stands in the dock beside the industry.
As a result of its own activity and development, the industry's labour force is returning towards its earlier standards. At 254,000, the labour force is lively and active. This is the figure at which it stood before the major cancellations were made. However, the industry is now faced with a new challenge, that of co-operation with Europe, and it is absolutely essential that this co-operation takes place if we are to survive.
At present Britain's aircraft industry manufactures everything it needs. It is broad based and produces everything from aerospace nuts and bolts right up to complete airframes and engines, plus all the sophisticated equipment that is required. It designs, builds, tests and sells missiles, space systems and complete aircraft. I hope that that broad-based function of the industry will not be altered if and when, as I hope it comes about, we enter into co-operation with other nations in Europe. I believe that the future of this great technological industry no longer rests in the hands of any one nation or separate nations. We are living in an age when the big group counts in the world of space affairs, and particularly in technology. It is by co-operation with our immediate neighbours in the European complex that this nation will carry on the successes in technology which have adorned the industry's past.

8.15 p.m.

Mr. Julian Ridsdale: I was glad to hear the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Rankin), in his

sturdy Scottish way, standing up for the aircraft industry and pointing out that if private industry is to be accused of charging excess prices, Whitehall must have equal blame. I am certain that if the experts are not in Whitehall, it is the duty of those in Whitehall to find consulting engineers whom they can employ to do this job. They must realise the shortcomings of the people to whom they are giving instructions to negotiate with private industry.

Mr. Rankin: I do not think that I went so far as to equalise the blame. I said that if one was held responsible, the other also had its responsibility.

Mr. Ridsdale: Equally, those who wish to support the aircraft industry must have been disturbed—considering the enormous success we are having with our aircraft exports—at the break-up of the scientific and technical teams. It is regrettable that the men who have formed these teams have been steadily dispersed to virtually the four corners of the world since the Labour Party came to power.
I last spoke in an Air Estimates debate four years ago, when I found myself having to reply to the debate. After these four years in purdah, as it were, I am speaking in this debate—not having spoken on air affairs in the interim—because much as I deplored the cancellation of the TSR2, the P1154 and the HS681—all the planes are laid down for the R.A.F. for the 1970s—I had hoped that the Labour Government would honour their pledge to buy the F111, which would have enabled the R.A.F. to carry out not only its world-wide capability cheaply and effectively, but also to fulfil what, for the R.A.F., is so vital: its tactical strike and reconnaissance rôle in N.A.T.O. This replacement was vital for this rôle because of the ageing Canberra, now 20 years old. It is vital that a replacement for this aircraft should be found.
I have been surprised at how easily this solemn pledge, given to the R.A.F. at the time of the cancellation of the TSR2—given not only by the Secretary of State but by the Labour Leader in the House of Lords, the then Minister responsible for the R.A.F.—has been shrugged off without a murmer of a resignation. We must face the facts, even if the defence Ministers have run away from them.


Without this aircraft we are in grave danger of having to face many of our potential enemies who already have such a capability. I regard this cancellation as the breaking of a solemn pledge.
I have been surprised that the Secretary of State has not seen fit to resign on this pledge, let alone the other pledges which lie scattered around the political arena rather like the Order Papers which lie scattered around the Chamber at the moment. He knows what the cancellation of the F111 has meant to the Royal Air Force. We shall regret it for a long time. Even more shall we regret the decision to cancel the TSR2. The present Government have been able to do a lot of things, but probably they are the first Government who have been able to spend £250 million without a single plane flying. Yet the losses go far deeper than £250 million. This prevents us honouring pledges, which we gave to carry out a rôle east of Suez, in a cheap way and, alas, it means that we have to withdraw now and probably carry out an entirely European rôle. It prevents us protecting British interests.
As the Leader of the Opposition said so forcibly in the defence debate, Australia and New Zealand have been left on their own. Our Asian friends will have to look elsewhere for help which we might have given to them. These are some of the diplomatic consequences. But has the Minister considered the implications for recruiting? Now the R.A.F. will have to be content with operating in Germany and the United Kingdom alone. I am sure that the pull of the civil airlines for pilots will be greater and the attractions of pay will be greater. In order to get some of the pilots into the R.A.F. we shall see much steeper rises in pay than there have been for some time past.
Is the Minister making preparations to help those who are having to leave the Service because of the cut-backs? I have a feeling that not enough consideration has been given to looking after and helping those who will suffer considerably and will have to end their careers in mid-flight, as it were, because of the cuts in defence spending.
To me the loss of the strategic rôle for the Royal Air Force is far more serious.

Time and again this week the Secretary of State has talked about the tactical rôle of the Royal Air Force. Let us face it, there is a real danger that in its fiftieth year it may become almost a branch of the Army like the new Canadian Army Air Corps.
Have we learned nothing from history? Surely the concentration of air power, the intelligence, expertise and technical know-how which goes with air power is a vital principle of modern war. Disperse the experts and those who know about air power and aircraft production, and we are in grave danger. Underestimation of the enemy's air power was a prime factor in our defeat in France in 1940 and in Malaysia in 1941. The skill and quality of pilots and plans in the Battle of Britain led to victory, but only by the skin of our teeth. We said that we would never again listen to the siren voices of unilateral disarmers like the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), but is not that exactly what unfortunately the country is doing today?
What would have happened to our Battle of Britain planes if they had been under the tactical command of the Army for the land battle on the Continent? How many would have survived for the crucial Battle of Britain in September, 1940? I am sure that the vital contribution we can make to the continental defence of Europe is in aircraft. It is a far cheaper way of making a contribution than by massively adopting conscription or making a large land contribution, which is expensive in foreign exchange if we are to have our forces for long on the Continent. Cannot we use the spare capacity of Support Command which the Government seem to have overbought in the Hercules transports from America? In order not to waste spare capacity, can we not provide a mobile force in these islands which can be used to protect not only the Northern flank in N.A.T.O. but also the important Southern flank in Turkey?

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the hon. Member assuming that the enemy in this case is the Soviet Union with its enormous number of planes and enormous power of nuclear destruction by rockets? What relevance has his argument to this debate?

Mr. Ridsdale: I assure the hon. Member that I and many others in this House, in the country and in the free world, are working as hard as we can in the hope of reaching a political détente with Russia. I remind the hon. Member that the best way of getting a political détente with Russia is to get it through strength, not through weakness. I do not agree with his policy, which seems exactly the same as that of one of the leaders of the Labour Party in the 1930s who believed that the best way to peace is to throw down one's arms.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: We did not do that.

Mr. Ridsdale: Have we estimated how many pilots and planes would be needed if a severe confrontation were to take place in Europe? Have we estimated what kind of wastage rate could happen quickly? The Secretary of State talked about a three-to four-day battle, but a three- to four-day confrontation of air power could be very expensive. Have we the reserves of pilots and planes for such a confrontation? This is the big doubt one has.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Could the hon. Member give me an estimate of how many pilots he thinks would be needed to fight the Soviet Union?

Mr. Ridsdale: I am not being led into answering that hypothetical question, but one has to make an estimate from time to time. If a severe confrontation were to take place, I believe that our present forces are gravely undermanned to meet it.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: The sky is the limit?

Mr. Ridsdale: No. We know perfectly well what we can afford. This leads me to digress to a degree to refer to the speech of the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock), who accused the Conservative Party of wishing to spend money on defence almost as freely as it could. Of course, this is not our policy. There must be a discipline in spending money on defence, but we laid down a very reasonable pattern when we were in power, which we could fulfil if we came back to power.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: As I understand it, the system of reserves as far as men were

concerned, with the ending of the old Royal Air Force Voluntary Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, took place in the mid-1950s. If the hon. Member for Harwich (Mr. Ridsdale) is worried about the situation now for Reserves, surely he should have been equally worried when he was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence?

Mr. Ridsdale: I was not in the Ministry of Defence in the 1950s but if the Under-Secretary would like to read some of the speeches which I made in defence debates since 1954 when I came to the House, he would see I was just as critical of my own Government as I am, at the present moment, of his.
It is the Reserve factor which we have to pay attention to, and defence policy changes, of course. Faced with the dangers which confront us, to consider that we can look at them and ask what we did in the 1950s is complete nonsense. I am sure the Under-Secretary, when he reflects on it, will realise that. We are dealing with a situation which changes; we are dealing with it now, and because of this we have to have more Reserves.
The wastage rate might lead us, in view of the scarcity of planes and power which exists at the present time, to move to a strategic and tactical escalation on the nuclear side far quicker than the outcome of the land battle. I do not believe we have enough planes for this purpose, without eating into those for our tactical nuclear strike. Because of this scarcity we might be brought, sooner than we might have wished, to a tactical and strategic nuclear escalation. I am sure we must have a far better strategic Reserve for such a battle. This is why I am so concerned when I hear the Secretary of State talking about the use of air power entirely as a tactical means. I am sure it is dangerous, not only from the point of view of the defence of these islands, but more dangerous because it may lead to a tactical and strategic nuclear escalation which none of us who knows the power, and what this means, would want.
This is why I want to see the country realising the seriousness of the situation that confronts us by the cancellation of the F111. This is why I am concerned that neither the Secretary of State for


Defence nor one Minister from the Ministry of Defence, learning the seriousness of the position with which we are confronted, saw fit to resign to bring it home to the country. This is what one would have hoped.
The Secretary of State for Defence speaks of the R.A.F. having 1,000 planes. Does he include in those the obsolete Canberras, Javelins, Hunters and others? Let us face facts. Under the Labour Government the Royal Air Force has been contracting, not expanding. Grave risks are being taken with defence—risks which, in my view are not justified.
The Secretary of State for Defence was right when he said that the Royal Air Force in the 1970s will be manned by men of quality and education. Of course, it will; it always has been. The question will be: are there going to be enough of them, and will there be enough pilots and planes to face a battle of confrontation—short, wasteful and bloody? The strength of the Royal Air Force at the end of the war was 9,000 planes; that strength cannot be reached now. We are working with our allies. The figure we have at the present moment is one in which the Government are taking grave risks with this country, especially in the European theatre. I do not believe the nation realises the risks that are being taken. It was for this reason that I felt, after the passage of four years, that it was my duty to make this speech in this Air Estimates debate.
The Secretary of State for Defence came into office as a young eagle he is going out of office like an ostrich with his head firmly dug in the sand, and with his wings clipped.

8.34 p.m.

Sir John Eden: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich (Mr. Ridsdale) on his powerful contribution. Any hon. Member who has had any association, particularly in a Ministerial capacity, with the Royal Air Force will for all time thereafter feel particularly loyal connections with it and will not miss any opportunity to stand up and to speak up in its defence, particularly at a time like this when one has been made so aware of the weaken

ing of this fine fighting force as a result of recent Government decisions.
This is a very important debate. I hope that hon. Members will forgive me for that the fact that I was not here at the beginning of it, although I recognise the significance of what we are discussing. However, I have been able to attend during the last few hours. Hon. Members, not confined to this side of the House, have deployed a formidable case against the Government.
If I were to give a text for my remarks in this debate, I think that it would be to refer back to the speech made by the Secretary of State in May of last year and to extract from that speech this sentence, which I have no doubt has already been quoted and which certainly bears requoting:
Tactical strike and reconnaissance is the military umbrella which we must have to protect our forces—land, sea or air—from attack.
The right hon. Gentleman illustrated how important this had been in fairly recent experience. He said later in the same speech:
In 1964, reconnaissance aircraft provided us with the first information of a developing crisis over Cyprus, without which we might have been unable to prevent general war in the Eastern Mediterranean and perhaps in Europe as a whole."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st May, 1967; Vol. 746, c. 112–13.]
In those two quotations stands the whole justification for British military expenditure and for British military commitment. It is the justification for which even the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has been looking. I know that he will agree with what I have just said. If he has been wondering why it is necessary for us to authorise continuing expenditure on armed forces, the answer has been given clearly by the Secretary of State, in that it enables us to play our part in limiting the area of conflict and in helping to prevent the outbreak of a further major world conflagration.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: That does not impress me.

Sir J. Eden: The hon. Gentleman may not be here at the time, but it interests me. It is certainly of great interest to those younger than me.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Where are they?

Sir J. Eden: And it is certainly of great interest to all those who have the ambition to see that they and their children shall live in peace. The hon. Gentleman must now recognise, as does every serving officer and man in the Royal Air Force, that the purpose of his service is to further the cause of peace. The hon. Gentleman, being a peace-loving man, will therefore be right later tonight in not persisting in his Amendment, which I suspect he tabled as a gesture.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: With his knowledge of the R.A.F., what does the hon. Gentleman think the R.A.F. would feel if it knew that we are discussing the expenditure of £537 million and do not have 15 hon. Members in the Chamber?

Sir J. Eden: That is not a significant barometer of the degree of concern which the country as a whole has in the subject.
I began by extracting from the speech of the Secretary of State for Defence what I regarded as a very significant reference to the important rôle of tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft. I want to find out just what has been happening in this sphere. At one time it was a rôle completely—and still almost entirely—discharged by the Canberra and V-bombers. When the Conservatives were in office, they developed the TSR2, the initial letters of which stand for "tactical strike and reconnaissance". It was designed for deployment elsewhere than just Europe. After it was cancelled, the Government planned to replace it with the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft and the F111K. Both have been cancelled by the Government, but what has not been changed as a result of the cancellation is the dependence of our fighting forces in all three Services on intelligence. The earliest possible warning of impending hostile action against our national interest is so vital that I want to be quite satisfied that the Government have planned to replace that capability which they have now destroyed.
We must have the capacity to penetrate very sophisticated enemy defences. I am not thinking only of strategic operations, even though in that context I was impressed by the Secretary of State's remarks in winding up the defence debate on Tuesday, when he said:
Another interesting thing at present, although it is not likely to be true for more than

another 10 years, is that there is no effective defence at strategic level against an aircraft in very low flight."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1968; Vol. 760, c. 352.]
The only aircraft which were to have come into service with that capability have been cancelled.
That capability is also of great significance even in the tactical rôle. Part of the reason for the development of the vertical take-off aircraft is that it is very manoeuvrable and capable of penetration at low level. What other aircraft are now being planned to come into service in the future which will have a range, payload, or all-weather reconnaissance capability similar to that which the TSR2 would have had and the F111 will have? I repeat that question in another way: have the Government any plans for replacing those very significant capabilities, the importance of which they fully recognise, with new aircraft coming forward, either to be developed by this country alone or in conjunction with others?
The whole history of the Canberra replacement is a sorry one. For the collosal cost of £240 million on this great venture, we have got nothing, and how rapidly at the Government's insistence were the plans and drawings of the TSR2 torn up! They were guilty men then and they are guilty men to day. I will illustrate this by one further example.
In the Defence White Paper, it is clear that the Government attach, quite properly, a great deal of importance to what they call the "new military concepts" of N.A.T.O. I agree with this. The Government owe it to the House to tell us a little more about the military plans and the future force planning of what they call the "new basis" of military concepts. Let them look at the N.A.T.O. flank now and tell us what British military equipment is available for the protection of British interests which are likely to be threatened by the deployment of hostile forces in the Mediterranean or North Africa.
I see that No. 100 and No. 139 Squadrons of Victor Mark II bombers are to be scrapped before the end of this year. No. 543 Squadron is comprised of Victor Mark Hs with strategic reconnaissance capability. It is this squadron which is now capable of photographing the whole of the Mediterranean in an afternoon. Is this, too, destined to be scrapped?
We all know that V-bombers have a limited life. They are most magnificent aircraft and have served the country very well and will continue to do so for some time. What are the Government's plans for replacing the reconnaissance capability, for example, of the Victor Mark Its of 543 Squadron? Can I have a specific answer to that question? Again, unless one can be assured of that, one cannot be assured that, even in the limited period of responsibility of this wretched Government, there is any prospect of securing this country in future against the possibility of hostile attack.
The Government know that Russians are now wholly in the Mediterranean, in Alexandria, Mers-el-Kebir and elsewhere. They know the vulnerability of N.A.T.O.'s southern flank. Yet they are busy destroying the major element in Western Europe's fighting air forces which now has the capacity to resist the possibility of attack and protect us against these threats.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Will the hon. Gentleman give way? I am sorry to interrupt. I am interested in his speech.

Sir J. Eden: I am not giving way to the hon. Gentleman. Did I give the impression that I was doing so?

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Yes.

Sir J. Eden: Then I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. I am not giving way to him. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) hopes to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker. I have put a specific question to the right hon. Gentleman and I hope that I shall have an answer.

8.50 p.m.

Mr. Stanley R. McMaster: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden) and my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich (Mr. Ridsdale) who have both underlined the grave risks which the Government are taking in defence. It is astonishing that the debate should be so poorly attended when £600 million is being spent on the R.A.F. The Government have created a complete mess with their pattern of order and cancellation, not only for the R.A.F. but for the entire British aircraft industry.
When they came into office they were quick to cancel TSR2, replacing it with

the F111. What has happened? The Fill has been cancelled. They cancelled the HS 625. That was to be a jet transport aircraft manufactured by Hawker Siddeley with subcontracting to other British aircraft firms. That has been replaced by the American Hercules with a much poorer specification than the HS625.
What is much more serious for our industry is that because of replacement with American aircraft, money is being spent in America to improve the technology and aircraft design capacity of that country. The AFVG has fallen by the wayside too. British scientists developed this idea but now it has been abandoned to the United States.
The Government were so proud of their vertical take-off aircraft. But they cancel the P 1154 and replace it with the Harrier—the older, slower aircraft. If we are to retain a technological lead in any branch of the aircraft industry, we must have the superior supersonic version of the vertical take-off aircraft, not the slower one. It is this aircraft that promises best for Britain in future.
In the recent crisis in the Middle East we saw how easy it was for a determined enemy to destroy aircraft on the ground. Vertical take-off aircraft such as the Hawker Siddeley can avoid this to a great extent. One can protect oneself from the complete destruction of one's fighter force on the ground. It is very important to retain the more developed and advanced version of this aircraft rather than to keep the slower version.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer: Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting, as a result of the experience of the six-day war in the Middle East, when the Israelis got beneath the Egyptian curtain, that if there was a vertical take-off force, the enemy would be seen in time and the force would get away before it was hit? Is the hon. Member honestly and seriously suggesting that? I have never heard anything so ridiculous. It is no argument at all.

Mr. McMaster: That intervention is irrelevant. One has to look at defence, particularly with the R.A.F., on a broad canvas. It is an important part of defence strategy that one should diversify and spread out one's air shield in every


way possible. There are many situations, not only in the Middle East, when a vertical take-off aircraft would be of great use. I have already stressed the damage done to the British aircraft industry. There are important by-products of our aircraft industry in defence technology, in the miniaturisation of equipment, in advances in metallurgy and in other fall-outs where Britain is losing the lead which she once had. This is a lead which is absolutely vital if Britain is to remain in the forefront as a scientific and technologically-based country with a large industrial manufacturing capacity.
As a result of the way in which hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have treated the British aircraft industry it is almost impossible to finance any new project in either the civil or the military field. I say advisedly the civil as well as the military field, for it is a well-known fact in the United States and every other country that civil aircraft production is subsidised directly or indirectly by money spend on defence. If Britain is to spend all the money she requires for equipment for the R.A.F. in the United States it is the United States technology and aircraft industry which will benefit from new techniques and the discovery of new methods. This will enable the United States to produce a better civil aircraft and Britain will be the loser thereby.
Unless our aircraft industry can be assured of a reasonable scale of profits on the contracts they take for defence purposes it will be impossible for them to continue to compete in this field. One must take the rough with the smooth, balance the successful contracts against the unsuccessful contracts, and make sure that there is the promise of a reasonable reward. When I say "reasonable reward" I mean a sufficient reward for the aircraft industry to enable it to raise on the market the finance it needs.
The Government have a 70 per cent. interest in the firm of Short Bros. and Harland. I hope that the Minister in summing up will say a little about the steps to be taken towards the financial reconstruction of that company. The past chairman has complained, often publicly, of he strange financial set-up and the need for the financial reconstruction of his company. What do the Government intend to do?
Let us make no mistake; this is a vital industry in Northern Ireland. We benefit directly from the employment it gives and, as every hon. Member knows, we have an unemployment rate of 7½ per cent., many times above the national average. If the Government are going to use the defence programme, as the Prime Minister and others have said they would, to assist areas of high unemployment, surely they can make certain that an adequate amount of this work is sent to Northern Ireland. I ask the Minister to give an assurance on this line. Not only does this provide employment but it also ensures the training of skilled craftsmen.
One finds from the Defence Estimates and pages 87 and 89 of the White Paper that about 50,000 people are employed in Whitehall, in local administration and other support services. The total Whitehall organisation comes to 63,500. The general purposes combat forces consist of the Navy 18,800, the Army 24,400 and the Air Force 20,300, a total 63,500, the same number as those employed in Whitehall. Is this the way in which the Labour Party should treat our Armed Forces? For every combat man, there is a man in Whitehall. When I say that, I am not referring to those employed in research and development, training, production, repair, and so on.
It is perhaps a strange comment on this debate that the last three speeches have been made from this side of the House. The interest which the party opposite shows in the defence of this country and in the expenditure of over £600 million worth of the taxpayers' money illustrates the terrible effect on morale in the Royal Air Force and the aircraft industry which has been caused by this Government's bungling.

9.0 p.m.

Mr. F. V. Corfield: I am glad that the Minister of Defence for Equipment has returned to the Chamber. I think that he opened the case for the Government with a degree of complacency from which the debate has never recovered, despite the usual knowledgeable interventions by my hon. Friends, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey).
The Minister's speech seemed to me to be based on a series of false premises.


He wholly ignored the fundamental problem of the long gestation period in the aviation industry, and in relying on the large numbers of people still employed in that industry he completely failed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield pointed out, to appreciate that this was a reflection of the past and had nothing to do with the future, which affects the confidence of the industry. He failed to reflect, too, the serious problem of holding together design and research staffs unless there is something else coming along in the pipeline. He failed to recognise that it is the future which matters and that when considering the future we must plan a very long way ahead.
As has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield, morale in the Royal Air Force today is undoubtedly seriously affected. If the Minister of Defence for Equipment got round the aircraft industry as much as I do, he would find that loss of morale reflected there also. I was glad that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Rankin) pointed out that in relying so greatly on the export figures to indicate the health of the aircraft industry he completely failed to point out the very serious switchround which has taken place this year when, for the first time in history, imports from the United States substantially outweigh the exports which we have sent them.
I would say only this to the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock). I see that he is not present, so perhaps I should skip it. However, I would remind him of the words of the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) when he was in opposition:
It is not our function in a debate of this sort to explain the Opposition's defence policy. This is, essentially, a time when we want to have from the Government a statement of their defence policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1963; Vol. 673, c. 146.]
I adhere to that. While I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his apparent discernment as to the Conservative defence policy from the words of the Motion, I fear that he has almost certainly got it wrong.
It is a long time since I took part in either a defence debate or any of the Service Estimates debates. I admit that I have done no checking in this regard,

but I assure the right hon. Gentleman that it will be the purest coincidence if I repeat myself, although I am not suggesting that matters of accuracy of that sort will deter him from including me in the very silly gibe which he made about my right hon. and hon. Friends the other night. His attempt to hold up the consistency of my right hon. and hon. Friends to mockery when he and his colleagues have done such untold damage by constancy only in their inconstancy, represents a degree of cynicism and irresponsibility for which it would be hard to find a parallel.
By what, in the light of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks on Tuesday, I suppose he would call the virtue of saying something new, he has by making short-term reversals both of policy and of solemn commitments wholly undermined the credibility abroad of our determination and ability to carry out our obligations. And to adopt as a defence the proposition that, having discarded weapons and bases which he himself has always regarded as a prerequisite to the fulfilment of obligations, we can nevertheless continue to accept those obligations without explaining how, is to insult the House. I hope that the hon. Gentleman, who has a higher regard for the House, will be more forthcoming tonight.
I want to take as an example of these tactics—and I make no apology for repetition and if the right hon. Gentleman gives no answer to these questions they will be repeated again and again—one that particularly affects both the R.A.F. and the aviation industry. It is not by any means the only example. I refer to our commitments to Australia and New Zealand which were the subject of a good deal of concern on both sides of the House in the debates on Monday and Tuesday of this week and which was expressed very forcibly, I thought, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Mitcham (Mr. R. Carr) in winding up. If the right hon. Gentleman the Minister ignores these questions he has no one but himself to blame if they are repeated and I will repeat this one again for the benefit of the Under-Secretary of State.
If in May of last year the type of capability, the tactical strike reconnaissance capability, represented by TSR2 and F111 was vital to any contribution we could make to the defence of Australia


and New Zealand, how do we fulfil our commitment and how can acceptance of that commitment be in any way credible when we have deprived ourselves of that vital capability? That is a question that worries hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House and it is really no good scrapping a vital piece of equipment, reaffirming the obligation to which it was vital and then wondering what to do about it. Surely, that is putting the cart before the horse with a vengeance that has seldom been seen before in politics.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr-Ewing) instanced a very similar story over Malaysia and referred to paragraph 8 of the White Paper. If that paragraph with its emphasis on new strategic concepts, particularly in relation to the rôle of air forces in extending the conventional phase of hostilities, is to make any sense at all it must, on the face of it, mean a greater rather than less dependence on a strike reconnaissance rôle, and must make it as vital in Europe as it is in relation to Australia and New Zealand. For the right hon. Gentleman to make out that this passage was intended to imply an extension from perhaps a one-to-two days' conventional war to a three-to-four days' conventional war, then I can only say he has expressed himself quite astonishingly badly. It does not conform with the information some of us are able to obtain from N.A.T.O. But once the Vulcans are phased out, as things stand at present among Western European nations only the French with their Mirage IV will have an aircraft capable of this long-range strike reconnaissance.
I ask the Under-Secretary whether he can tell us any more about the future of the Vulcan, because on April 14th there seemed to be two Answers to Questions which seemed to be slightly contradictory. One, from the right hon. Gentleman, was to the effect that he cannot conceive the life of the Vulcan being extended. The other was from the hon. Gentleman in respect of the fitting of ejector seats in which he said that that was under consideration in relation to modifications—which I took to be to extend the life of these aircraft.
Without the Vulcan, in Europe only the Mirage IV will have that capability.

The French, however, as the right hon. Gentleman correctly reminded us, are not members of N.A.T.O. and we do not know—we cannot know—how long it will be before once again France becomes a reliable ally. As something of a Francophile, I say that with sadness rather than bitterness.
The only conclusion to which one can come is that if this rôle is still vital—and we have not been told why it has suddenly ceased to be vital—we must rely on the United States in circumstances in which, because of the Government's vacillations, the Americans are less certain than they have ever been in recent history that they can rely on us.
In considering the British forces in the Far East, I am surprised that the Government never seem to take cognisance of the fact that the Americans believe that it is in their interests that we should be there. The fact that we rely so heavily on America in Europe at least deserves to be taken into account in considering whether they are not entitled to a quid pro quo from us.
In relation to the long-range strike reconnaissance rôle, I must refer to the cancellation of both the TSR2 and, now, the F111. I was glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield emphasised the question of cancellation, because it does not contribute anything at all to debates in this House to throw across the Floor charge and counter-charge of cancellations and to add up a bogus balance sheet.
In aviation, electronics, atomic energy and all advanced technologies there is always likely to be a need, if we are to remain in advance in those industries, to embark upon projects which take us beyond the bounds of existing knowledge. It stands to reason that in operations like this the period of development will be long and that between the initial conception and production there may be all sorts of developments which make it wise to call a halt.
For a start, by the nature of an effort to go through the bounds of knowledge, one cannot begin to forecast what it will cost to solve a problem which has never been solved before. Nor can it be guaranteed that either alternatively or in addition, during that long period, the problem may not be solved or, indeed, be


rendered obsolete by developments elsewhere.
I very much fear that by creating in the House of Commons the idea that cancellation as such is evidence of failure and error, we create an atmosphere which will hopelessly inhibit the financial risk-taking which in these spheres is so vital, because so often financial risk and progress go hand in hand and without the former we cannot achieve the latter. I conclude from that, not that there is anything wrong with the Motion, as hon. Members opposite are suggesting, but that each project must be considered on its merits as an individual project. It would be rare indeed to find that the cancellation of one project was of very much relevance in considering another.
As to the TSR2 and the F111, which we have debated more than once, let me remind the House that the TSR2 was virtually a finished aircraft. It was flying. As my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield reminded the House, at the stage at which it was flying it was behaving remarkably well in comparison with many other types at a comparable stage of development.
By the absence of any explanation from the Government of why this strike/reconnaissance rôle is no longer required or, alternatively, how it is now to be provided, and in the light of our balance of payments problem and the complete failure at the time of this Government to make a really sensible balance sheet of the difference in cost between producing this aircraft at home—bearing in mind that a large part of the costs would be spent in a way in which a considerable proportion would return to the Exchequer in taxation—and importing the F111, it is apparent to us that the decision to abandon TSR2 was even more wrong in retrospect than appeared at the time.
However that may be, let us turn to the replacement of the F111. I would just refer in passing to the interesting passage about the anti-ballistic missile system in the speech of the Secretary of State when he wound up on Tuesday. He referred to the fact that systems of this type, at any rate in relation to present day knowledge, remain vulnerable to fast low-flying aircraft. My hon. Friend the

Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten) intervened to ask why that did not indicate a use for the type of weapon that the TSR2 would have been—and perhaps the Fill as well. The right hon. Gentleman merely said that he did not envisage that this would be a necessary addition. I hope again that the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force may be able to elaborate a little on that.
Coming back to the F111, many of my hon. Friends have pointed out that there was an expenditure on this type of capability of some £300 million, not only with no aircraft, but once again with a threat created to the viability of the British aerospace industries, which are still suffering a lack of confidence, and certainly a lack of the confidence which would encourage the investment of private capital, from the cancellation of TSR2, the HS681 and the P1154. As a result of those cancellations, there now rests a question mark over the whole future of the offset agreement, which is referred to ominously throughout the White Paper always by reference to the F111.
To give the Government their due, there is no doubt that that offset agreement has proved a very valuable means of opening up a vast export market in the United States. This has been particularly so in the case of the British avionics industry. I know of one firm which has made a total of seven bids, five of which it has won. It has secured orders to the extent of some 50 million dollars. That is something about which we should all be pleased and proud; and that, incidentally, excludes equipment for the United Kingdom Phantom programme.
One has to face the fact, however, that until the Kennedy Round tariff reductions are fully effective in 1972, in the absence of this agreement, there would be some pretty difficult if not insuperable barriers to the continuance of our exploitation of what is a very valuable market. At the moment, it is not even clear what is the fate of some of the contracts already won. Certainly it has never been clear to me and even less clear in retrospect why—[Interruption.] I would be grateful if the right hon. Gentleman could continue his private conversation elsewhere—

Mr. Mason: I was not trying to be rude to the hon. Gentleman. I was explaining to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force, who was present during the course of my speech, as I thought the hon. Gentleman was, that the contracts which we have secured under the F111 offset agreement are safe.

Mr. Corfield: I am glad to note that, but the hon. Gentleman will remember that he was going at a fair pace and this may have slipped my mind.
The point that I want to make is to ask why, at the time, we tied, or appeared to tie, this agreement so specifically with the F111. We were also ordering the Hercules, and my information is that during the five years running from the initiation of the offset agreement British purchases of military equipment from the United States seem likely to amount to about £2,000 million, of which the F111, at about £400 million, represents only 20 per cent.—a substantial part, but by no means the major part. There is very little doubt that in the future we shall purchase further military equipment from the United States, and it does not seem unreasonable, on the face of it, that there should be a continuous arrangement between our two countries, as is the case between Canada and America.
There are certain other factors which strengthen the Government's bargaining position somewhat more than is generally realised. Not only is the appalling drain of the war in Vietnam making an enormous demand on the United States supply capacity, but there exists in the United States an absolutely fundamental rule in relation to the United States Government contracts that if the supplier loses profit as a result of cancellations, he is under a pretty strict obligation to take every conceivable reasonable step to reduce that loss, particularly where he can switch his labour, his materials, or indeed the finished product, to another customer. It is very much to be hoped that we shall be able to secure the application of that principle in the case of our own cancellations.
I appreciate that these negotiations are delicate, and cannot be the subject, at any rate in detail, of public debate, but it is only right to tell the Government that my impression from going around

industry is that there is a feeling of anxiety and frustration, in part because of the Government's delay in giving guidance about the existing contracts, but also because of real apprehension that the Government negotiators are being too dilatory, too much on the defensive, and lacking in determination. I hope that that is not true, but I hope, at the same time, that the Minister will assure us not only that it is not true but that he will never allow it to become true.
There is a further aspect which we have to face, and that is that the Government's constant changes of mind in the past, the cancellations, the failure fully to back, and the delay in backing such successful projects as the Harrier, to which my hon. Friend referred, and the uncertainty about the variable geometry advanced combat aircraft, are all increasing the danger that in the United States there will grow up a feeling that British contractors, however reliable in the past, may be subject to such action by the United Kingdom Government as to make it impossible for them to remain so reliable in the future. It is therefore extremely important in our export as well as in our home production to induce in the industry a return of confidence.
I turn for a moment to consider the advanced combat aircraft now under study at B.A.C. Warton. Even in the short history of this project, the story of the core of the R.A.F.'s equipment—those were the Minister's words—seems to be one of order, counter-order, and approaching disorder. The Government cannot justly be blamed for the withdrawal of the French, or the resultant necessity to reframe the design with less emphasis on the air defence rôle, which was demanded by France. But now that the position in regard to our military commitments overseas, and the F111, have been so dramatically and suddenly changed, the operational requirement appears to have been thrown so much into the melting pot that there is a danger that we may be attempting to cover such a wide range of possible operational requirements that we shall once again miss the boat, either by too much delay, or by the Government getting cold feet, at ever mounting cost.
There is surely a lesson to be learned here from the TSR2. In retrospect, many


people would agree that one of the problems of the TSR2 was that it was an attempt to incorporate too many highly sophisticated operational requirements, involving technical break-throughs on far too many fronts, and, therefore, far too many unforecastable costs; and that, secondly, during the development, there were far too many modfications, particularly in the avionics, as opposed to the air frame or the engine, some of which were being made at a very late stage indeed.
Therefore, in regard to the advanced combat aircraft, I would urge that the operational requirements are kept within or very near the limits of what the industry knows how to do and that we do not allow it to bulge up into some vast flying research operation into the unknown. Second, I urge the Government to exploit to the full the great—perhaps the only—advantage of their change of strategy, namely, the emphasis on Europe, which will presumably enable us to design an aircraft which should be suitable to the air forces of our N.A.T.O. allies.
Nevertheless, even if we are to include none of the special requirements and equipment which we should have needed in the past because of our Middle Eastern and Far Eastern commitments, I hope that the Under-Secretary will say something about how we are to carry out "the general capability based on Europe, including the United Kingdom, which can be deployed overseas", and which appears at the top of page 3 of the White Paper. On the assumption that we can design for very similar rôles in European air forces, I hope that we shall have an eye on the substantial European and Canadian F104 replacement programme.
Desirable though it no doubt is that we should secure a European partner in this project if possible, I hope that the Government will not make this arrangement an absolute prerequisite for continuing the project nor once again sell out Britain's rightful position, because in terms of their size and comprehensiveness of our industry, as design leader. If we were to do this over and over again, we would embark on a self-destructive policy, because, if we surrender our basic aircraft position as the only European industry with a completely comprehensive range, we lay ourselves open—at any rate until

we can become an economic part of Europe—to being played off against America by a European industry which has taken over the lead.
I was interested to hear the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Rankin) make the same plea, when he said that we should maintain the broad base of our industry. We shall not do this if we cast away over and over again our design leadership.
I turn now to general conditions in the industry. Of course we were pleased with the Chief Secretary's long-delayed statement on some more sensible profit formula, but we should realise that what is worrying the industry is the future and that there is a lack of confidence, to which the Government's inability to make up their minds and determine future projects is adding. There still remain many questions to ask on the Chief Secretary's statement and I will not ask them again tonight.
I will finish with a quotation from an article in that influential American magazine, Aviation Week, on 22nd January:
If there is any hope at all for Britain to climb out of its present economic morass, it lies in a massive development of modern technology to increase the productivity of its labour force and make its goods competitive once more in international markets. This goal cannot be achieved without a thorough revitalisation of the British aerospace industry to function as the spearhead for the breakthrough technology required.
The Government have not given us confidence that they are either doing that or are capable of doing it.
We are all, I suppose, conditioned by our background. Some of my hon. Friends started life as Regular officers in the R.A.F. I started in the Army, and I have never regretted that. But it taught me one thing: a great obligation to one's subordinates. I ask the Minister to consider whether he has fulfilled that obligation and earned their respect.

9.30 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Merlyn Rees): Tonight has been the second of the debates under the new procedures whereby we debate a Motion before dealing with the Estimates for a short period at the end of the evening. This debate has been of great interest


to the few of us who have been present but, while it has been successful in this respect. I do not think that this procedure has achieved one of its main aims, which is to interest more hon. Members in our proceedings on defence. While the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South (Mr. Corfield) referred to the position now, I suggest that the debate has not been over-attended all day.
In this debate hon. Gentlemen opposite have gone out of their way to build up an exceedingly gloomy and despondent picture of the R.A.F. equipment programme. They have, in general, glossed over all those aspects which give cause for satisfaction. I would except from that the hon. Member for Dumfries (Mr. Monro) and, to a large degree, the remarks of the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, South, who I think for the first time in three years put some of the questions concerning research and development, and the problems that are faced by all Governments, in their right perspective.
It is no use denying that the R.A.F.—and this is the starting point; I freely admit it—has suffered a setback in its equipment programme with the loss of the F111. I am sure, however, that this is of a temporary nature, and I shall return to this matter shortly. Important though this loss is, it relates to only one part of the operational capability of the R.A.F.
The Service itself, I can inform the House, is settling down with its customary efficiency and resource to consider what is the most sensible way to deal with the resulting situation. I shall deal with this more fully later, as I appreciate that this matter has been raised by many hon. Members.
To listen to the speeches which have been made by hon. Gentlemen opposite—bearing in mind their Motion—one would have thought that, when they formed the Government, they always had the right long-term answer to our aircraft equipment problems, that all the measures they took in this field were morale boosters, and that every project they conceived was seen through to a satisfactory conclusion. Of course, this is not the case. Their record is a dismal catalogue, as my right hon. Friend pointed out earlier.
They may claim that they bequeathed a comprehensive long-term aircraft pro

gramme in 1964, but they were spared the salutary lesson of having to see it through and to face the operational and financial consequences. They did not have to face the immediate prospect of being responsible for a force that would have been, in a few years' time, grossly under-equipped. We have gone over all this ground many times before but we have had Motions couched in similar terms to that offered today many times before, and the facts—not just because of the debate or because of the Motion—are worth repeating because the loss of the F111 has rightly been in the minds of hon. Members and has received a great deal of publicity. For the sake of those in the R.A.F. and their career prospects, it is worth again repeating the facts of the situation about the re-equipment programme of the R.A.F. and its operational needs. My right hon. Friend said earlier that I would concentrate on the operational side.
When the Labour Government took office, the R.A.F. was operating Canberras, Hunters, Beverleys, Hastings and Shackletons—which were then 13, 10, 8, 16 and 12 years old respectively—and there was no prospect of a replacement within a satisfactory time scale and within a defence budget that the country could have reasonably been able to afford. Even the party opposite, in the event, might have found it impossible to stomach the large sums which their future programmes would have entailed.
When the Secretary of State has claimed the savings made on the long-term aircraft programme which he inherited, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) has replied that the long-term costings were "imaginary". This perhaps betrays a lack of understanding of the functions of long-term costings in the Ministry of Defence—and aircraft workers did not march for imaginary reasons—but in so far as he believes what he says, it must mean that, had the party opposite won the 1964 and 1966 elections, further cuts would have been made. It certainly follows that during their 13 years it would not have been a new idea that cuts should be made. It could have been that the TSR2—which priced itself out of the field and because of a lack of overseas sales was in no sense in the long-term interests of the


British aircraft industry—might have been a victim.
In reaching decisions about aircraft, there are three central considerations which my right hon. Friend the present Chancellor outlined to the House in a debate on the F111 on 13th December, 1965, namely: one, to give the Service the best aircraft for the rôles which it has to fulfil at the time it is needed; two, to do so at the least possible cost to the nation taking into account both budgetary and balance of payments considerations; and, three, to do so in the way that offers the British aircraft industry the best prospect for the future.
In the decisions which they have made on the R.A.F. programme, the Government have taken all these considerations into account.
My right hon. Friend in opening this debate today has referred to the industrial aspects. I am more immediately concerned, in my job in the Government, with the operational aspects; I say quite firmly that the Government have throughout been anxious to ensure that the Royal Air Force would have the equipment appropriate to its tasks at the time when it was needed. We cancelled the P1154, the supersonic VTOL aircraft—this has been mentioned today and many times before—because, despite the urgent need of the Royal Air Force for a Hunter replacement, it could not have been available before 1971 at the earliest. I say "at the earliest", because slippage in development projects was not an entirely unknown factor under the previous Government.
We decided to replace the P1154 by a combination of the Phantom and the Harrier, the former having a multi-rôle strike/ground attack/interceptor capability with supersonic performance, and the latter the V/STOL capability to provide the intimate close support of ground forces which is possible only with vertical/short take-off and landing techniques.
In the next financial year we shall begin to receive Phantoms in considerable numbers and conversion training will begin. The first R.A.F. Phantoms will enter R.A.F. service early in 1969. The House has been reminded that this air

craft has over 40 per cent. British equipment. My hon. Friend asked whether it was worthwhile. I will put to him a dilemma. I think it would be right to say that the American Phantom would have suited the job, but the Government took into account in this instance the effect that buying British would have on the British aircraft industry. This is an instance where two things came together and it costs more to do it in this way.
There have, as the House knows, been development difficulties associated with the Spey engine and the Ferranti nay/attack system, but I am glad to say that we are now well on the way to solving these and there should be only a few months' delay in our plans for getting the aircraft into squadron service. The final decision on price has to be agreed with our agents.
As regards the V/STOL Harrier, here too the report is of solid progress. With this advanced aircraft the United Kingdom leads the world and production is in full swing for the Royal Air Force. I have said this is a close support aircraft: with its unique take-off and landing capability it is able to maintain very close touch with the Army formations which it is its purpose to support in the battlefield. This capability is of special and growing significance in the European theatre It has export prospects, not the least of the reasons being that the lessons from the Arab-Israeli war have not been lost on people in services in all parts of the world. We had to cancel the HS681, the V/STOL tactical transport aircraft, because of excessive cost and because it would not have been in service until 1971–72 at the earliest. There was a crying need to replace urgently the Hastings and the Beverleys which simply would not have lasted until that time at the sort of rates we needed to operate them.
The hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) is very concerned with production but, as far as the Royal Air Force is concerned, we have a responsibility to people who are flying and those who are travelling in old aeroplanes. The decision we made was to buy this rather than wait.

Mr. McMaster: That is all very well, but when cancelling the Hawker-Siddeley


615 did the Under-Secretary not consider ordering the tactical version of the Belfast instead of ordering the Hercules so that the order could be kept in this country?

Mr. Merlyn Rees: All I can say is that we considered it.
We decided that the urgent operational need would be met by ordering the Hercules. This is a tactical aircraft which also has a strategic capability and it has made a most impressive contribution to recent transport operations. If there is time, I will mention it to the House.
A question was asked this afternoon about the maritime field by the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), who always shows such interest in Royal Air Force matters. We found that the previous Government had not made a decision on the urgently-needed maritime reconnaissance aircraft to replace the Shackletons. We reached an early decision, in the first few months of the Government, for a development of the Comet—the Nimrod as it has been subsequently named. This programme is going well. Both prototype aircraft have now flown and we can confidently expect deliveries of aircraft to the Royal Air Force to replace the Shackleton Mark Hs before the end of 1969.
This new aircraft is powered by four Rolls-Royce Spey engines. It has a modern computerised attack system for use against submarines and surface shipping, and its deep-section fuselage accommodates a large-capacity weapons bay. Here again, the United Kingdom leads the world and this will be the most advanced maritime reconnaissance aircraft, the first to be powered by turbo-fan engines.
The hon. Member for Dumfries spoke with the knowledge of a Coastal man; I assure him that when he spoke of the tight flying at low levels the advice I have is that these aircraft are first rate and the problem in this respect is minimal. Many matters were raised by him, but taking it out of the context of remarks I want to make, he referred to the problems of the Reserves, and the need of contact for the Royal Air Force with civil life. The comment I would make here—and it is a question I have often posed myself—is that, when the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and the Royal Air

Force Volunteer Reserve were ended, I was surprised there was not the same noise and outcry as there was when the Territorial Army was disbanded. The decision was absolutely right and logical; the situation of men arriving at an airfield with no aeroplanes to fly made it quite obvious that to carry on with that sort of system was the wrong thing to do. My own view is that the logic is there too in the present situation.
The question of flying for officers was referred to. I have looked at the matter further, and I am advised it is far more economical for officers to do it by refresher training. It is not only economical but, apparently, to do it any other way would be, from an operational point of view, extremely dangerous. The light type of aeroplane has very little relevance with regard to a Phantom.
I have an example of an officer in the Royal Air Force who was, admittedly, going to fly two types of aircraft. I was much surprised to find that, leaving in January, he would not arrive with his squadron until August, because during that time he would be flying refresher aircraft. There are good reasons for this.
In the longer term, to return to the main theme, we shall also have the Anglo-French Jaguar, which is a supersonic light close support/trainer aircraft. In its trainer version it will replace the Gnat/Hunter aircraft as the follow-on aircraft from the Jet Provost in the flying training sequence. In its close support version it will take over the ground/attack rôle from the Phantom when the Phantom takes over from the Lightning in the mid 1970s.
As regards helicopters, the R.A.F. will start to take delivery of the SA330 air-portable support helicopter in 1970–71. The other two helicopters have an interest for the R.A.F., but their greater interest is for the other two Services.
In the missile field, there will be Rapier, a surface-to-air missile system which is fully airtransportable and highly mobile in the field. Deliveries to the R.A.F. of Martel will begin in 1971. The development of both versions of Martel—the anti-radar and the television—is progressing satisfactorily.
I submit that all this adds up to a very creditable situation in which there will


be a substantial improvement in the operational quality of our front line. I emphasise that already the improved operational capability which the present Government's policies have created is beginning to be available to help the Service carry out its many worldwide responsibilities. The year 1969 will be a vintage one for the introduction of new aircraft.

Mr. Patrick Wall: Does not this depend on the number of aircraft ordered? How many Harriers and Nimrods are to be ordered? Is it not very uneconomical to order in small packets?

Mr. Merlyn Rees: I will come to that in a moment. I know the hon. Gentleman's interest in this. A number of hon. Members have said that the number of front-line aircraft is only 400. There is not time to go into this in comparison with other countries, but it is not a straight comparison with numbers in other countries. There is the sophistication of the aircraft concerned. Sweden was mentioned. The then Chief of the Air Staff visited Sweden last year and commented extremely favourably on its very fine Air Force; but the Swedish Air Force concentrates its mind on one rôle. The R.A.F. has a variety of rôles in different parts of the world.
The hon. Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr-Ewing) raised the question of a brochure which he had obtained from the recruiting centre. I have checked on that this evening. I regret that a slip of paper which, I am informed, has been put in all the others, was not put in the hon. Member's. There it is. A slip of paper correcting the Fill reference has been issued and has been sent out with these brochures. I apologise that it was not in the hon. Gentleman's copy.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: The silliest statement is that new aircraft coming into R.A.F. service up to 1970 will number over 1,000, in view of the statements about helicopters not coming into service until later.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: I was about to refer to that. I have not had the time to check on this thoroughly, but I undertake to do so. What is the issue? In fact there will be more than 1,000 air

craft in the R.A.F. It is not the practice to give the precise figure. From what the hon. Gentleman has told me, the wording in that statement about "coming into service" would give the impression that they were all brand new. I apologise for that, and I will check it. It is 400-ish front line and 1,000-ish aircraft in total. I regret that from what the hon. Gentleman tells me the brochure certainly gives the wrong impression.

Mr. James Johnson: My hon. Friend has not said anything about the future of the Buccaneer. Will he do so?

Mr. Merlyn Rees: I will not forget the Buccaneer. I was saying that 1969 will be a vintage year. While we continue to have bases in the Persian Gulf and the Far East and the responsibilities related to them and afterwards, the Royal Air Force will be fully capable of meeting the operational responsibilities which fall to it. So much for the present. The policy of this Government gives the R.A.F. a far stronger immediate operational capability.
I turn now to the question of tactical strike reconnaissance aircraft and their capability, an issue raised by many hon. Members. However, before I touch on that, I want to take a look at the future and the new operational situation which will face the Royal Air Force in its European rôle, because the tactical strike must be considered in the European context.
Over the years the Royal Air Force has become a Service of great versatility operating in many different parts of the world. Because of this, squadrons learnt to be equally at home in greatly differing geographic and climatic environments. Concentration mainly in support of Europe and the North Atlantic presents a new and equally worthwhile challenge. The operational environment in Europe is tougher and will be even more so in the future. I am advised that this will demand a very high degree of professionalism, and in this aim new aircraft and equipment have an important part to play.
I should like to give some examples. In current N.A.T.O. thinking there is the need to operate aircraft away from main bases where they would be vulnerable to attack, and the need to improve


mobility. Therefore, not only the Harrier but the Phantom-Harrier partnership will be of special importance in Europe. On the question of mobility, obviously in the context of cutting down on a worldwide rôle the transport fleet will not need to be as great, but the actual size will have to be related to the commitment as it is worked out.
A unique contribution to N.A.T.O. is at present made in strike and reconnaissance. Before dealing with that may I say briefly—there is no time to deal with it Fully, but the House should be aware of this—that not only on the operational but on the administrative side very much of the R.A.F. has been geared to the worldwide rôle. With an Air Force which has its major responsibilities in Europe thought must obviously be given to this aspect.
I now turn to the subject of general capability. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said on 16th January that this will be
based in Europe … which can be deployed overseas as, in our judgment, circumstances demand, including support for United Nations operation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th January, 1968; Vol. 756, c. 1581.]
The situation now is that we have bases overseas with their own resident forces. These bases are backed by considerable resources in the United Kingdom. My hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration dealt with the cost factor in the debates this week.
In the future the general capability we use outside the N.A.T.O. area will have to be drawn from the forces we keep for the defence of Europe. Naturally, there will be need for greater notice, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has said, but because of the great flexibility of air power the Royal Air Force will have a significant contribution to make in the general capability rôle, either acting alone or through its capability for rapid development of operational squadrons, or in conjunction with the other Services. It could provide air transport to enable troops and equipment to be rapidly deployed where needed and then return to the European rôle. But, as I have said, this question must be looked at very carefully.
The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) raised the question of tankers and so on. In this reassessment of the

situation the skill of the R.A.F. in its tanker rôle is also being carefully examined.
There is an immediate and a long-term aspect of the F111 question. The Canberra was originally to have been replaced by the TSR2. We found that we could not afford this and opted for the F111K in association with the V-bombers. The purchase was limited, because the problem was to fill the gap between the demise of the Canberras in two years' time and the introduction of a new strike-reconnaisance aircraft in the mid-1970s. The V-force, due to operate in the tactical rôle, could not fill the gap unless it was bracketed with a spearhead type of aircraft—the F111—the Vulcan remaining, to the mid-1970s.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the Victor PR. It is not affected. Page 26 of the White Paper refers to the Blue Steel Mark II Victors.
The point about the F111 is that it would have had long-range tactical reconnaisance capability. It would have a dual capacity to deter attack by reconnaisance together with its capacity for strike, largely in the conventional rôle, and it also has a maritime rôle.
The point now is that this creates a serious gap. This matter is receiving urgent examination. The whole question is very difficult. What is clear is that there is no new type of aircraft which can be developed for the R.A.F. to offset the withdrawal of the Canberra in the strike rôle, which must take place in 1969 and 1970, for the Canberras are old aircraft. The PR9, a later version will carry on beyond that date for photographic reconnaissance.
The problem is, therefore, to consider aircraft now in service or under development and to see what can be done in the immediate future to give us the most satisfactory combination of combat aircraft for our military rôle in the mid-1970s, until about 1975.
We need to remember that we are part of an alliance and that our American allies have a capacity for long-range strike reconnaisance. We shall, of course, have at our disposal Buccaneers to support the Navy for maritime strike in the post-carrier situation and to support our V-force in a tactical strike and reconnaissance rôle in the European situation.


There are also the Phantoms, and, later the Jaguar, which also have to be considered. The capability of these aircraft is impressive. The question is to decide which has the right element or elements to be strengthened to alleviate as satisfactorily as possible in the short-term the consequences of losing the F111 capacity, and this is being done.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) asked about the Buccaneer Mark II. I am advised that this aircraft is not in the same class as the F111 but it is a very useful aircraft. We are also looking carefully at the prospects here. All the options need to be carefully considered. That is what we are doing, and by July we aim to be clear on the answer.

Mr. Onslow: rose—

Mr. Merlyn Rees: No. I would rather get on.
As the hon. Gentleman conceded, it was not the Government's fault that the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft did not go on. But studies are proceeding related to the need for an advanced military combat aircraft in the mid-1970s. Various possible solutions are being examined by the B.A.C. project team at Warton. While I take the point that one does not want to feed too much into it, one has to avoid getting aircraft in the mid-1970s which are not capable of the task required. The emphasis on

the European rôle is being fully taken into account in these studies, which are wide-ranging and are taking in all the fundamental issues involved.

Collaboration would be our preferred policy, and for good reasons. I find it odd that the Opposition should write into their Motion a view which deprecates dependence on others. Where do they draw the line? When is dependence deep? In N.A.T.O. we are dependent upon others not only industrially but operationally. Fighter Command is and has been for many years small, but it has to be looked at in the context of the defence of Europe, both with aircraft and with radar. This is true of Coastal Command as well. We are interdependent with our allies in the maritime rôle and in the strike rôle.

By the very nature of the requirements of industry and operations, Europe is interdependent. The Motion does not seem to realise or accept this fact of life. That is true of the whole Motion. It is almost the same Motion that we have debated many times since 1964. Now, as then, it ill becomes the party of the cancellations to tell us our business. The Motion is a charade. It is the same old Motion with the same old arguments, and it deserves the same result.

Question put:—

The House divided: Ayes 116, Noes 181.

Division No. 86.]
AYES
[9.58 p.m.


Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)
Crowder, F. P.
Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin


Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n &amp; M'd'n)
Cunningham, Sir Knox
Holland, Philip


Awdry, Daniel
Dance, James
Howell, David (Guildford)


Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
Iremonger, T. L.


Batsford, Brian
Digby, Simon Wingfield
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)


Bell, Ronald
Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Jopling, Michael


Biffen, John
du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward
Kershaw, Anthony


Biggs-Davison, John
Eden, Sir John
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)


Black, Sir Cyril
Elliott, R.W.(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Kirk, Peter


Blaker, Peter
Errington, Sir Eric
Kitson, Timothy


Body, Richard
Eyre, Reginald
Lambton, Viscount


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Fisher, Nigel
Lancaster, Col. C. G.


Brewis, John
Galbraith, Hon. T. G.
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col, Sir walter
Gibson-Watt, David
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Goodhart, Philip
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)


Bryan, Paul
Goodhaw, Victor
MacArthur, Ian


Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N &amp; M)
Gresham Cooke, R.
McMaster, Stanley


Bullus, Sir Eric
Gurden, Harold
Marten, Neil


Campbell, Gordon
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Mawby, Ray


Carlisle, Mark
Hamilton, Marquess of (Fermanagh)
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.


Cary, Sir Robert
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Monro, Hector


Channon, H. P. G.
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Montgomery, Fergus


Chichester-Clark, R.
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere
Murton, Oscar


Clegg, Walter
Harvie Anderson, Miss
Nott, John


Cooper-Key, Sir Neill
Hastings, Stephen
Nabarro, Sir Gerald


Corfield, F. V.
Hawkins, Paul
Neave, Airey


Costain, A. P.
Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel
Onslow, Cranley


Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Hill, J. E. B.
Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian




Osborn, John (Hallam)
Russell, Sir Ronald
Wall, Patrick


Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)
Scott, Nicholas
Ward, Dame Irene


Page, Graham (Crosby)
Scott-Hopkins, James
Weatherill, Bernard


Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
Sinclair, Sir George
Webster, David


Pym, Francis
Smith, John
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Quennell, Miss J. M.
Stodart, Anthony
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James
Tapsell, Peter
Woodnutt, Mark


Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Worsley, Marcus


Ridsdale, Julian
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)



Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Teeling, Sir William
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John
Mr. Jasper More and


Royle, Anthony
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek
Mr. Anthony Grant.




NOES


Abse, Leo
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip(Derby, S.)


Anderson, Donald
Haseldine, Norman
Norwood, Christopher


Archer, Peter
Hazell, Bert
O'Malley, Brian


Armstrong, Ernest
Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis
Orbach, Maurice


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Heffer, Eric S.
Owen, Will (Morpeth)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Hilton, W. S.
Padley, Walter


Bidwell, Sydney
Hooley, Frank
Palmer, Arthur


Bishop, E. S
Horner, John
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)


Blackburn, F.
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Pavitt, Laurence


Booth, Albert
Howarth, Harry (Wellingborough)
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred


Boston, Terence
Howie, W.
Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Hoy, James
Perry, George H. (Nottingham, S.)


Bowden, Rt. Hn. Herbert
Huckfield, Leslie
Prentice, Rt. Hn. R. E.


Bradley, Tom
Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)
Price, William (Rugby)


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Rankin, John


Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)
Hunter, Adam
Rees, Merlyn


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Hynd, John
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Buchan, Norman
Irvine, Sir Arthur
Robinson, W. O. J. (Walth'stow, E.)


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Jackson, Peter M. (High Peak)
Rodgers, William (Stockton)


Chapman, Donald
Janner, Sir Barnett
Roebuck, Roy


Coleman, Donald
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n &amp; St. P'cras, S.)
Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)


Concannon, J. D.
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Ross, Rt. Hn. William


Conlan, Bernard
Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Rowlands, E. (Cardiff, N.)


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)


Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard
Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Sheldon, Robert


Dalyell, Tam
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)
Short, Rt. Hn. Edward(N'c'tle-u-Tyne)


Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, West)
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)


Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Judd, Frank
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)


Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
Kelley, Richard
Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)


Davies, Ednyfed Hudson (Conway)
Kenyon, Clifford
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Kerr, Russell (Feltham)
Slater, Joseph


Dell, Edmund
Lawson, George
Small, William


Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Lee, John (Reading)
Snow, Julian


Dickens, James
Lestor, Miss Joan
Stonehouse, John


Dobson, Ray
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Swingler, Stephen


Dunnett, Jack
Lipton, Marcus
Taverne, Dick


Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)
Luard, Evan
Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)


Eadie, Alex
Lubbock, Eric
Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy


Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
MacColl, James
Tinn, James


Ellis, John
MacDermot, Niall
Urwin, T. W.


Ennals, David
Macdonald, A. H.
Varley, Eric G.


Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
McKay, Mrs. Margaret
Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)


Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
Maclennan, Robert
Walden, Brian (All Saints)


Faulds, Andrew
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Finch, Harold
McNamara, J. Kevin
Wallace, George


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
MacPherson, Malcolm
Weitzman, David


Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)
Marks, Kenneth
Wellbeloved, James


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Marsh, Rt. Hn. Richard
White, Mrs. Eirene


Foley, Maurice
Mason, Roy
Whitlock, William


Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Maxwell, Robert
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Forrester, John
Mayhew, Christopher
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Fowler, Gerry
Miller, Dr. M. S.
Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)


Fraser, John (Norwood)
Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)


Garrett, W. E.
Molloy, William
Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)


Gourlay, Harry
Moonman, Eric
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Gray, Dr. Hugh (Yarmouth)
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Winnick, David


Gregory, Arnold
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Yates, Victor


Grey, Charles (Durham)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)



Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Morris, John (Aberavon)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)
Moyle, Roland
Mr John McCann and


Hamling, William
Murray, Albert
Mr. Neil McBride.


Harper, Joseph
Neal, Harold

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered.
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and that the proceedings on Vote A of the Defence (Air) Estimates, 1968–69, may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour during a period of two hours after Ten o'clock, though opposed.—[Mr. O'Mlley.]

Supply again considered.

Orders of the Day — DEFENCE (AIR) ESTIMATES 1968–69

Vote A

Number of Air Force Service

10.10 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Merlyn Rees): I beg to move,
That a number of Officers, Airmen and Airwomen, not exceeding 125,000, all ranks, be maintained for Air Force Service, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1969.
On Monday and Tuesday this week the House concentrated on the broad issues of policy in the defence field. Today we have had a close look at the Royal Air Force equipment and operational programme. This has left only a short period to consider the many other important aspects of the Service.
It gives me particular pleasure to be reporting on the state of the Royal Air Force in this year, when the Service celebrates the 50th anniversary of its foundation. I am proud to be reporting on a Service which, as ever, is carrying out its tasks with efficiency and confidence, and preparing for the future in the same manner.
When I introduced the Air Estimates in 1967, I laid particular stress on my "management" responsibilities. I want to stress these again and, in the short time at my disposal, to consider mainly personnel and some organisation matters.
It is my privilege normally to take the Chair on behalf of the Secretary of State at meetings of the Air Force Board. I should like to remind the House of the important rôle of the Boards in dealing with the many purely single-service, day

to-day management problems, which arise in the implementation of defence policy.
I do not propose to go into detail on the provision in Air Estimates. A comparison between 1968–69 Estimates and those for the current year is shown at Annex C of the White Paper, but the House may ask why, at a time of retrenchment in the defence field, the Air Estimates should be £13½ million higher than last year. In real terms there is a decrease of some £12 million on 1967–68. The increase is due to devaluation and pay and price increases.
The Estimates take account of the cuts in defence expenditure announced in November following devaluation. The major single item for the Royal Air Force was the cancellation of the Chinook, for which there was a forward provision in Air Votes of over £6 million in 1968–69.
As indicated in the statement by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 16th January the changes in defence policy which he then announced will not have much effect on spending in 1968–69, but they will yield of course substantial economies later on. One significant reduction in the Estimates is in the Movements Vote, which covers the main movements of all three Services by air. We expect to spend nearly £3 million less on movements next year than was provided for 1967–68.
This is primarily due to the increased operational capacity of Air Support Command with its new aircraft such as the VC10, the Hercules and the Belfast. In keeping themselves at the proper state of operational readiness, these aircraft are continuing the reduction in the need for charter.
I should now like to turn to the personnel field. The whole future of the Royal Air Force depends on the skill and dedication of those who serve in it. The changes in defence policy—which we have been bound to make in the interests of building a sound economy—have naturally been disappointing for the Services. This is particularly true of the loss of the F111 capability. But the changes we are making, and particularly the concentration on the European rôle, are ones to which the Royal Air Force will readily and quickly adapt itself.
When redeployment is complete, as I have argued earlier, the R.A.F. will remain a powerful and effective force. It will also have a clearly defined rôle, primarily in Europe. To man this force we shall need a continuing flow of high-calibre recruits capable of handling most sophisticated equipments, and I cannot emphasise too strongly that the Royal Air Force will continue to offer a career fully commensurate with their skills.
Throughout the period of redeployment and the slimming which this entails, it will be our aim to maintain a careful balance between those entering and those leaving the Service so that, at the end of the day, we emerge with a smaller but no less effective force with an age, rank and trade structure designed to meet both the need of the Royal Air Force for efficiency and the desire of the individual for an interesting and rewarding career.
Recruitment in 1967 continued at much the same level as in 1966 although, with one or two exceptions, it fell rather below the target. So far this year, however, there has been more than the seasonal Falling off. This may be due in part to the anxieties felt by parents or career advisers as a result of plans to redeploy the Services and reduce their size. I hope that in a small way the outline I have given of our future aircraft plans will help to reassure the Service and that the outline which I have given of our manpower plans will help to reassure parents aid others concerned with career guidance that they need have no fears on his score.
It is my impression that the problem of redundancy in connection with the rundown of the Services gets far too much emphasis. As the House knows, amongst the measures announced in January was provision for an eventual reduction in Service manpower beyond the 75,000 forecast in the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy in 1967 (Command 3357) and for the reduction to be spread over a shorter time.
Although the manpower reduction forecast is substantial, it is important to get the matter in proper perspective. One must remember, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that over 10,000 men leave the Royal Air Force on normal exit each year and that by 1973 some 50 per cent. of the

men at present serving in the Royal Air Force will have left through normal wastage. It will be possible to take advantage of this turnover in keeping redundancy to the minimum required to preserve a proper age/rank and trade balance.
I cannot at this point give specific figures for the Royal Air Force because we are still working out detailed plans, and to do this properly will take several months. As soon as firm information is available, I will arrange for it to be published to the Service. I can say, however, now that so far as possible any redundancies will continue to be made by voluntary applications from officers and men in the prescribed age and rank zones, and compulsory selections will be made only when there are insufficient volunteers.
While on the subject of exit from the Royal Air Force, I should like to refer to a question which very frequently arises in correspondence on individual cases—namely, premature release at an individual's own request. I do not propose to refer here to youth entrants. That is a problem which is being examined specially by my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence for Administration, as he has told the House. From time to time, however, I am told that the Royal Air Force is acting unreasonably in refusing to let an airman go when he wishes to. In a disciplined fighting force, we cannot release men indiscriminately, regardless of our need for them, and there are clearly defined rules for premature discharge.
I would emphasise to the House that in the Royal Air Force, with its complicated trade structure—complicated only to the layman like myself—for a man suddenly to leave might well mean that aircraft repairs on a bomber station, for example, would have to stop. It is not simply a question of other individuals doing the same task.
There are clearly defined rules for premature discharge. They enable a man to be released provided that, first, he has completed a minimum period of service to offset the cost of his training; secondly, he pays the prescribed purchase price; and thirdly, his trade is adequately manned. In compassionate cases some or all of these provisos may


be waived according to the circumstances. In 1967, over 1,300 airmen successfull applied for discharge by purchase. Of these, some 180 went out on compassionate grounds.
When I look at these cases I find that more often than not they have been treated very fairly by the officers who are responsible for dealing with compassionate cases and the other types as well. Very rarely do I have to overrule what has been decided. The Royal Air Force knows of its problems in a Service where wives are separated from husbands, and these matters are dealt with extremely well.
Before leaving the subject of personnel, I wish to devote a few moments to the Air Training Corps, in which I have a particular interest. Hon. Members will recall that in last year's debate I announced that we were setting up a committee to review the whole organisation administration and training of the A.T.C. We were fortunate enough to obtain the services as chairman of Air Marshal Sir Douglas Morris, who had recently retired from the post of Commander-in-Chief, Fighter Command. The committee has produced a most valuable report which we are now studying.
I think it is sometimes overlooked that the Air Training Corps is not simply a pre-entry organisation for the Royal Air Force: its services in youth training are of value to the nation as a whole. There is, obviously, a very close connection with the Royal Air Force. This is the basis on which the Corps exists and, as a result of this connection, many hundreds of ex-A.T.C. boys join the Royal Air Force every year. They provide an extremely valuable and high quality entry of the type which we shall continue to need in the future. The A.T.C. is essentially a voluntary body and I want to praise the work done by these volunteers all over the country.
As the Royal Air Force looks to the future with its new aircraft and runs down to a size commensurate with its new tasks, it is essential that its organisation should be right. A great deal of thought has been given to the question of command structure and the changes I announced last year will mainly take effect during the coming financial year. The changes are set out in the White

Paper. Time is short, so I will simply draw the House's attention to the fact that, when the re-organisation is completed, the total of United Kingdom commands will have been reduced from eight to four.
The reasons for this re-organisation are many. The Royal Air Force of the 1970s, as we discussed earlier, will have a smaller number of aircraft than the force for which the existing United Kingdom operational command structure was designed. These aircraft will, however, be capable of operating in a number of different rôles. Both these factors have led to the need for a stream-lined system of operational control, but the last one is often ignored. The fact that an aeroplane can be used in a multiplicity of rôles makes it good sense to have a command structure which can deal with this factor.
Furthermore, when the aircraft carriers phase out, the participation of the Royal Air Force in maritime operations will increase, both in national and N.A.T.O. defence tasks. The new command structure will help in establishing a much closer working relationship with the Royal Navy and also the Army. There are, of course, also economic benefits from the changes. The reduction in the number of command headquarters will lead to valuable savings amounting eventually to over 1,000 posts which, together with other administrative savings, should amount to some £1½ million a year.
We shall continue with our policy of concentrating the Royal Air Force on the smallest number of stations consistent with our needs and of disposing of those for which we have no further use. When we have determined the size and shape of the Royal Air Force as a result of the most recent defence cuts we shall undertake a full scale review of our deployment requirements. This will be a complex task, and it is not possible at this stage to forecast which stations may be no longer needed, but we shall follow our usual practice of making announcements as soon as decisions are reached. May I say here, Mr. Speaker, that the other evening, when the subject of Honington came up, I thought that one hon. Gentleman opposite was unfair to the officers who deal with the use of airfields. It is often good sense to put an airfield on to a care-and-maintenance


basis and to move squadrons to nearby stations to achieve economies, while a decision is made about what is to go into a new airfield. It might seem ludicrous to people who are not in the full picture, but it is not a sign of inefficiency on the part of the people dealing with deployment in this sense.
As the Royal Air Force reshapes both in size and command structure to meet the tasks of the future, it is able to take advantage of the improvements in methods which have been introduced over the years, including the computer control of stores and the computer for airmen's pay and records. The hon. Member for Hendon, North (Sir Ian Orr-Ewing) will be aware of that in terms of his constituency.
Before concluding, I should like briefly to draw attention to the service which the Royal Air Force renders to others. The White Paper refers to the valuable service which the Royal Air Force Search and Rescue Service continues to give. It also draws attention to the assistance given in the "Torrey Canyon" incident and the foot-and-mouth epidemic. I should add that when I discovered what the airmen for whom I am responsible had to do, I felt that they did it with an extremely good heart, We were very pleased when my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food wrote a word of thanks on behalf of farmers. Incidentally, I am aware that it was not only Air Force personnel who were involved.
I should like also to draw attention to the assistance given by the R.A.F. Technical Training School at St. Athan, in South Wales, in retraining redundant workers. Although of modest size and of a trial nature, the scheme has been highly successful.
Of very topical interest in the humanitarian assistance given by the Royal Air Force in Vietnam, in helping the Ministry of Overseas Development and certain charitable organisations to distribute emergency relief supplies. Several flights by Roy al Air Force Hercules and a Belfast of Air Support Command have been carried out, taking to Saigon vehicles, ambulances and medical supplies. This is a considerable operation which is being carried out by the Royal Air Force with characteristic efficiency.
Finally, the Meteorological Office—one of the my hon. Friends has a great interest in the Meteorological Office and I was looking to see whether he was here—which I have had little time to refer to, and which is playing a significant part in the World Weather Watch programme, has recently made a weather ship temporarily available to meet Board of Trade requirements for a vessel with a control officer to be available near the Icelandic fishing grounds.
This is a time when the Royal Air Force, in common with the other Services, is having to face significant changes in all fields, arising from the major policy considerations which the House has been debating over the last few days. The withdrawal from bases east of Suez and the concentration on a European rôle will mark the end to a chapter in Royal Air Force history.
But the Royal Air Force has always responded to change and adapted itself with vigour and dedication to new tasks, and I am convinced that, as the Royal Air Force looks back over 50 years with justifiable pride in its tremendous achievements, it can look forward with confidence to meeting the challenge it will face in the future in its primarily European rôle.

10.26 p.m.

Mr. R. Chichester-Clark: When I could catch up with the hon. Gentleman, who almost rivalled the speed of his immediate superior at the Ministry of Defence, I thought that I heard him say that the problems of redundancy received too much emphasis. I am afraid that they are going to get a little more, though perhaps in a different way.
I want to tell the House about the problems created for a community in my constituency due to the announcement that the Royal Air Force base there is to be closed by 1970. The problem arises in a village with the perhaps deceptively Irish name of Ballykelly. Although this decision concerns my constituency, it has a wider interest because it is a microcosm of the effect of broken assurances all over the world.
The Government have announced that they intend to close this Coastal Command station in 1970. The station employs about 470 civilians, and there are


1,330 Service personnel. The presence of the Royal Air Force in the area accounts for 3,290 people, in a village with a population of about 200. It can be seen, therefore, that the Royal Air Force is the heart and soul of the community, and indeed the community has grown up because of the presence of the Royal Air Force. It has been a happy community in which R.A.F. personnel have been held in great affection.
Unemployment has been a problem in the area for a long time. I do not deny that. In January, male unemployment was 16½ per cent. When I recently expressed anxiety in the House about the effect on unemployment of the closure of the base, the Prime Minister seemed to suggest that because the unemployment figures for Northern Ireland as a whole had shown a welcome improvement in February, we all ought, for some reason or another, to take our hats off to him, though what credit he can claim for this I do not know, as it has been the habit of the Government in the past to suggest that the unemployment problem was one largely for the Northern Ireland Government. That, of course, is when the figures are bad.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Is it not a fact that the Government's action here will result in putting unemployment in this area up to more than 30 per cent.? Is not this disgraceful?

Mr. Chichester-Clark: My hon. and learned Friend has anticipated what I was about to say. That is the case. The Prime Minister should have known at the time that the unemployment figure in this area, however much it may have improved elsewhere, had already worsened to the extent of 17·3 per cent. in the last month and the substantial loss of trade to the village and the neighbouring town of Limavady as a result of the departure of the Royal Air Force must inevitably lead to further unemployment. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that.
I wonder whether the Government have considered the other effects of closure and the official abandonment of the whole site. They have spent about £3 million on the base over 10 years. They are proposing to leave behind them

52modern houses, which cannot be entirsly absorbed by local demand because the housing authorities there already have 360 houses planned or in the course of erection, houses which in all probability they would not be building if they thought that the Royal Air Force was going to leave.
For instance, do the Government realise that a large new primary school now nearing completion at a cost of £250,000 was built largely because of the presence of the R.A.F. and that two-thirds of the pupils intended for it were the children of Service personnel? Other schools in the area have been enlarged for the same reason, practically at the behest of the Ministry of Defence. That is one result. I will not deal with the other hardships such as the rate increases which must fall on the local people with the disappearance of the Services.
Perhaps we will be told that the local authorities should have known better and that they should not count on the presence of defence establishments in this day and age. In this respect, it is easy to be sophisticated after three years of this Government, but hear what the Government themselves said about the station and then ask whether they can blame the local authorities for putting their faith in the future of the base. Early in 1966 I raised its future in another context with the then Under-Secretary for the Navy. All was well and, on 23rd June, 1966, the present Under-Secretary of State for the R.A.F. wrote me the following letter:
I have been asked to reply…I can confirm…that the transfer of J.A.S.S. from Londonderry will have little effect on the numbers of Air Force Department civilians employed at Ballykelly.
Our present plans are to continue using Shackletons there for some years to come. When these aircraft are replaced by HS 801s (Maritime Comets) the station will be suitable for their use.
Then, from no less a personage than the present Foreign Secretary, the Deputy Prime Minister, when at the D.E.A., who was trying to be helpful on another point, I received a letter, dated 15th July, 1966, saying:
In your letter you also express fears that some other possible developments will lead eventually to Ballykelly being closed down with serious consequences for Northern Ireland. I need hardly say that the Government


would certainly look very carefully at any proposal which could have the consequences you fear but I can put your mind at rest…I am in fact assured by my Defence colleagues that the Ballykelly Station has, and will continue to have, an important rôle as a Coastal Command airfield. Shackletons will continue to be used there for some time to come and when they are replaced by Comets the Station will still be suitable for their use.
There can be little doubt about that assurance.
Then, on 14th September, 1966, the present Leader of the House of Lords visited Londonderry and told a Press conference that he had been very impressed by the obvious efficiency and morale at the station, and went on:
It is true that Ballykelly is a very important R.A.F. station and, so far as I can see it, whatever may happen to J.A.S.S. in Londonderry, this Ballykelly station will continue because Coastal Command has a wide wide range of responsibilities. It is highly desirable that the Royal Air Force should continue to have a strong presence in Northern Ireland where they have many friends…The R.A.F., for as far ahead as we can see, will remain here in Londonderry.
Apparently, the right hon. Gentleman could not see very far ahead.
These are some of the assurances, but despite them, and because of the overriding importance of the base to the local economy, I wrote again in April, 1967, and received a letter from the Under-Secretary marked, curiously, "Confidential". I have not yet discovered why, but, because it was so marked, I will not reveal its contents except to say that it dealt with the situation—

Mr. Merlyn Rees: I cannot recall the occasion, but I think that the reason was the time factor connected with an announcement. I have no objection to the hon. Member quoting it now.

Mr. Chichester-Clark: I have it here, but it makes no difference, since I can tell the House that it dealt with the situation in the 1970s and left me with no real cause for alarm. This was in April, 1967. However, in December, rumours of a run-down reached me, and this resulted in a verbal assurance from one in high authority in the Ministry of Defence on 13th December last year that there was no reason for concern. To get that on paper, I wrote to the Under-Secretary for confirmation on 21st December. On 5th January, 1968, 15 days later, closure

in 1970 was announced. In such a way do purposeful planners work. Other than sheer panic to make cuts somewhere, somehow, what can be guiding the Government in this matter?
I have related some of the assurances that the Government have scattered like confetti. Can one wonder why the local authorities acted as they did? They were too trusting. Can one wonder that a restaurant owner in the village of Ballykelly spent £1,300 on his premises? Can one imagine the resources of a restaurant in a village of 200 inhabitants? Can one wonder that the proprietor of a hairdressing salon invested £1,000 in his premises and a draper £2,000 in his? Two of these will now lose 60 per cent. of their sales and the other 90 per cent. Is the storekeeper who spent £6,000 on his premises, and will now lose 75 per cent. of his sales, to blame himself simply because he trusted the Government?
These are doubtless trifling sums to the Government, but they are people's savings. They were spent because the Government said something which they now say is untrue. If there is no comeback for those who spent their savings, there must be enough shame left in even this Government for them to say tonight what were the overwhelming and wholly unforeseen strategic reasons which decided them to close this station. How do they propose to compensate this area which had faith in them?
Above all, what alternatives are they proposing for the civilians who worked there? At present, despite the welcome news of a new industry which the Northern Ireland Government have succeeded in inducing to go to the area, the prospect which many of the unskilled and middle-aged face in 1970 is that of gazing out over the deserted airfield. The Government have a clear, unmistakeable responsibility for the misfortune which has overtaken the area. It cannot be shed or shrugged off.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Is it not a fact that these assurances were given right up to January of this year and that each one has been broken? Is it not also true that the Government will now take away from this area more than 3,000 people, Service personnel and families, and about £1¼ million a year?


How will that affect the community around Ballykelly?

Mr. Chichester-Clark: Assurances were given right up to December of last year. The closure was announced on 5th January. I agree that vital spending power is being taken out of the community.

10.39 p.m.

Mr. Roy Roebuck: The hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Chichester-Clark) will not expect me to follow him in a purely constituency matter. I, too, have a constituency issue to raise and I will come to that later. First, I should be grateful if the Under-Secretary will let the House know the policy of the R.A.F. towards pensions, and to what extent that policy marches in tune with that pursued by the Army.
My curiosity about this matter has been whetted by an article in the Sun on 1st March, which reported that General Sir James Castle was appointed a field marshal one day before he retired and that, as a result, his pension would be £4,050 a year as against £3,430 had he remained a general. Is this policy pursued in the R.A.F. and is it possible that we shall see an air chief marshal made a marshal one day before his retirement?
This raises interesting possibilities. Perhaps a corporal will become a sergeant or a flight lieutenant a squadron leader—and in a year in which we have embarked on a policy which is likely to involve many calls for restraint on people, this leaves the Service open to criticism from the rest of the working population.
I was most interested in what the Under-Secretary said about the civilian aid which the R.A.F. had given during the year. I understand that it helped in Aberfan, helped in the foot-and-mouth epidemic, helped to rescue by helicopters people in difficulties at sea; and the Under-Secretary told us tonight how it had helped to take supplies to civilian victims of the Vietnamese war. One would certainly not want to put any sort of financial evaluation on work of mercy such as this, but it might be interesting to have in future years some sort of estimate of the value of such services to the community. That would help many people who perhaps have difficulty in seeing how

the money spent on defence helps the civilian population.
The Under-Secretary pointed out that in the coming year we are to have a large number of organisational changes in the Royal Air Force. This is of interest to my constituency because we have had Fighter Command there since 1936, and it is now to be merged into the new Strike Command. Fighter Command has been housed at Bentley Priory, which stands on a hill above the village of Stanmore. It was from that spot, which incidentally is near the place where it is believed that Queen Boadicea was buried, that the planning for the Battle of Britain was done. From there Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, as he then was, wrote the famous letter during the Battle of France which warned the Government not to send more aircraft there because we might need them to defend our islands.
The House will be glad to know that the relationship between my R.A.F. constituents and my civilian constituents has for long been excellent. Within the last year or so it has been made event better, if that were possible, by the actions of the Under-Secretary who, when it was proposed to build a number of R.A.F. houses, readily and courteously accepted my suggestion that we should have a meeting of residents so that the matter could be discussed. This sort of friendly contact between the Services and the civilian population is valuable. Having read various reports of difficulties and trouble in other parts of the country, I hope that this contact may continue.
Is my hon. Friend yet in a position to say whether the R.A.F. will relinquish Bentley Priory altogether in the near future, and to say what thought has been given to its further use? He will know, because he lives in the next constituency to the one I have the privilege to represent, that there are numbers of Government buildings in Harrow, East which are of a rather unsightly appearance. Some are owned by the Ministry of Defence. I wonder if he has thought that when the R.A.F. moves from Bentley Priory it would be a good idea if other Departments move in; that these unsightly buildings should be demolished and houses built on their sites. Bentley


Priory is a very beautiful residence which was designed by Sir John Soane.
What is likely to be the position in regard to the headquarters unit in Stan-more Park, which covers a rather big acreage? Will the R.A.F. still need it in view of the command changes? What is the position in regard to married quarters in the area? There are large numbers. I suspect that as there is a great demand for accommodation for the R.A.F. in the Greater London area and that the R.A.F. might need them for some time to come. It would be extremely helpful if we could have an idea of how long they are likely to be needed. Can my hon. Friend say what is the position in regard to the educational needs of airmen's children in my constituency? We have been in correspondence about this, and he knows that there is a shortage of school places. What attention has been given to this matter?
I am also concerned about the question of the unemployment which will result from these changes. My hon. Friend, in his characteristically courteous manner, has kept me well-informed on the subject, but may I ask him to tell us what the present position is? Is it felt that all those who will become unemployed as a result of the move will be settled either in new jobs with the Ministry of Defence or elsewhere?
Finally, what arrangements have been made to ensure that Fighter Command ends its existence with some suitable ceremony? I hope that a way will be found of commemorating in a permanent manner the long association of Fighter Command with my constituency, and with the nation's finest hour.

10.45 p.m.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: I have sat through most of today's debate, although, unhappily, because of another meeting, I was not able to be present for the earlier speeches. It has been well worth my while to listen to the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Roebuck), because I have just learned something. I was in Bentley Priory half-way through the war. There was a mixed crowd of us there—R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. I suppose that I learned much whilst I was there, but I certainly did not know then that Boadicea had had

any connection with Bentley Priory. As my constituency includes Stamford, and as Stamford was the place from which Boadicea set out to conquer the South, I now recognise, having been at Bentley Priory, that I have almost as much connection with the hon. Gentleman's constituency as I have with my own.
I suppose we are accustomed to hearing a good deal in defence debates from representatives of the Army and of the Navy. The R.A.F. is outnumbered in the House. However, as the Under-Secretary knows full well, we do not consider that we are of less importance because of that. I have wondered today, as I have wondered in previous years when listening to debates on the R.A.F., whether the R.A.F. is there to keep the aircraft industry going or whether the aircraft industry is there to keep the R.A.F. going. In the previous debate I fancy that we heard much less about the R.A.F. than we heard about the aircraft industry and the production of aircraft.
I find it a little sad that in its fiftieth year the R.A.F. has taken the knock that it has taken. In the Defence Estimates it has taken a rather greater knock than the other Services. I do not think that the Under-Secretary has admitted that. I understand his difficulty, but in his heart of hearts he must think that this is true. The R.A.F. itself thinks that it is so. It is at present in a rather depressed condition. The officers and men are just not sure of what the future means for them.
In winding up the previous debate and in opening this one the Under-Secretary said, perhaps nine or ten times, that the Government were having "studies" studies on the R.A.F's future rôle, studies on the type of aircraft. Finally, he said that he was having studies on redundancy and studies on the A.T.C. I do not know whether he meant that he was having studies with a view to abolishing the A.T.C. I think not, and I hope not. The R.A.F. is not involved with any Territorial Army-type organisation, and this is the only voluntary thing we have. I hope that we shall always keep it.
I urge the Under-Secretary not to study for too long on the question of redundancy. This is a very important matter. In my constituency there are two R.A.F. stations—R.A.F. Luffenham and R.A.F. Cottesmore. Wittering is just


outside, and most of the people in Wittering come into Stamford. Therefore, when we were fighting for our independence in Rutland we always reckoned that if the Government took us over we had an air force that could fight our battles.
We have very close relations with the R.A.F., and the R.A.F. and the local people know each other and enjoy each other's company. We meet in the pubs, and I can tell the hon. Gentleman that there is the utmost depression in the Service. He has a very important job to do in the next few months in dispelling it. It is a public relations job, and it must be backed up with something. The people concerned must be convinced that there is a future for them. The Minister said tonight that redundancy within the R.A.F. would take place on the basis of the normal wastage, people buying themselves out and so on. It would be helpful if in the next few weeks he could put a figure to the amount of redundancy that would take place over and above the normal wastage. I know that this is difficult because he cannot very well calculate what the wastage will be.
Nevertheless, he should be able to assure those in the R.A.F., particularly officers and senior N.C.Os. of about 40, that they will still have a future in the Service. This applies more to ground crews than pilots, because he must keep his technical people on the ground if the Service is to be operational in the air. The technical people have jobs in industry available to them if they leave before a certain age, and at present they are seriously contemplating getting out in order to pick up those jobs in industry while the going is good. If that happens to any great extent there will be a brain drain from the Service, a rush from it into industry, and then he will be struggling to get the people back again. Furthermore, he will not get the same kind of people, because a man who has worked technically in the R.A.F. for 10 to 15 years is a great advantage to the Service.
If the Minister must recruit lower age groups from outside he will find gaps which will make it very difficult for the squadrons to stay operational. Therefore, the question of redundancy is of the utmost importance and should not be

studied for a period that will continue the kind of uncertainty that exists at present. The morale of the Service is not good at present. It is up to the Minister to improve it.
A good deal was said in the earlier debate on the rôle of the R.A.F., overseas service and the like. I do not agree with the Government's leaving east of Suez, and I think that they have announced the decision in advance precipitately. But, if we are withdrawing from east of Suez to a certain extent, it could be made clear to the R.A.F. that certain bases will be maintained and that it will be engaged in supplying them and even having personnel stationed there. If the future rôle of the R.A.F. is to be within Europe, it could make a contribution, because of its experience round the world, if Europe—not Britain, but with Britain included—has an east of Suez rôle and has to do anything in Asia.
If this is so, it must be said and it must be spelt out. If it is not, then the Royal Air Force will run down, because people will feel there is no future in it. I do not think that anyone who joins the R.A.F.—and I expect this applies to the other Services as well—and is told that the furthest he can go is the Orkneys or Margate will think his journey worth while or that giving up part of his life in this way is worth while. Such a person wants to go overseas and does not mind being based overseas.
I am not convinced that the cost of the kind of thing that is going on at R.A.F. stations at the moment—for example, at Wittering, which is actually in the Peterborough constituency—where there is the building of large housing estates, will save any Government money in the long run. It costs less to keep the men overseas in terms of housing and probably also in terms of overall cost. The pressure upon the housing programme as a whole is made all the greater by this policy in a situation where, according to the right hon. Gentleman, we shall have to house 35,000 people here and eventually 50,000. The Government should give some assurance on this.
Another matter, which also applies to the other Services, and which I have raised in defence debates before, is the fact that I do not think the country is


sufficiently generous in the amount of money it makes available for the education of Servicemen's children. Officers and airmen whose children have to be boarded in direct grant schools or other schools at home are in considerable difficulty if they have more than one child. Boarding education here gives the children a stability of education which they cannot otherwise get because of the nature of their father's job, which means being switched around every three years.
In terms of what we do with public schools and direct grant schools, this is a rôle which the Services themselves would find useful to fulfil in the grants for education were more generous. Many more children could be given this kind of permanent education instead of floating about from school to school over a period of 10 or 12 years.
I was anxious to take part in the debate because it is the 50th anniversary of the R.A.F. this year. I hope that this year, depressing as it is, will quickly pass and that next year and for the next 50 years the R.A.F. will continue to give the same kind of service to the country which we have come to expect and have always had from it.

10.59 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I beg to move,
That the said number be reduced by 1,000 men.
This is the traditional manner of objecting to the Vote under consideration and the policy behind it. I listened with some interest to the complaints of my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Roebuck) about the station which was associated in some way with Boadicea.

Mr. Roebuck: No complaints.

Mr. Hughes: No complaints, but Boadicea came into it somewhere. But she is not included in Vote A and the Estimates, so I do not propose to follow my hon. Friend, interesting as he was. He looked rather far back and the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) looked forward to the next 50 years for the R.A.F.
There is a complete absence of realism in this debate, but I do not know whether it depresses me because I am not easily depressed even by a debate on the R.A.F.

There is a remarkable degree of unreality about this debate, which has been very badly attended. There is a smaller number of Members present than I can ever remember for a debate of this kind. The average attendance has been about 15, which is less than would normally attend the opening of a branch butcher's shop by the Leeds Co-operative Society, with which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary is associated. I want to challenge the whole concept of the policy behind these Estimates and this Vote. My hon. Friend gave a very interesting technical account of the R.A.F., looking forward to what he called the vintage years. somewhere in the 1970s.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: 1969.

Mr. Hughes: There is talk in these careful and elaborate prospectuses of what a wonderful output of aeroplanes there is likely to be in the next few years. That is completely out of touch with reality and is certainly out of touch with the basic economic situation. We are approaching the time when we will face the fact that we are in a financial and economic crisis, but there has been no sign of it in this debate.
There has been no sign that the Government realise that, far from these economies being great economies, we are now being asked to vote for a sum of £537 million. This is at a time when we are told that the country is so short of money that it has even cut the milk to secondary schools. We should bring a touch of reality into this. The Chancellor, and those responsible for the economic future, are telling us that we must reduce public spending, but I see no practical sign of this. We hear of all these aircraft coming into play in 1969–70–71 and the hon. Gentleman for Rutland and Stamford talks about celebrating the R.A.F.'s centenary in another 50 years' time.
It is time for someone interested in the country's economic future and the possibilities of our development towards Europe to bring the House down to earth. Listening to the very able, very technical speech of my hon. Friend, which would have been applauded by the Institute of General Dynamics, I felt that it was certainly not a speech of a Socialist Minister looking forward to the future from a Socialist point of view, or a peace point of view. There has been no realisation


in the debate of the policy of the Government, which is calling for this big sum and this substantial number of men.
The idea that we are hard up as a nation has gone, and we are talking about enormously expensive aircraft coming into operation in a few years' time. If this goes on, the economic crisis will continue for the next five years. I protest at the very idea behind this Vote. Why do we need these men and this gigantic sum? There is this lame apology put forward about the humanitarian work that can be done. I quite agree. Good things are being done. Earlier I expressed my thanks to the Minister for the help given by the R.A.F. in rescuing by helicopter some sheep in my constituency, caught in the snow- We recognise what the Royal Air Force has done in the floods and off the Cornish coast, but that is not what the Royal Air Force is for. The Royal Air Force is a continuation of war policies. This £537 million is for building up an enormously powerful destructive force with modern nuclear weapons, about which the Minister has been strangely reticent.
What is the purpose? I am glad to know that we are reducing our expenditure in the Far East. The present Government have no intention of repeating a Suez-type colonial expedition. What is this powerful striking force needed for outside Europe? It certainly cannot be used in Rhodesia. The Government rightly have no intention of using it there. I am not one who believes that we can use the military power of the Royal Air Force in Rhodesia. If it is not to be used in Rhodesia or the Far East, and I do not know how it could possibly be used in the Middle East, we are forced to ask what is the rôle of this powerful bombing, reconnaissance and tactical force for which we are asked to raise this sum of money tonight.
If those responsible are thinking in terms of military power and striking, they must be thinking of striking somewhere. The only enemy which I can see is that our strategical experts and our military leaders are thinking in terms of an air strike against the Soviet Union. That would be suicidal. Nobody can say that if the Phantom, the F111 or whatever the heavy bomber is called went into reconnaissance into the Soviet Union, it would

ever come back, because there would be immediate retaliation, and, I believe, with nuclear weapons.
All this expensive paraphernalia and catalogue of bombers which are coming into existence, costing enormous sums of money, is completely outside the realms of reality of modern technological developments in war. The reality is that if we are to get war with the Soviet Union, it would be decided by intercontinental ballistic weapons and nuclear weapons, and about three or four of them would wipe out this country in a few hours.
Those are the realities that Mr. McNamara and his fellow thinkers in the Pentagon are enunciating. Mr. McNamara has been telling us that America has four and a half times more nuclear power than the Soviet Union. As the years go on, as we go into the 1970s, it is not likely to be a development of the Royal Air Force. It is likely to be the development of nuclear weapons and the megaton bomb.
Last summer, I had the opportunity of visiting Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Two flashes wiped out two great cities. If we get the megaton bomb again, however, it will wipe out countries and continents. Therefore, if we do not think in those terms, we are not facing the realities of modern scientific and technological development. We are thoughtlessly, wastefully and uselessly spending money which would be better spent in raising the standard of the technical education of our people. If one is to get the technical staff behind these powerful weapons, one will have to improve technical education. The secondary school in the town in which I live is short of five science teachers at present, but at the same time the R.A.F. is going to the school to recruit the younger and more intelligent people to what I call a blind alley occupation.
It has been said several times that the pressure of the Left wing has several times made the Government decide on certain economies, but I do not flatter myself about that. I do not think that anybody ever listens to me in the homilies I address to the House, but there is a march of events, of economic and scientific development in the world.
We are wasting our money, and the Government is not realising that, nor


the pressure of events. If this country is not to be bankrupt, if it is ever to emerge from the financial and economic crisis, it will have to revise its ideas, and will have to stop spending these enormous sums, and reduce the number of men in this force.
Lonely voice that I am, I will continue with this warning. I believe that as the years go by, they will not see another 50 years of the R.A.F., but either world peace or this country and the world annihilated. It is my duty in the House to impress this on the House and I hope to do so at every opportunity and on every possible Vote.

11.12 p.m.

Lord Hamilton: I shall concentrate on the annihilation of the R.A.F. station at Ballykelly and I endorse and support all that my hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry (Mr. Chichester-Clark) so strongly and cogently emphasised about the proposed closure of R.A.F. Station, Ballykelly. I am convinced that this is a disastrous decision which will deal a sad and savage blow not only to the employment situation, but also to the prosperity and welfare of the entire area. The area is still recovering from the shock announcement by the Government that they were closing H.M.S. "Sea Eagle" nearby, and also from the callous closure of the B.S.R. factory.
Representing a constituency in the west of Ulster, in many respects similar to that of my hon. Friend, I fully appreciate and comprehend how difficult, if not impossible, it will be to find alternative employment for those doomed to become redundant at Ballykelly. The young will, in all probability, be forced to migrate to find alternative employment, while the middle age-unskilled will be forced to swell the dole queue yet further.
Unemployment is the common enemy in West Ulster, to such an extent that even a dozen redundancies will capture the headlines, so I trust that the Government comprehends and appreciates the utter devastation which its decision will cause, net only to the 470 civilians employed at the station, but also in the loss of at least £1¼ million of spending power provided by the R.A.F. personnel

and their families, who number well over 3,000 people in total.
Again, a guess estimate is that nearby Limavady will lose about a third of its present trade. Furthermore, there will be a considerable loss in tourist revenue, for, naturally, friends and relations of R.A.F. personnel visit them during their tours of duty. All these factors will lead to further unemployment, which at present is at an intolerable level but could well become catastrophic and chronic. Tradesmen who, though faith in consistent Government pledges, have invested their savings will be clinically betrayed.
Ballykelly is situated in an agricultural area, and since there is a continual decline in employment in the industry, thus the situation will be aggravated further. The Government must realise that, in Ulster, as new jobs are created, others cease to exist. To coin a well-known phrase, we are having to run mighty fast even to keep standing still.

11.17 p.m.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: Having made four speeches in four days, perhaps, in a few sentences, I might express my concern about individual Servicemen and thank the Under-Secretary of State and his staff for the care that they take about individual cases. Here, I have no complaint, and those who are critical in other directions perhaps should say that they are entirely satisfied about the way in which individual cases are dealt with.
I want, too, to thank my hon. Friend's Department for the visits to R.A.F. stations which it arranges. I have in mind particularly a recent one that I was able to make to the R.A.F. Supply Centre at Hendon to see its computer centre.
Finally, however critical we may be across the board, we are all concerned about the career structure of the personnel concerned. We are anxious that, in future, the career structure of such Forces as we need should be matched not only with the civil airlines but with industry. I know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence is thinking along these lines. We have to have a different kind of age/career structure, and I hope that the Department will give some thought to it.

11.18 p.m.

Mr. G. B. H. Currie: I must declare an interest at the beginning of my speech, having served with the R.A.F. at most of the places which have been mentioned. The hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Roebuck) referred to Bentley Priory, Stanmore. I had the very good fortune to serve there with someone whom we referred to affectionately as "Stuffy" Dowding during the latter stages of the Battle of Britain.
It is a tragedy that Fighter Command is to be abolished. It was the one command, above all, which saved the country in the dark days of the early stages of the war. It is an even greater tragedy that it is to be abolished in the year which is the 50th anniversary of the Royal Air Force. On 1st April of this year, it is to be celebrated all over Britain, and I am glad to say that I shall be attending one of the celebration ceremonies. I agree completely with what has been said about the abolition of Fighter Command and Bentley Priory.
My real purpose in rising is to support my hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry (Mr. Chichester-Clark). During the latter years of the war I had the good fortune to serve at the Royal Air Force Station at Ballykelly. I ask the Minister, before he comes to a final determination about Ballykelly, to refer to the records of submarine sinkings which were carried out by planes from that station, and to refer also to the protection which was given from Ballykelly and Castle Archdale, which has ceased to function, to our convoys crossing the Atlantic with the sinews of war which were so necessary in those days.
I speak very sincerely on this matter. We know the records of sinkings in those days. We know how vital Ballykelly was to the western approaches. We know the intimate details of the control of the Atlantic which was carried out from there in conjunction with Liverpool, the latter being controlling the whole of the Atlantic approaches to Glasgow, Belfast, Liverpool, and the other great sea ports upon which we relied in those days. This reason alone, I believe, is sufficient to justify the retention of Ballykelly as an essential station from the point of view of protecting convoys in the event of any future war.
I am sorry that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has left the Chamber. He told us what he visualised a future war would entail. In the early days of the last war we heard about the possibility of the use of gas. In not so recent days we have heard about the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a future war. I think that when we consider the lessons which have been learned in Korea, and other latter-day outbreaks of war, we discover that those who make war are rather frightened of introducing the use of nuclear weapons. As I visualise it, certainly the early stages of any future war will be a war in the traditional sense. I do not believe that nuclear weapons will be used in the early stages of a future war. If this premise be right, it is obvious that it will be essential to have the use of bases for aircraft to cover the Atlantic approaches. It will be essential to have the use of land-based aircraft, seaplanes being outdated, and of bases from which they can operate to the greatest advantage.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry about the hardship which will be caused to the local populace if Ballykelly is closed. The loss of trade will amount to about £1¼ million, and will be felt right across the community. Not only the civilians employed at the station will suffer. Bookshops, shoeshops, vegetable shops, and all the other shops in the area will suffer. The loss of purchasing power will be spread among the local populace, the shopkeepers, those who let lodgings, and all the ancillary services.
I ask the Minister to re-examine these losses in the light of what his conscience tells him the hardship is going to be, and to re-examine the decision as to the closing of Ballykelly in view of the advantage which such a station gives in the defence of our Atlantic approaches. I ask him, having thought about these things, to come to the conclusion that this is not the time to take such a drastic decision as the one which he appears to be about to take.
I do not want to detain the House longer, but having myself served, and having appreciated my period of service with the Royal Air Force during the war, I thought I should add my voice to the debate tonight.

11.26 p.m.

Mr. Paul Hawkins: I am very glad to have a few minutes in which to discuss the question of the R.A.F. tonight.
My constituency has three—or possibly I should say two and a half—R.A.F. stations in it. The largest is Marham, which has almost equalled the size of the smallest town in my constituency, and then there is Swanton Morley, and Feltwell, which is nearly run down. In Feltwell there is considerable hardship for a very large number of people now unemployed who were employed at the base.
Nevertheless, we know these things have to happen, and I would not be one to want to keep stations going merely for the sake of keeping them going. We have to find further employment for those employed on these stations when they are shut down. But I should like to say how keenly I find the R.A.F. try to cooperate with civilians in the area; the way in which they do this is extraordinarily good.
I should also like to praise the Ministers with whom I come into touch, Lord Shackleton, who is now in another place, and the present Minister who has always been most helpful over questions which I have raised with the Ministry. But there is a large amount of natural disquiet amongst the personnel of the R.A.F. over recent happenings. The chopping and changing, which I am sure the Minister himself deplores, has led to the men asking themselves whether they should carry on with the career of which they are intensely proud.
Although I did not serve in the R.A.F. myself, I started my war career as a Territorial trying to defend Marham Aerodrome with a Lewis gun, which even in those days seemed rather inadequate, and I have a great respect for the R.A.F. and for their comradeship with everybody in the district and the keenness of their service.
There is one other point I should like to mention. In my district a very large number of civilians go to an Air Force hospital nearby—though not in my constituency—at Ely. That hospital has tremendous credit in the area for being one of the best run hospitals in the district, and we have heard disquieting

rumours that it may be closing its doors to civilian cases. I hope the Minister, either in winding up the debate or later on, may be able to assure me that this is not the case.
In conclusion, I believe there is a great future for the R.A.F., even if it is to be smaller than we have known it in the past. But in this great service there is at present a feeling of disquiet and this disquiet ought to be allayed as soon as possible, otherwise very valuable trained men will be lost to the Service. I sincerely hope the Minister will be able to apply himself to this over the next few months.

11.30 p.m.

Sir William Teeling: I want to know more about the intentions over Northern Ireland and not just the Ballykelly area. When I was at Bentley Priory, I remember that this was a lively area, with tremendous defence developments beneath. What will happen to it now? Can these be made tourist attractions, since they are of intense interest?
I went from there to Northern Ireland, to Aldergrove, a fighter station, and we were told that it was impossible to go anywhere else because the land was unsuitable. But I went around Castle Archdale, Eglington, and Limavady, telling the wretched owners to get out as we were taking over their places. Some misery was caused in one place where all the houses were pulled down, but this was a wartime necessity.
Much more money was spent and now there are 540 houses around Ballykelly. Many troops will be coming back from abroad; could they not be quartered here? Must this property remain with the Defence Ministry? Could not more ordinary people be attracted over there, thus avoiding a loss to the rates? These families would not have to live in the same area but could live in different parts of Northern Ireland. I wonder whether the Secretary of State and the R.A.F. are doing all they can to use these expensive houses fully for future possibilities, which need not be military.

11.32 p.m.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: If I may speak again, by leave of the House. As I said last year, I will try to cover all the points, though some, particularly at this


hour, may be better dealt with in correspondence. The hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Chichester-Clark) pressed his point about Ballykelly, and has brought a delegation to see us. A number of assurances were given, not lightly but in the light of the prevailing operational situation.
The change came with the White Paper of July last year and the proposed withdrawal from the Far East, which led to the present studies on which we shall base the White Paper in July this year. Arising out of last year's were several studies, one of which concerned the Shackleton aircraft, which was getting out of date, and the fact that the Nimrod, which is much more efficient, was coming in. The number of Nimrods which we have will do the job of a greater number of Shackletons.
Ministers have to weigh different considerations. I have been pressed recently, since the accident to the Shackletons, by many people concerned about the age of these aircraft. This must be taken into account, but the accident reports have not yet reached me.
I am merely pointing out that many people consider that the Shackleton is an old aircraft and will have to be withdrawn. It was in the light of those studies that we considered where the new aircraft should be deployed. It was decided—I fully support this decision, but hon. Members will appreciate that this was an operational decision—that instead of the three Coastal Command stations at Kin-loss, St. Mawgan and Ballykelly, there was a requirement for only two. That being so, the Government had to be advised on where the two stations should be. The decision was that they should be at Kinloss and St. Mawgan, and it is important to note that at St. Mawgan there is the Maritime Operations Training Unit.
To show the sort of considerations that arose, it was at that time that I was being severely pressed by the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Pardoe), who is not now in his place, to do something about the problem of aircraft noise in Newquay. The question which sprang to mind was, "We are getting lots of complaints about low flying aircraft at St. Mawgan. If we can shut down that station, I can write to the hon. Member

and say, 'Your troubles are over.' " However, I was advised that, for operational reasons, a station in the north of Scotland and one in the south-west, bearing in mind the anti-submarine rôle, should be kept open.
There is no question of our going back on that decision. I am not prepared, nor are my right hon. Friends, on operational grounds, to decide the siting of an operational station on the sort of social grounds that have been put forward tonight. There are R.A.F. stations where such a step might have been taken, but here it is absolutely impossible to do so. I am not unaware of the problems of Northern Ireland and, with my roots, I am well aware of the problems caused by unemployment. Although in Leeds, which I represent, there are no problems of the kind we are discussing, I am aware of what happens in the nearby coalmining areas when pits are closed. I therefore do not lack appreciation in this matter.
I asked the R.A.F. whether anything could be done at Ballykelly, bearing in mind the various forms of training, but the answer was plainly "No". It was at that point that the Minister who has responsibility across the board for the Services came into the picture. He looked at the matter from the point of view mainly of the Army rather than of the Navy, but I assure the House that it was looked at, and is being looked at, across the board. It does not look particularly hopeful—this is the fairest way of putting it—but we are considering whether there is an alternative use of Ballykelly by the other Services. I realise the difficulties, but I assure hon. Members who have pressed the case, that this problem was not taken lightly and that the decision was taken on operational grounds.

Mr. Chichester-Clark: my constituents complain because assurances were given long after June, 1966. They went on and on, and I wrote to the hon. Gentleman telling him that I was worried because he had said that after Ballykelly had been used for Shackletons, it could go on being used and be suitable for Maritime Comets. I pointed out that I was concerned about the number of Comets we would have and if that number would justify three stations being used.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: The decision stems from July, 1967. I assure the hon. Gentleman that while he refers to December and


January, the decision was actually taken on 22nd December, only a few months ago. I could have written to the hon. Gentleman and let the industrial staff on the station know three days before Christmas. I felt that it would be kinder to leave it a week or two before making the announcement generally, and while this might seem a little naive, I felt that to do otherwise would not be the kindest of Christmas presents.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Roebuck) asked about pensions policy. He raised a question about the Chief of the General Staff who was promoted the day before he retired. This matter was taken up by a number of newspapers. The Army is not my responsibility, but I have checked this point and find that the position is the same for all the Services. I thought I should clear it up because it is capable of misrepresentation. The situation at the moment is, as it has been since 1964—certainly before my time in office—that there is a Chief of Defence Staff and individual Chiefs of the three Services, the C.A S., C.N.S. and C.G.S. In the old days these three heads of the Services were five-star officers. Then the question came of having a Chief of the Defence Staff.
The decision taken had no political intent; it was before the time of this Government. I say this to get the date right. It was decided that there should be four-star officers for the three Services and only the C.D.S. should be a five-star officer to give him seniority. This meant that they lost rank. The decision taken was that they should be given their promotion a day or two before retirement. This, I gather, was done, not to save money, but simply so that there was a senior officer who was their boss, as it were. This was certainly not an attempt to give extra money to someone merely because he retired. We find odd things of this kind. In the Ministry of Defence there is a Permanent Under-Secretary for each of the Services, and a P.U.S. over them. Someone decided that the P.U.S. of each individual Service should have his salary cut by £10 so that it should be known that the P.U.S. of the whole Department was the boss.
My hon. Friend also mentioned the value of civil aid. I do not think that it would be possible to put this in monetary

form. We do not charge for the service given. It would be possible to work out the cost of aviation fuel used, but that would have no bearing on the real cost. We think it better to forget it and to do the job rather than trying to work out the cost.
I know of my hon. Friend's interest in Fighter Command. He lives near the station and many hon. Members have revealed that they served in the Command. It was my first posting. I shall be going to the various ceremonies marking the end of Fighter Command. It is not a tragedy that Fighter Command is finishing; it is a reorganisation. One of the great things about the R.A.F. is that it does not hang on to titles which no longer have meaning. Although I am sorry in the sense that my hon. Friend and others are sorry, this simply meets the facts of life. A fact of life is that there will be a Strike Command at High Wycombe, with No. 1 Group at Bawtry and No. 11 Group in place of Fighter Command, and the Maritime Group. Coastal Command is going. This makes sense because "Maritime" explains the job better than "Coastal". The last thing they ever were was coastal. I have always felt, as many who served in Coastal Command have felt, a high regard for the Command, but the name did not describe its function.
No decision has been taken about the future of Bentley Priory. Fighter Command will become 11 Group R.A.F. and will perform the fighter defence aspect of the work. A decision will be taken in the early 1970s. The position is that such places are first offered to the other Services. It must be offered to the R.A.F., obviously, and then to the other Services. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has across-the-board responsibilities. After that, it would be offered to other Departments and then to local authorities. There is a procedure. I will keep my hon. Friend informed.
The married quarters are are not occupied now solely by people at Fighter Command. The occupants come from R.A.F. Headquarters in London, and this position will continue. I have written to my hon. Friend on the question of school places. We are in close touch with local authorities throughout the country. There are sometimes difficulties


in this respect, but perhaps we can leave this issue. I have not had time tonight to check the facts. I will consider the unemployment question, but there is no immediate problem. It is three or four years off. It is best not to worry anybody by causing them to think that they might be immediately affected.
I take my hon. Friend's point about the desirability of commemorating Fighter Command's association with my hon. Friend's constituency. I feel confident that the R.A.F. will not forget this. A number of ceremonies are due to take place in a few weeks' time. I believe that my hon. Friend, as the constituency Member, is attending one of them.
In reply to the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis), I agree that one problem about studies is that people are left in the air. However, I am always conscious of the fact that there are similar problems facing people in industry. It is no satisfaction to R.A.F. personnel, but I know that people become very worried in the coal industry when they hear rumours about a pit closing. These things happen, not only in the Services, but right across the board.
I assure the hon. Gentleman, who is not with us now, that I set up an investigating committee into the Air Training Corps, not with the intention of abolishing the Corps, but because there had not been an investigation for eleven years and I thought that it would be a jolly good idea to have a look at it. On the question of redundancy, every airman knows what sort of redundancy pay he would get. The question outstanding is the various trades in which there will be redundancies. The announcement was made for last year. We will make our announcement for this year as soon as possible. Although this is only marginal, one or two people protest that they have not been made redundant. There are some financial advantages to being made redundant. I believe that the happens in civil life as well. However, I do not pretend that this is a significant factor.
We are aware of the importance of public relations and are doing all we can to get it round the Service.
My hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) always

puts the different viewpoint. At one point he talked about being the only one putting that view. He would be the last person in the House to want to be patronised by a relatively new Member. I hold a contrary view to his, but his view was one that I came across very early in my life. I come from the next village in South Wales to that of my hon. Friend. I assure my hon. Friend that I do not answer the points he made in any cavalier spirit.
My hon. Friend said that I had predicted that 1969 would be a vintage year for the R.A.F. My prediction was made on the basis, which my hon. Friend does not accept, that the R.A.F. is flying large numbers of out-of-date aeroplanes. My view is that I certainly will not be responsible for men in the Service flying dangerous and out-of-date aircraft. I know that it does not meet my hon. Friend's point, but that is what I meant by "a vintage year".
The great cuts will be in 1970–71. This is not the occasion to go into the argument about the increase in social expenditure. My service in the R.A.F. was very brief and was in wartime. I do not think I have ever known anybody in the Service, particularly amongst those who know something about nuclear weapons, who was not aware that there are very great dangers for civilisation. I have never found anybody really involved in the Services who glories in war. I do not think that my hon. Friend suggested that. If people are tied up in the Services, particularly on the nuclear side, they are not unaware of the holocaust that could be let loose. I believe that we are all working in our different ways to avoid that.
I am grateful for the praise of my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) for the people who deal with individual cases. It is true in the R.A.F., as it is in the other Services, that a great deal of attention is given to welfare, and I often feel that it is a great deal more than in industry of all kinds. Those who arrange the visits will also be grateful for his praise.
The career structure is very important. One thing that happened as a result of changes in the 1950s—I make no political point on this—is that we found ourselves in the R.A.F. with surplus N.C.Os., and a man becoming corporal with no chance


of promotion. It is most important to get this right, and most important in the context of a European-based Royal Air Force.
I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Norfolk, South-West (Mr. Hawkins), who mentioned the problem of morale. We are aware of this. I tried to make the point earlier that the loss of the F111 was important to the morale of the Service, but it is most important to get it over that it is not the only aeroplane in the R.A.F. There are changes taking place, and it is our job in the Services and on the Service Board to see that morale is considered.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: What was the point of the Minister's reference to a European context when he was speaking about the career structure? Why specially in a European context?

Mr. Merlyn Rees: This is a marginal point. 11 just feel that the R.A.F. will be smaller because it has a European rôle. That is all I had in mind; I did not mean that there were any factors that would affect the career structure other than size.
There was also mention of the hospital near Huntingdon which I visited the other day. I noticed that there were a fair number of civilians there. It is a fine hospital and the civilians appreciate being there. I know of nothing that would lead me to believe that it is shutting down. We are always very pleased to have civilians in if possible. Incidentally, I noticed that the maternity ward seemed to have a fair number of ladies from Swanton Morley R.A.F. station, but I draw no conclusions from that either.
I have tried to deal as well as I can with the points raised. I shall write to hon. Members about any that I have not answered.
I finish where I began. The R.A.F. is having its 50th anniversary. This is a year when there are problems for it. It is a modern Service, which does not look too far to the past. I am very sure that it will overcome its problems.

Question put and negatived.

Original Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That a number of Officers, Airmen and Airwomen, not exceeding 125,000, all ranks, be

maintained for Air Force Service, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1969.

WELSH GRAND COMMITTEE

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That for the remainder of the present Session the following paragraphs shall have effect:—

(1) There shall be a Standing Committee to be known as the Welsh Grand Committee to consider such specified matters relating exclusively to Wales and Monmouthshire as may be referred to them and to consist of all Members sitting for constituencies in Wales and Monmouthshire, together with not more than Five other Members to be nominated by the Committee of Selection, who shall have power from time to time to discharge the Members so nominated by them and to appoint others in substitution for those discharged.

(2) A Motion may be made by a Minister of the Crown at the commencement of Public Business, to be decided without amendment or debate, to the effect that a specified matter or matters relating exclusively to Wales and Monmouthshire be referred to the Welsh Grand Committee for their consideration.

(3) If such a Motion be agreed to, the Welsh Grand Committee shall consider the matter or matters to them referred on not more than Four days in the Session, and shall report only that they have considered the said matter or matters.—[Mrs. Eirene White.]

It being after Ten o'clock, and objection being taken to further Proceeding, the debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — POLICE (SEARCH WARRANT)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Ernest G. Perry.]

11.55 p.m.

Mr. Norman St. John-Stevas: In my rôle as champion of the oppressed of all classes, from immigrants to the aristocracy, I raise this important issue of civil liberty and the circumstances in which Lady Diana Cooper's house, No. 10, Warwick Avenue, was serched for drugs on Monday, 19th February. I am glad to see that the Under-Secretary of State has had the courtesy to come to listen to the arguments and I take it that he will reply.
I will briefly recite the facts of what occurred that day. At midnight, Lady Diana's maid, Mrs. Vials, was asleep in


her bedroom alone in the house when she was aroused by banging on the door and the ringing of the doorbell. The house was in darkness, save for one light left on to discourage burglars—a reasonable precaution when one recalls that 18 months ago, Lady Diana and a friend, en route to the opera, were bound and gagged by a gang who broke into the house.
Mrs. Vials went downstairs and prudently, in view of the experience of her mistress, opened the door on the chain only. She saw four young men standing on the doorstep, two uniformed and two in plain clothes. She said, "I cannot let you in. My Lady is not here." They replied that she was obliged to let them in, saying, "We have a warrant. We are policemen." Mrs. Vials was sceptical and said that she did not know whether the warrant was genuine or whether they were real policemen, adding, "You can get that gear in Carnaby Street". I understand that there is a practice in some police stations to lend uniforms to members of the public for private purposes, and I strongly suggest that that practice should be discontinued.
However, the police said, "If you do not open up, we will break the door down." Discretion overtook valour and Mrs. Vials let them in. The policemen then went straight to Lady Diana's bedroom and asked, "Could we see the hat box?" I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will be able to throw some light on the question of the hat box. On the previous Saturday, Lady Diana had returned from Rome carrying a hat box, which she carried through the Customs. It was a hat box of distinctive character because it was covered in paper made out to look like leopard skin. A question which arises here in my mind is whether there was some suspicion perhaps at the Customs which was later translated into information to the police. The police then searched Lady Diana's bedroom thoroughly, but reasonably, and caused no damage, and there is no complaint on that score. Having expressed surprise at the length of the dressers in her bedroom, they then left. They were in the house 45 minutes.
Lady Diana returned from Brighton the following day and was naturally indignant, in fact outraged, at this invasion of her house. Later she received

an apology from the police. This incident raises grave issues about the liberty of the subject. They are of concern not only to Lady Diana Cooper but to every citizen of the United Kingdom. A brilliant and attractive woman like Lady Diana Cooper—the greatest beauty of her generation, and the bearer of a name which will always be honoured as long as there is an English nation—will never lack for champions. Even in this dreary epoch, where the contemporary idol is the computer, chivalry is not quite dead.
What of others, less generously endowed with the graces of hereditary gifts and social rank? Their remedies are not so obvious. As Lady Diana, with typical modesty and magnanimity, remarked:
If they have me stamped as a drug maniac it doesn't matter at my time of life. It would be so awful if it happened to people, unlike myself, who were not in a position to make a fuss.
It does happen to other people. The National Council for Civil Liberties has been in communication with me and informs me that there are frequent complaints of unjustified drug raids. I have had a communication from the Freedom Press, complaining about a raid on its premises on 27th February, a few days ago.
Because of the necessity to protect the liberty of the individual, both common law and statute law have hedged about with restrictions the right to search a house. The common law allows only one instance of a search. Statute law has added others, but has always been careful to add safeguards. This case concerns drugs. I appreciate fully that in this, as in any other branch of the law, the police have a difficult task to discharge. If they are to discharge their duties, they must act swiftly.
But the Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1964, while recognising this, goes out of its way to provide safeguards for the liberty of the subject. It requires that before a search of private premises be carried out a search warrant should be issued. That warrant can only be issued by a magistrate, and the magistrate must be satisfied, upon written information, substantiated on oath, that there is reasonable ground to believe that drugs are present on the premises. Unless those conditions are fulfilled, he is not to issue a warrant.
Were these conditions fulfilled in this case? The police, as we know, acted on an anonymous telephone call. It seems clear that no attempt was made to check it. Surely this is an intolerable practice. Anyone's house, their most private papers, their personal possessions, their personal privacy, is thus made liable to disturbance at the behest of an anonymous and possibly malicious troublemaker. If this is allowed to go unchallenged, then an Englishman's home, far from being his castle, is reduced to the status of a wigwam.
What we require from the Home Office, and the Minister, is an authoritative statement of the practice of the police, what it is meant to be and why it was not observed in this case. I must ask the Home Secretary now to issue instructions to the police that in future an application in such circumstances for a search warrant will not be made until further inquiries have been made, such as the observation of the house, observation of the occupants, etc. All these should be carried out before action is taken on an anonymous tip-off.
There is a second disturbing part of the case. Parliament has interposed a magistrate between the police and the public as a protection. As The Times has pointed out, this necessary safeguard is nullified if magistrates do not inform themselves fully of the grounds on which the police are seeking to act or if, having informed themselves, they are not prepared to exercise their discretion about what constitutes reasonable suspicion.
If a magistrate's intervention is to be other than a mere formality, surely the police are under a duty to inform the magistrate or magistrates of the grounds on which they apply for the search warrant. If they do not do this, how can any inquiry be made into the justification for the issue of such a warrant? How can there be any judicial exercise of discretion? Surely, Parliament has imagined that magistrates would make inquiry into the grounds on which a warrant was being sought before issuing it.
In the present case, there has been a double failure. It was never revealed, as far as I understand, by the police that the tip-off was an anonymous tip-off and the magistrate never made inquiry into the circumstances in which he was

required to issue the warrant. The least we can do is to ask that the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor remedy this shocking state of affairs and end the practice by which police approach for search warrants only those magistrates known to be accommodating or lax in this regard.
If liberty is to survive in Britain, if we are to avoid the horrors of a police State, liberty must be zealously defended. The distress and anxiety caused to Lady Diana Cooper are deeply to be regretted, but they will have served some purpose if they lead to a more scrupulous practice in the police and others with regard to search warrants.
The Home Secretary rightly supports the police in their difficult task of maintaining law and order, but he would be failing in his duty and he would rapidly lose the confidence of the people if he did not also exert himself to protect what is equally important: the rights and the liberties of the subject. Of those rights and liberties, the inviolability of the home is not the least to be cherished.

12.8 a.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Dick Taverne): We are debating an individual case of great importance, as the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Mr. St. John-Stevas), in a very fair speech, has properly pointed out. It started with a hat box but it is a case which concerns the liberty of the subject.
As the hon. Member has said, the case attracted special attention because the lady concerned has always been a lady highly esteemed and widely respected and was recently concerned in an incident in which she acted most courageously when attacked by burglars. The House would not, however, want to treat this incident in isolation or, indeed, on the basis of the status, standing or admirable qualities of the individual concerned.
We are concerned with the general safeguards provided for all citizens whatever their status or social background. I propose, therefore, to deal briefly with the incident and then to discuss the general implications to which the hon. Member has referred and also to mention the action which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary intends to take as a


result of what has emerged from this case.
The facts are not in dispute. The hon. Member has referred to them, but perhaps I may set them out from the police side. At a quarter to eleven on Monday, 19th February, a call was received in the Information Room at New Scotland Yard from a person who refused to give particulars of himself. It was an anonymous informant. He said that Lady Diana Cooper, and he gave the address, had just returned from Paris and that a large amount of heroin was in a hat box under the bed at her address. It was not information coming from the Customs. It was not suspicion aroused by the way the hat or the hat box had been got up. The information was passed to the local division to be dealt with. At 11·15 p.m., the station sergeant applied to a magistrate who issued a search warrant.

Viscount Lambton: Will the Under-Secretary say whether it is the custom of the police to act on any anonymous call if no details whatever are given of the person making the call?

Mr. Taverne: As I have already explained, I intend first to deal with the incident and then with the general practice and implications.

Viscount Lambton: This is a simple point which can be answered at once.

Mr. Taverne: I will answer it in the proper place.
At midnight, the sergeant, in uniform, went with three other officers to the address. They asked to speak to Lady Diana Cooper and were told by her housekeeper that she was not at home. It was explained that they had a search warrant and they were admitted to the house. They searched a wardrobe in a bedroom, made an examination of the room generally, and in particular paid attention to this hat box.
In the morning of 20th February, the station sergeant reported the facts of the search to his superintendent. The following morning, the superintendent called by appointment on Lady Cooper. He explained the circumstances which had led to the search and asked for Lady Cooper's assistance in tracing the identity of the anonymous caller. On 23rd

February, the Deputy Commissioner called upon Lady Cooper personally and offered apologies for the incident.
The first thing to say about this incident is that a serious mistake was made by the police in acting upon an anonymous telephone call in the way they did. When the facts came before senior officers, the mistake was immediately admitted and an apology offered without delay. At no time has it been claimed by the police that the action taken by the sergeant was justified. Later I will say what is normally done in this kind of case. The officer who took the decision on the spot in the middle of the night had a difficult decision to take, but I would emphasise that there is no question but that he committed a serious error of judgment, and the hon. Member was right to draw attention to an invasion of privacy which should never have occurred. I want now to analyse what went wrong.

Viscount Lambton: Before he goes on, can the Under-Secretary make it quite clear that there has been no other investigation of private individuals as a result of anonymous information?

Mr. Taverne: I wish he would be patient. I will analyse what went wrong and then say what is the general practice, and deal with the question of whether it is right for the police to deal with anonymous telephone calls. I have said it was wrong for them to act, in the way they did.
It is right to remind the House of the importance of the drugs problem and of the importance of dealing with illegal trafficking, particularly when there is an allegation about heroin. The police know that drugs have been introduced into legitimate consignments of goods and luggage and recovered when the container has been landed. They also know that supplies move rapidly and that bulk is soon broken down and distributed. It is therefore desirable to act quickly when information is received, so it must first be said in defence of the police that they have always to balance the need for quick action against the need to check the reliability of information. This is often a difficult matter of judgment and, although general guidance can help, about which I will say more later, no hard-and-fast rules can be laid down, as each case presents individual problems and there is no


substitute for the wisdom and experience of the individual officer.
When one comes to information from an anonymous source, one has a particular difficulty. Recently, there has been an increasing amount of information about drugs coming from members of the public. Much of it has turned out to be true; some has no foundation and seems to be motivated by spite, malice or mental unbalance on the part of the informer. Obviously the police cannot ignore anonymous information, and it would be much preferable if information always came from impeccable and respectable sources, but that is not always so.
Anonymous information must clearly be treated with especial care, and the sort of steps that can be taken to check information will depend on the circumstances, but they can include observation of the premises to assess the likelihood of the allegation and the need for speedy action, searches in various indices at Scotland Yard—and it is fair to say of the police officer concerned that he made a search, but it is not altogether surprising that nothing was found in this case—and contact with local informants to see whether additional information is available or whether such information as has been received can be verified.
In this case, there was no attempt to find corroborative evidence. The officer concerned, felt, wrongly, that the overriding need was to act quickly, and he should not have acted in the way that he did. He should have checked his information in the ways that I have indicated. If he had, the incident would never have occurred.

Viscount Lambton: I must interrupt the hon. and learned Gentleman, because this is one of the silliest speeches that I have ever heard. If the officer concerned received the information at 11 o'clock at night, how could he check and watch the premises until 12 o'clock before making a demand for an inquiry?

Mr. Taverne: The hon. Gentleman is not helping the debate. His hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford made a fair speech and raised a number of valid points, but the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lamb-ton) raises matters which are not relevant. I have made it clear that the officer was wrong to act without corroboration. The hon. Gentleman

is pointing to the fact that the officer did not do what could have been done. He might well have waited and should have waited until morning to see whether he could check on the premises, if by then he had not discovered who Lady Diana Cooper was. The officer acted on his own. He made some effort to get guidance, but could not because his senior officers were engaged on a major inquiry. As a result, he went to a magistrate and applied for a search warrant.
As the hon. Member for Chelmsford his pointed out, the ultimate authority for the issue of a warrant rests with the magistrate, but he has to rely on the information and, to an extent, on the judgment of the officer applying for the warrant. Certainly the Commissioner of Police regards it as a police responsibility not to apply for a warrant without first taking all reasonable steps to check the reliability of the information on which the application is based. The Commissioner regrets that insufficient steps were taken in this case to check the reliability of the information on the basis of which the warrant was applied for, and that the magistrate was asked to issue a warrant.
In another place, a discussion took place on the action of the magistrate in granting the warrant. Inquiries have been made about the practice of magistrates, and it has been pointed out that, from the magistrate's point of view, what he does when he grants a warrant on a police statement is merely what he is expected to do in many other cases in which applications are made ex parte. He is relying on sworn evidence from a source which he has no reason to suspect. But the mistake in this case was that the application by the police officer gave no indication that the source which he said he believed to be reliable was an anonymous one.

Viscount Lambton: rose—

Mr. Taverne: No, I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: rose—

Mr. Taverne: Certainly I will give way to the hon. Member for Chelmsford.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: Surely there must be some duty on a magistrate to make


a judiciary inquiry and to assess the evidence in some way. If that is not the practice of magistrates, the inclusion by Parliament of the intervention of a magistrate is a pure formality and of no effect.

Mr. Taverne: The magistrate has to satisfy himself that the person making the application is a person whose word can be believed. If he has no reason to believe the person making the application, he should not grant a warrant. In many cases, with the many inquiries which come, particularly to Bow Street—this is not a matter for the Home Office, but we have information about this from the magistrates—the magistrates look at what is stated on the form, they look at the person before them, and, as with other ex parte applications, if they have no reason to disbelieve what is stated there, and it gives grounds for action, they grant a warrant.
In this case the police officer made a mistake. He considered that he had reason to believe that there was reliable information, when there was none. In this situation, quite clearly some action is called for. I have made inquiries into other cases in which it has been alleged the police have acted on anonymous tips. As far as I have been able to discover, on those occasions the police have made further inquiries, and have obtained corroborative evidence before they have applied for a warrant.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary intends to draw the attention of chief officers of police to this incident, because, as the hon. Member for Chelmsford has rightly said, it illustrates the need for police officers to take all reasonable steps to check information before they take the serious further step of applying for a search warrant. It also points to

the need—and my right hon. Friend intends to draw this to their attention—to consult a senior officer in case of doubt or difficulty, because in this case the action was taken by a station sergeant. It is very important to reassure magistrates that what is said by police officers can be relied on.

Viscount Lambton: How can one check anonymous information?

Mr. Taverne: If the hon. Gentleman had not been so obstructive, unlike his hon. Friend, he would have heard me say that there are many ways in which one checks this information from other sources. Watch can be kept on premises to see whether a large number of people are going in and coming out who may be known to be drug takers. Some of them are known to the police. Again, searches are made at Scotland Yard to see whether the person against whom the allegation is made has a record of this kind of offence. The police also have to rely on their own information. There are some local informants on whom they can rely, and if the information is confirmed from a number of different sources, there is some sort of corroborative evidence. What they should not do is to act, as happened in this case, simply on an anonymous telephone call without seeking to check it from any other source.
It is therefore important that this incident should be drawn to the attention of chief officers, and that the practice in all cases should be to check anonymous information. If this is done, the magistrates can be reassured in relying on the word of police officers, as they should normally be entitled to do.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-four minutes past Twelve o'clock.